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CHAPTER I 
THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY AND ITS PRINCIPLES 
Periodically, when evil conditions reach a climax, a rumble of dis-
content is heard from the heart of the masses. Sometimes this rumble 
becomes an avalanche and sweeps all before it as during the French Revolu-
tion; again, the rumble moves along evenly and forces the evil conditions 
to right themselves. Whichever is the case, the periodic stirrings of 
the people inevitably result in change, and ttlis change, rightly or 
wrongly, is referred to as progress and the people who advocate it as 
progressives. 
The term "progressive" means different things at different times. 
According to tne dictionary, it is something or someone "aiming at or 
encouraging advancement toward maturity or completion, or toward a better 
state." 1 That general definition is well suited for our purposes. Any-
thing more specific is dated for thdse things for w'nich tne "Progressives" 
stood in 1912 would now be considered conservative. As this chapter 
develops, the aims and purposes of the Progressive party will be set 
down. It is with these in mind that we use the term "progressive" as 
relating to 1912. 
The progressive movement did not begin in 1912 nor did it end with 
the defeat of the Progressive party in that year. Within the last few 
years, Henry A. Wallace, speaking of the liberal wing of the Democratic 
1 The Funk and Wagnalls College Standard Dictionary, Funk and Wagnalls 
Company, New York, 1930, 469 1 
2 
party whose acknowledged leader he was and of his defeat for renomination 
as vice-president of the U:dted States, said rtthe liberal cause has not 
been defeated and will not be. It is merely in the process of being 
reborn. T'ne cause cannot die no matter what may happen temporarily to 
certain individuals·" 2 Irrespective of party affiliations, that is an 
excellent expression of the significance of progressivism. The movement 
is the embodiment of the fundamental measures an~ principles of reform 
that have been advocated for many years by all political parties. 
For many years, America operated, as did the rest of the world, 
on the principle of 11 laissez-faire11 • Everyone, including the mass of the 
people, felt thet the less interference that there was by the government 
the better off the country would be. For America, this attitude was a 
reflection·of tne fact that this country still possessed a frontier. There 
governments were simple because conditions were simple and people were 
unable to comprehend the need for a more complex government anywhere. 
The Civil War marked a change in that attitude. 3 
The Civil War diminished agrarian influence in Congress by the 
defeat of the South. At the same time, the country• s frontier rapidly 
disappeared and railroads and industrial corporations grew to tremendous 
size. These factors gave impetus to the progressive movement. There 
was no longer an escape valve in the west when conditions became too bad 
2 Article in The Chicago Daily News, July 29, 1944, 3. 
3 Benjamin p.-n9 Witt, The-FTOgressive Movement, The Macmillan Company, 
New York, 1915, and Kenneth w. Heckler, Insurgency, Personalities and 
Politics of the Taft Era, Columbia University Press, New York, 194V. 
The account or-t~ackground is taken largely from De Witt, Chapter I 
and Hechler, Chapter II. 
3 
in the east. And the growing business interests saw in the Republican 
party an opportunity to use the government for their benefit. They gained 
control of the politicians and bent them to their will. They received 
huge land grants and franchises from the government in great number. And 
they-made substantial inroads on the natural resources of the nation that 
should have been the heritage of all. At the same time, they kept the 
government from interfering in their activities. 
And while the corporations were becoming rich, the masses of the 
people were facing new social and economic problems. Cities were increas-
ing in size and number. The individual worker could no longer compete 
with the factories. Men became economic chattels forced to live in con-
gested cities and to work in unhealthy factories. Hours were long and pay 
was low. At first, the people did not tum to their government for relief. 
They still believed that government interference was bad and that the 
government was not to be concerned with their problems. They formed 
unions to fight capital. But the fight was too unequal. The government 
fought on the side of capital. 
The idea that relief from oppression by the business interests could 
be obtained through government intervention gained ground slowly. One of. 
the groups which promoted the idea was the "Muckrakersn with their social 
literature. And when the people were converted to this idea, they found 
that they could no longer force their government to their will. They came 
to the government which they had made, intending to use it to curb the 
abuses of capital, and they found that it was already in use by that self-
4 
same capital. Then the people tried to correct the abuses within the 
government itself. In response to popular clamor, civil service was intro-
duced. In an attempt to keep corrupt influences from government, laws 
for direct primaries were enacted, lobbies were regulated, corrupt prac-. 
tices acts were passed, and the initiative, referend~ and recall were 
introduced. Then, the government, being more responsive to the demands 
of the people, passed laws regulating the railroads and the corporations, 
and providing for social legislation. 
This is an over-all picture of the progressive movement. The Pro-
gressive party was but a part of this. It was only one of the many waves 
of insurgency that swept across the country after the Civil War. Two of 
the previous outbreaks had found expression in the Greenback and the 
Populist parties. 4 These were eventually incorporated into the progressiv 
element of the Democratic party. 5 It is natural that the Democrats 
should have·attracted the reformers first because, as the par~out of 
power, they found much to criticise and change in the administrations. 
The Greenback party appeared on the scene in 1876 with a platform 
that advocated the unlimited use of paper money "based on the faith and 
resources of the nation", and the withdrawal of all bank currency. They 
held a national convention that year and placed Peter Cooper in the field 
as presidential candidate. The par~lost its separate identity after the 
election but the dissatisfied elements that combined to make it later 
4 Ray Stannard Baker, 11 The Meaning of Insurgency", The American M"agazine, 
LXXII, no. 1, 60 (May, 1911). 
5 De Witt, 28. 
5 
found their way into the other movements coming into being at that time. 6 
It was the Populist party that caug!lt up most of the loose ends of 
progressive sentiment in 1891. The party was the result of the union of 
several organizations which had come into existence as a result of unrest 
among the people. It included the Grange, the Fanners' Alliance, the 
Knignts of Labor and various other fann and labor organizations. In 1892, 
the party nominated James B. Weaver i'or the presidency. The platform that 
they adopted was very forward-looking anci included the direct election of 
Senators, government control of public utilities, and postal savings 
banks. The party also advocated certain financial reforms peculiar to it, 
including the free coinage of silver, increased issue of paper money, 
and the direct distribution of this money to the people without the inter-
vention of the national banks. The party made a strong showing in the 
election. In 1896, the Democratic nominee for president, William Jennings 
Bryan, received t~e support of the Populists. 7 
In 1896, the progressive wing of the Democratic party gained control 
and nominated Bryan for the presidency. He gathered under his bannar 
many discordant elements. Al thougn his platform is remembered chiefly 
for its free silver plank, there were other measures advocated that were 
of greater importance in the long run. These included the control of cor-
porations, income tax, and direct legislation. It is the first instance of 
such liberalism in a platfon:n of one of the major parties. But Bryan's 
6 The World Book Encyclopedia, 6th ed., VII, "The Greenback Party", 
Chicago, 191J; 2956=2957. 
7 Ibid., XIII, 11 The Populist party11 , 5740. 
6 
defeat was a serious blow to progressivism in the Democratic party, for, 
with the rejection of bimetallism, the rest of the platform was discredited 
also. 8 Bryan continued his control for a time, but by 1904 the Democrats 
had lost their peculiarly progressive nature. 9 
Despite the fact that the Democrats attr~cted the reformers in 
greatest number, the Republicans were not without their farseeing men. 
The Civil War was still a vivid memory when the Liberal Republicans dis-
rupted the party in 1872. Still later, the "Mugwumps" revolted against 
James G. Blaine. 10 The former movement was the more significant since 
it actually resulted ~ the formation of a third party. 'rnis was formed 
essentially in protest of the administration's severe policy toward the 
South but it did number among its members such a staunch supporter of 
honest government as Carl Schurz. 
Thus it can be seen that the progressives of both parties struggled 
against corruption within their parties and fought to promote progressive 
legislation. The Progressive party was one aspect of t11e movement. It 
enlisted all types of people--social reformers, champions of the rights 
of labor, and scions of the business world advocating a greater sense of 
responsibility to the public--and spread throughout the country. Its 
battleground was largely the city hall and the state Capitol in the begin-
ning but it eventually reached also into the halls of congress. 11 
8 De Witt, 33-34. 
9 Ray Stannard Baker, 11Is 
of the Insurgent west", 
(February, 1910). 
10 Hechler, 11. 
11 Ibid. , 24. 
• 
the Republican Party Breaking up? The Story 
The American Magazine, LXIX, no. 4, 438 
7 
As early as 1897, Mayor Samuel M. Jones of Toledo, Ohio was advocating 
equal opportunit! for all and attempting to provide just that by abolishing 
the private-contract system of doing city work and by supporting the public 
\. 
ownership of public utilities. At about the same time, Hazen S. Pingree, 
governo~ of Mlchigan, was attempting to introduce the direct prim~ and 
more effective railroad taxation in his state. In.l904, WilliamS. u•Ren 
finally obtained a primary law in Oregon that included the famed "Oregon 
Plan. 11 
The progressive members of Congress were called "Insurgentsn. Tnis 
word was little used before the election of 1908 and did not come into 
common parlance until after Taft was inaugurated in March of 1909 according 
to the Insurgents themselves. The word was carried over from international 
law where it is used to describe the. state of armed rebellion preceding 
recognized belligerency. 13 And it 1rell expressed the position of the 
progressives, particularly in the Republican party, from 1909 to 1912. 
The fight in the Senate became pronounced--though not successful--in the 
fight over the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Bill in 1909. 14 In the House of 
Representatives, the ouster of 11 Uncle Joe 11 Cannon as Speaker in March of 
1910 was the work of tne Republican Insurgents in league with the Demo-
'_\ crats. 1.5 From that time, the fight went on in Congress between the 
Insurgents and the •Stand-pattersn or Conservatives. 
12 Fred E. Haynes, Tnird Party Movements Since the Civil war with Special 
Reference to Iowa, The State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa-city, 
Iowa, 1916;-4IQ:417. 
13 Hechler, 12, citing The Three Friends, 166 u. s. 1. 
14 William Francis Raney, Wisconsin, a Story of Progress, prentice-Hall 
Inc., New York, 1940, 304. - --
1.5 Hechler, 420-421. 
8 
By the end of 1910, the principles of progressivism had become a 
cause. The term progressive began to be spelled with a capital 11 P11 • 
These men then began to think of banding together in some sort of formal 
organization to promote progressive legislation in the various states as 
well as in the nation. When Taft became "persona non grata" with the 
progressive Republicans, the need for such an organization became more 
pronounced. Finally, after nearly a year of discussion, Robert La Follette, 
Senator from Wisconsin, drafted a Declaration of Principles during the 
holiday recess of 1910. After some changes, suggested by Senators Bourne 
and Bristow, the declaration was mailed to those members of the two houses 
of Congress who were progressives and also to the leading progressives 
in the various states. When the next session of Congress met, the organi-
zation that had been so long discussed was founded. 16 
On January 21, 1911, the progressive Republicans gathered at Robert 
La Follette• s Washington home and established the orga.'1ization known as 
the National Progressive Republican League. 17 Its purpose was to work 
for simplification of the agencies of government and 11 the purification of 
its working so it will reflect and be responsible to the popular will." 18 
The first officers were Bourne, president; Frederic c. Howe, secretary; 
and Charles R. Crane, treasurer. 19 
The Progressives felt that the evils of government were due to the 
16 Robert M. La Follette, La Follette's Autobiography, The Robert M. La 
Follette Company, Madison, Wiscons~n, 1913, 495. 
17. 
18 
Ibid., 495-496. 
~rs of Edward P. Costigan relating to the Progressive Movement in 
Colorado, 1902-19!7, Colin B. Goodykoorrtz, Ed., un~vers~ty of Colorado, 
1941, Letter of J. Bourne to E. p. Costigan, Feb. 14, 1911, 154. Sub-
se uently ref rred to as Cost~ Papers. 
a 11 tt 
9 
complexity of political agencies, wnich caused government to fall under 
the control of special interests. As remedies, they presented their 
Declaration of Principles. This included direct primaries, direct elec-
tion of United states Senators, amend~ents to state constitutions pro-
viding for the initiative, referendum, and recall, a thorough-going 
-
corrupt practices act, and direct election of delegates to national con-
ventions with an opportunity for the voter to express a choice as to 
candidates. 20 With these reforms achieved, it was the hope of the Progres 
sives that 11 the people themselves will be able to purge our politics of 
the ascendancy of special privilege and bring about such other economic 
and social reforms as they desire. n 21 
It was tne plan of the Progressives to run cm1didates against the 
conservatives where ever possible. They were not going to leave the 
Republican party, however. As can be seen, the platform they advocated 
stressed political rather than social reform. In this tney differed from 
the Socialists. They did, however, sponsor some economic measures. They 
favored a lowered tariff, tax reform including an income tax, reform of 
the currency, a postal savings bank, parcel post, conservation, regulation 
of public utilities, and pure food and drug and public health laws. 22 
After the foundation of the Progressive League, pressure was brought 
to bear by progressives throughout the nation on the members to put 
for«ard a candidate for the presidency. On the thirtieth of April, 1911, 
20 Ibid., 495. 
21 Letter of Bourne to Cost~, Costigan Papers, 154. 
22 Ray Stannard Baker, 11 The Meani.'lg of Insurgency", The American :Magazine, 
LXXII, no. 1, 62 (May, 1911) 
10 
the progressives met in Senator Bourne's committee room to decide upon 
a sui table man. 23 The topic was discussed and Robert M. La Follette 
was decided upon. When he was assured that no other candidate would be 
put forth and that he would have sufficient financial support, he accepted 
the nomination. 24 
In July, La Follette's campaign got actively under way. Progressive 
headquarters were opened in Washington, clubs were organized in a number 
of the states, thousands of circular letters were sent out, and the 
services of a corps of speakers obtained. Men like Gifford Pinchot, Louis 
Brandeis, Willia.11 Allen White, and Francis J. Heney supported the cause. 25 
In October, a meeting was held in Chicago attended by approximately 
three hundred Progressives and arranged by Walter L. Houser, La Follette's 
campaign manager. This meeting endorsed La Follette. 26 Many newspapers, 
especially in the Middle West, and the majority of the magazines of the 
nation came to the support of the progressive cause and its candidate. 27 
Enthusiasm for the movement became marked. 
Before continuing the historf of the development of the Progressive 
party, it might be well to look at its official position up to this time. 
On September 9, 1911, the progressive Republican Conference was held at 
Montrose, Colorado. There it was stated that the Progressives in Colorado 
were "undertaking to restore genuine representative government.'' The 
23 La Follette, 516. 
24 Ibid., 519. 
25 Outiook, "The Insurgent League 11 , vol. 97, 245 (editorial on February 
4, 1911). 
26 La Follette, 532, also Costigan Papers, 175. 
27 .Ray Stannard Baker, "Is the Republican Party Brealdng Up? The Story 
of the Insurgent West", The American Magazine, LXIX, no. 4, 435 
Februa 1910 • - ---- ----
~ 
---------------------------------------------------------------------. 
11 
methods to be used should be the establishment of honest elections through 
a thorough corrupt practices act, a sane and effective civil service law, 
the recall of unworthy public officials, the Australian ballot and a 
primary election law. In regard to economic reform, the Colorado Pro-
gressives insisted on regulation and control of all public service cor-
porations and their elimination from political activity through the proper 
application of a public utilities law with strong anti-pass and anti-
preference provisions. The movement sought more equal distribution of 
wealth through the enlargement of the bonds of human rights and oppor-
tunities. It favored compensatory damage for victims of industrial acci-
dents, an eight-hour day for women, and control and curb of monopoly, an 
equalized tariff, and the fair division of the burdens and expenses of 
government. A summary of the Progressive stand was given in the words: 
"It (the party) particularly contends that the conservation of men, women, 
and children--their lives, their liberties, and their opportunities--is 
the predominant conse~ation policy in the world." 28 
When the Progressives met in Chicago, they presented their stand to 
the nation in the Chicago Platform wnich they adopted on October 16, 1911. 
In this, they restated their foremost idea. T'ne platform said: "The 
progressive movement is a struggle to wrest the control of government in 
the nation and states from the representatives of special privilege and 
restore it to the control of the people." 29 The platform also supported 
28 Costigan Papers, doc. 25, (Montrose Address of E. P. Costigan) 165-166. 
29 Ibid., 11 The Chicago Platform of Progressives", doc. 30, 175, citing 
The ~hicago Record Herald, October 17, 1911. 
12 
the regulation of trusts but was very careful to bring out the fact that 
the party favored "constructive legislation, not destructive litigation." 30 
Finally, it favored the use of the initiative and referendum and the 
direct election of representatives to national and state conventions.31 
Returning now to the history of the Progressive party, we find that 
in the late autumn and winter of 1911 La Follette made an extended speak-
ing tour of Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois and was greeted with great en-
thusiasm. 32 But already there was a turning from him to the man who had 
long been considered the focal point of progressivism in the Republican 
party, Theodore Roosevelt. By the middle of January, 1911, men like the 
Pinchots, Medill McCormick, and William Flinn, who had given substantial 
monetary aid to La Follette, were giving their endorsements and their cash 
to the Roosevelt 11 boom". 33 The opportunity for publicly disavowing 
La Follette came after he gave a long a partially incoherent speech at a 
banquet in Philadelphia on February 2. It was obvious that the Senator 
was suffering from over-work. Shortly after this, Pincnot and the other 
previously mentioned leading contributors to the Progressive treasury 
announced that La Follettess physical condition made it impossibl~ for him 
to continue as a candidate. The way was now open for Roosevelt. 34 
It is not our purpose to go into the justice of the treatment of 
La Follette by the mean who had at first supported him nor of the position 
30 Ibid., 176, citation as above. 
31 GeOrge Henry Payne, The Birth of the New Party or Progressive Democracy, 
J. L. Nichols and Company, Napervffie-;Illinois7""1~11, 101. 
32 De Witt, 76. 
33 Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, a Biography, Harcourt, Brace and 
Company, New York, 1931, 554, citing Clapp Committee, vol. II, 541; 
1184-1185. 
De itt 
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of Roosevelt in this matter. It is sufficieltt to know that the change in 
allegiance came by January of 1912 before La Follette• s collapse. 35 
Toward the middle of the month, Roosevelt turned his attention to a means 
of getting into the fray in such a way that his entrance would seem to 
be in answer to public demand. 36 He decided on the eighteenth of January 
and the method was to bea letter from some of the governors of the more 
progressive states in the nation. 37 Meanwhile, headquarters to support 
the Roosevelt campaign for the Republican nomination had been set up in 
Chicago by Alexander H. Revell on January 31. Revell visited Oyster Bay, 
Roosevelt•s home, and then called a meeting of the governors saying that 
he was sure that Roosevelt would respond to an invitation to carry the 
Progressive banner in the Republican National Convention. 38 This invi-
tation was to be the public demand needed by Roosevelt. 
Seven governors attended the Revell meeting--Stubbs of Kansas, 
Osborne of Michigan, Aldrich of Nebraska, Hadley of Missouri, Bass of New 
Hampshire, Glasscock of West Virginia, and carey of Wyoming. On February 
10, they sent a message to Roosevelt asking him to lead the Progressive : 
movement. 39 On February 13, Roosevelt announced that he was considering 
the call of the governors and on the twenty-fourth, he accepted their invi-
tation to lead the movement. 40 
35 Letter of (J. s. Temple) to Gifford Pinchot, January 3, 1912 and Reply, 
Janu~ 12, 1912, Costigan Papers, 181-182. 
36 Pringle, 555. 
37 Harold Howland, Theodore Roosevelt and His Times (volume 47 of The 
Chronicles of America Series, Al1en~n~), Yale Univers1ty Press, 
New ffaven, conn. 1921, 209. 
38 Victo.r Rosewater, B<lkstage in 1912, The Inside Story of the Split 
Republican Convent1on, Dorrance and Company, Inc., PhiTaaaiph1a, 1932, 
41, citing Philadelphia North American, February 1, 1912. 
Payne, 52. 
osewat r 
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It was Roosevelt's original intention to battle only for the Republican 
nomination for the presidency against Taft in the National Convention. 
There seems· to have been no thought of a third party early in 1912. 41 
From Februar,r until the convention met in June, Roosevelt and Taft hurled 
hard words at each other and the campaign was every bit as bitter as any 
that took place between the candidates of different political parties. 
rt became obvious, however, that Roosevelt was fighting a losing battle 
because many states were choosing two rival sets of delegates and Taft•s 
followers controlled the seating of these disputed delegations. 42 Thus, 
by the end of May, Roosevelt's utterances were threatening the creation of 
a third party if his candidacy were rejected. 43 
The Republican National Convention met in Chicago from June 18 to 
June 22, 1912. Most of its attention was given to the question of seating 
delegates. 44 Roosevelt, himself, was in Chicago to lead the fight for 
his candidacy but to no avail. On the night of June 19, it became obvious 
that the Roosevelt delegates were not to be seated. At two o'clock the 
following morning, before a crowd of shouting, sweating men in the Floren-
tine Room of the Congress Hotel, Roosevelt made the announcement that was 
to split the Republican party and result in the election of Woodrow Wilson. 
He announced that, if the convention would not accept his delegates, he 
would not allow his name to be put in nomination and, thus, a new party 
41 Pringle, 556-557. 
42 Ibid. , 563. 
43 I'6Id.' 562. 
44 Wfiiiam Jennings Bryan, A Tale of Two Conventions, Funk and Wagnalls 
and Company, New York, 1'9'1.2,""!-'89".-
15 
was born. 45 As soon a.s Taft was nominated, with most of the Roosevelt 
delegates refusing to vote, his followers left the convention. 46 On 
that same night, Jillle 22, a meeting was held in Orchestra Hall at which the 
delegates pledged their support to Roosevelt. 47 He, in an address to the 
group, urged them to return to their homes and encourage progressive senti-
ment and then come together in August for a convention of their own.48 
The Progressive party conventionmet in Chicago on Monday, August 5, 
1912. Albert J. Beveridge, former Senator from Indiana, was made temporary 
chairman and gave the keynote speech. He was later made permanent chair-
men. On August 6, Roosevelt gave a speech known as his "Confession of 
Faith". The following day, the permanent organization was effected, 
committeest reports were adopted, and the platform accepted without opposi-
tion. Theodore Roosevelt was nominated for the presidency and Hiram 
Johnson of california for the vice-presidency. Both men accepted and the 
convention was adjourned that evening. The whole affair had been conducted 
amid the wildest enthusiasm with the singing of h~mms and patriotic songs 
and great demonstrations. 49 
Rooseveltt s "Confession of Faith 11 was a lengthy document in which 
he rom1dly condemned the old parties as 11husks, with no real souls within 
either, divided on artificial lines, boss-ridden and privilege controlled, 
45 Payne, 19-26, Also Pringle, 565, citing~ York Times, June 20, 1912. 
46 B~, 82. 
47 Pringle, 565. 
48 De Witt, 83. 
49 Bryan, 248-249. 
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each a jumble of incongrous elements, and neither daring to speak out 
wisely and fearlessly what should be said on the vital issues of the day." 5 
He proposed to change all "t;his and "boldly to face the real and gre~t 
questions of the day", 11 to raise aloft a standard to which all honest men 
can repair, and under which all can fight, no matter what their past 
political differences", and 11 to put fort11 a platform which ••• shall be 
a contract with the people ••• and ••• we shall hold ourselves under honorable 
obligation to fulfil every promise it contains as loyally as if it were 
actually enforceable under the penalties of the law." 51 
The nconfession" continued to express the views that went into the 
making of the Progressive party platform. Roosevelt stated that the 
political bosses and the privileged interests were with Taft and Wilson and 
wanted to defeat the Progressives. He insisted that neither the Democrats 
nor the Republicans were to be trusted in the promises they made. And the 
speech contained a suggestion of paternalism in the passage that it was his 
aim nto use the government as an efficient agency for the practical better-
ment of social and economic conditions throughout the land." 52 
As far as actual promises were concerned, Roosevelt wanted a national 
law for Presidential primaries, a corrupt practices act, the initiative, 
referendum, and the recall. He desired the people to have the right to 
interpret the constitution and this idea was incorporated in the party plat-
form in the form of a plank advocating an easier and more expeditious method 
50 Ibid., 250. 
51 IEid., 250. This summary of Roosevelt's speech is taken from Bryan's 
report in his story of the convention, 250-278, and, henceforth, only 
direct quotations will be foot-noted. 
52 Ibid., 252-253. 
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of amending the Federal constitution. 53 Also on the political question, 
Roosevelt and the Progressives advocated woman suffrage. 
For the working man there were many reforms suggested. Industry was 
to publish wage scales and such other data as would be of public interest, 
such as diseases, deaths, and injuries due to occupation, for inspection by 
the public and co~~ttees of the workers concerned. Furthermore, minimum 
wages were to be established, sta.."'ldards of safety and sanitation were to be 
enforced, and compensation for industrial accidents and deaths were to be 
paid. Child and woman labor was to be prohibited or regulated and was 
never to be night work. Finally, hours were to be regulated to the extent 
that women were not to work more than forty-eight hours a week and all 
workers were to be entitled to one d~ a week of rest. 
There were the usual kind words for the farmer and suggestions were 
made for improVing his lot. None of these were very positive, however, 
consisting as they did mainly of suggestions~that the farmer's life and 
that of his wife be made more attractive and more profitable. It was also 
suggested that the Country Life Commission, recently abandoned, be revived. 
Roosevelt devoted more time in his speech to a discussion of the trusts 
and their control. He pointed to his own record in this respect as exem-
plary. He maintained that "our aim is to control business, not to strangle 
it. n 54. He felt that "the only effective way in which to regulate the 
trusts is through the exercise of the collective power of our people as a 
53 Ibid., 281. 
54 rora., 262. 
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whole through the governmental agencies established by the Constitution 
for this very purpose." 55 He suggested strengthening the Anti-Trust Law 
and also setting up a commission to regulate and control all the great 
industrial concerns engaged in interstate transactions. 
The Progressives and their standard-bearer favored a protective 
tariff but one "approached from the standpoint of the interests of the whole 
people, and not as a bundle of preferences to be given to favored indi-
viduals." 56 A com:nission of non-partisan experts was to be selected to 
examine the question of the tariff. This commission would then make 
suggestions to Congress which would then make the necessary reVisions 
schedule by schedule rather than treating the whole tariff as a single bill. 
An improvement in the national currency system was advocated. The 
issuance of money by private agencies was deplored as harmful and unscien-
tific. It was felt that the government alone should issue money and that 
the currency should be sufficiently elastic to meet the changing needs of 
the country. 
Roosevelt also advocated the maintainance of the army and navy at a 
high pitch of efficiency. He wanted the Panama Canal fortified and felt 
that we should not have to pay tolls on our own coastwise traffic that passed 
through it. As far as other foreign affairs, were concerned, he favored 
friendly relations with all nations. 
Finally, both Roosevelt and the platform devoted a great deal of time 
and space to conservation. It was urged that all natural resources that 
55 Ibid., 265. 
56 Ibid., 268. 
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were not already in the hands of private interests be retained for the 
use of posterity. Waste land should be reclaimed and the use of natural 
resources, such as water power, should be rigorously supervised by the 
states or the nation. 
The Progressive platform was a reflection of Roosevelt's speech. 
It did, however, contain some additional planks. 57 One of these provided 
for public recall of judicial decisions. It also held for a limited use 
of injunctions in labor disputes and the establishment of a Department of 
Labor with a seat in tne Cabi:t:et. The platform advo:.eated a graduated 
inheritance tax and supported the Constitutional admend;'!lent then pending 
establishing an income tax. Finally, there was the usual support for a 
soldiers' bonus and the usual criticism of the administration's use of 
the civil service law. 
After the enthusiasm of the conventions and the bitterness of the 
Taft-Roosevelt pre-convention quarrei, the actual campaign was anti-climax 
and roused little interest. The most exciting thing that happened was 
a shot fired at Roosevelt in Milwaukee on October 14, 1912. Roosevelt 
acted very nobly in the situation, sa7ing the culprit from a lynching and 
going on with his scheduled address. 58 
But all the fine promises of the platform and all the heroics of 
Milwaukee were unavailing. After the uninspiring campaign, the voters 
went to the polls and the results were as had been expected. Woodrow 
Wilson was elected with 435 electoral college votes to 88 for Roosevelt 
57 Ibid., 279-295. 
58 Pr1ngle, 568-570. 
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and only 8 for Taft. The popular vote was not as one-sided, however. 
Wilson received 6,286,124 votes; Roosevelt 4,126:t020; and Taft 3,483,922. 59 
As can be seen, the two Republican candidates polled more votes than did 
Wilson, but the split in the party defeated them. Moreover, there were 
many progressives who preferred to vote for Wilson rather than Roosevelt 
for the Democratic candidate was also considered a progressive. Because 
of this, also, Roosevelt did not gain any strength from the progressive 
Democrats as he had hoped to. 60 
After the election, Roosevelt withdrew his support from the Progressive 
party and, in its 1912 version, it all but went out of existence. Its 
death knell, on a national scale, was sounded by Roosevelt's refusal to 
run in 1916, although it did continue to have some life in the various 
states. 61 But there its existence was more of a substantiation of the 
claim that the progressive spirit is never dead than any formal carry-over 
of the Progressive party of 1912. 
59 Ibid., 570. 
&J "De'Witt, 86-87. 
61 Pringle, 570. 
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CHAPTER II 
LOOKING AT CAREERS 
Having viewed the progressive movement, we can now turn our attention 
to the two men who were its leaders in 1912. Before looking at their 
snecific records on some of the major problems of the day, it might be wise 
to take a bird's eye view of their careers up to the point where we find 
them engaged in the heated campaign of 1912. Here, as in all subsequent 
chapters, we will begin with a consideration of Theodore Roosevelt. 
Theodore Roosevelt was born on October 27, 1858, the second child 
and older son of Theodore Roosevelt, Sr., of New York and :Martha Bulloch 
Roosevelt of Georgia. The boy was born in his father's home on then-
fashionable East Twentieth .Street and h.sd the advantages of wealth, travel, 
and fine education in his youth. All, however, was not easy for him for 
he had to overcome the handicap of a frail body and weak eyes. His fight 
ac:::ainst his nhysical c1isabilities is too well-known to recount. Having 
cvercome his disabilities, Roosevelt matriculated at Harvard and was gradua-
ted from there in June, 1880. It is from that date that we follow his 
political career. l 
Throughout his life, Roosevelt was a great believer in doing things 
rather than just talking and this characteristic was one of the things 
which turned him to politics as a career. He wanted to take nart in 
l This paragraph is a s~~ary of Pringle, Chapters I to IV, l-53. 
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everything that was going on and that incluceci civic affairs in his communit • 
He wa11ted to be one of the governing class and if that necessitated going 
into nolitics he would go into politics despite his friends' objections to 
the tyoe of men with whom he would have to associ~te. Roosevelt was very 
definite about this himself for he later said that he did not enter politics 
nto benefit other peonle, but (as a means) of getting for myself a privilege 
to which I was entitled in common with other people." 2 Any other course 
would have been inconsistent with the character of the man who said: "The 
nrime thing that every man who takes an interest in nolitics should remem-
ber is that he must act, and not merely criticize the 3~Ctions of others • 11 3 
Once Roosevelt's interest was aroused, he promntly took steps to make 
himself a nart of the political organization of his ward. He followed 
his own advice that 11if he (a man) goes into politics he must go into 
practical politics, in order to make his influence felt." 4 He began his 
career by joining the Twenty-first District Republican Association in New 
York in 1880, the very year that he graduated from Harvara. The Club was 
controlled by a very practical politician na~ed Jake Hess. 5 The first 
six months or so of Roosevelt's membership in the Club were without the 
explosive qualities that marked his subsequent political career. He was 
involved in studying law at Columbia Law School during the winter and went 
2 Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt, Autobiography, Macmillan and 
Company, Limited, London, 1913, 68. Subsequently referred to as 
Roosevelt, Autobiography. 
3 Theodore Hoosevelt, American Ideals, New Knickerbocker Edition, G. ?. 
F-utne.m's Sons, New York, 1920, 26. Subsequently referred to as Roosevelt 
American Ideals. 
L Ibid., 28. 
5 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 64. 
~--------------------. 
23 
to Europe with his wife in the spring. i•hen he returnee from that trip, 
he found himself, for the first time, a candidate for public office. 6 
The Twenty-first District Republican Association was having a bit of 
internal difficulty in the fall of 1881. Joe Murray, an ex-Tammany Democrat, 
was working for Hess but had ideas of his own. One of them concerned 
Theodore Roosevelt. tlurray decided to press for the nomination of Roosevelt 
for the position of Assemblyman from the District against the candidate 
nut forward by Hess. Aftersome hesitation, Roosevelt agreed to go along 
with the plan. Murray was himself an astute politician and his plan 
worked. Roosevelt was nominated in the party caucus. 7 Once the nomination 
was made, Hess, despite Roosevelt's assertion that he was elected in spite 
of the "machine", 8 suuported the young aristocrat. His course might, in 
part at least, have been dictated by the fact that the rich Republicans of 
the district had lost confidence in the local Reuublican leadership, and, 
since their contributions were necessary, Hess hoped to restore their good-
will with an Assemblyman whom they all knew personally. 9 
As a candidate, Roosevelt attracted some attention outside of his own 
district. The New York Times praised him as "a public-spirited citizen, 
not an office seeker." 10 He was endorsed by the Council of Reform, and 
6 Pringle, 46, 59. 
7 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 67. 
8 Ibid., 67. 
9 Howard L. Hurwitz, Theodore Roosevelt and Labor in New York State. 
1880-1900, Columbia University Fress, New York, I94J,70,Citing 
Chauncey M. Deuew, My Memories of Eighty Years, (N. Y., 1922), 159. 
10 Pringle, 61, citingNew York Ti::nes, Nov. b,l8"81. 
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other civic organizations. But he was wise enough to realize that the 
supl:'ort that really counted was that of the Republican machine and, sensibly, 
allowed its leaders to conduct the major portion of his camoaign. There 
actually was not too much work to be done for the Twenty-first was a solidly 
Republican district. Roosevelt was easily elected and prepared to take his 
seat in the legislature at Albany. 11 Although he did not go -vvith the 
unqualified blessing of his organization's boss, Hess fat more kincly toward 
him because of his campaign attitude that proved that he did not intend to 
ignore the machine comnletely. 12 
l'luch of Roosevelt's work in the Assembly will be treated under the 
oroper chapters so a brief summary will suffice here. He served until 
April, 1884 and attracted considerable attention to hL11self during that time. 
The legislature, at that time, was in part composed of a group of men called 
t!1e "black horse cavalryn w~10 supported, usually by selling votes, the 
s'Jec:l.al interests. Roosevelt developed as the natural leader of the o:;pos-
ition to this group. 13 Roosevelt, himself, mentions these men when he 
estimated that about a third of the me!Ilbers of the New York legislature were 
ooen to corrupt influences in some form or other. 14 
The new Assemblym&'J first attracted attention to himself when he 
attempted to force the imoeachment of Judge Westbrook. The Judge was in 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Ibid.' 61. 
Roosevelt, Autobiography, 60-61. 
Harold Howland, Theodore Roosevelt and His Times (volume h7 of The 
Chronicles of ATJJerica Series, Allen Johnson, ed.), Yale University 
Press, New Haven, Conn., 1921, 11-12. 
Roosevelt, A11erican Ideals, 50. 
the grip of the business interests and Roosevelt and his friends came 
in the possession of some correspondence to prove this. The Assembly 
refused to take up the charges against the Judge but Roosevelt was deter-
mined. Against the advice of his friends and associates, he forced the 
issue and kept talking in the legisla.ture until public oressure and interest 
in the case necessitated the aopointment of a committee to investigate the 
charges. Westbrook was "whitewashed 11 but everyone knew that it was just 
that and Roosevelt hac achieved a moral victory. 15 He had also placed 
himself firmly in the DUblic eye. Thayer goes so far as to say that this 
affair was the 11 deciding act in Roosevelt's career." 16 
Thereafter, his legislative career was less spectacular although 
Roosevelt was made the minority leader of the assembly after the Democratic 
victory in the state in 1882. This was a great honor for one so young 
and virtually without precedent for one with only a single year of experienc 
behind him. 17 While Cleveland was governor of the State, Roosevelt 
worked with him and supported many of the reform measures that he attempted 
to enforce, including civil service reform. 18 In general, Roosevelt 
supoorted those measures that would encourage clean government, worked 
against the special interests, and, unhap,)ily in view of his future record, 
was unfriendly toward labor, esoecially organized labor. But more of that 
later. 
15 Howland, 14-15. 
16 William Roscoe Thayer, Theodore Roosevelt, a..11d Intimate Biography, 
Houghton Miffin Comoany, N. Y., 1912, 35. 
17 ?ringle, 74. 
18 Ibid., 75. 
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In the summer of 1884, Roosevelt was a delegate-at-large to the 
Renublican National Convention. He supported the candidacy of the Senator 
from Vermont, George F. Edmunds, and worked hard for him in order to 
defeat the Reoublican bosses' choice, Ja~es G. Blaine. ~ben Blaine was 
nominated, however, Roosevelt stood by his party's choice despite his 
convictions. l9 
After the Convention and ca'Upaign, Roosevelt retired to his ranch 
in the West. He remained in 11retirement 11 until the mayoralty election in 
New York City in 1886. That year Henry George ran for mayor as the repres-
entati ve of the laboring class. The Democrats opt=Josed him with Abraham 
s. Hewitt, an indeoendent of great wealth. The Republicans, had they been 
interested in saving the city from the radical ideas of George, should have 
supported 1-Ievvitt. But he was too honest to aliow the usual division of 
spoils between the machine Republicans and Tammany if he should win • 
. Moreover, the Republicans hoped that, since George had labor's support and 
the Democrats pretended to be the oarty of labor, George would take more 
votes from the Democrats and that their candidate might slip into office. 
Roosevelt was approached and accepted the nomination. But the great fear 
of George on the part of business, forced many Republicans to vote for 
Hewitt and Roosevelt was defeated, running third. 20 Thereupon he went 
to Europe and faded from the spotlight for a time. 
When Harrison was nominated by the Renublicans in 1888 to oppose 
19 Howland, 21-23. 
20 Pringle, 113-115. 
~----------------~ 
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Cleveland, Roosevelt took the st"t.unn for him. After Harrison was elected, 
he repaid Roosevelt for his efforts by arypointing him a Civil Service 
commissioner. This was in ~;£ay 1889, and Roosevelt served until May 1895. 21 
vVhile on the comnission, Roosevelt steered its policies and enforced its 
regulations with the utmost vigor. His enthusiastic support gave great 
impetus to the cause of Civil Service reform. 22 
Roosevelt moved directly from his job on the Civil Service Com~ission 
in 7{ashington to one of the New York City Board of Police Commissioners. 
He was aopointed by the anti-Tammany but Democratic M:ayor Strong. 23 
Roosevelt was handicaoned in his position as presicent of the board by the 
arrangement that made unanimous consent necessary for any real action but 
he did work hard and enthusiastically. He attempted to take politics out 
of the force and gave great nublicity to all that the commission did in 
order to keen alive public interest and supnort. 24 He, himself, gives 
a good summary of the work he did: 
Our method for restoring order a.nd discinline were simple, 
and indeed so were our methods for securing efficiency. We 
made frequent personal inspections, especially at night •••• 
vre then proceeded to pumh those guilty of shortcomings, and 
to reward those who did well. ••• The days of political "pull" 
were over while we had the power. 25 
As police commissioner, Roosevelt stopped the wanton brutality of 
policemen but he backed up strong action where it was necessary. He stopped 
21 Roosevelt, A~erican Ideals, 100. 
22 Howland, 39, also Thayer, 89. 
23 Roosevelt, American Ideals, 119, also Howland, 40. 
24 Howland, 43. 
25 Roosevelt, American Ideals, 127. 
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blackmail by enforcement of the law. That he was successful is attested 
to by the fact that in February, 1897, the Judge who addressed the grand 
jury of the month congratulated them on the fact that there was less crime 
in New York C:ity relative to the ponulation than ever before. 26 Finally, 
however, New York hac1 enough of reform anc the corru?t influences in the 
city were able to force Roosevelt's resignation. 27 That was in 1897 and 
the ex-cOI'h'llissioner was on the threshhold of greater thir:.gs. 
In return for his support of McKinley in the election of 1896, Roose-
velt was once more in line for a -position in Washington. His old friend, 
Henry Cabot Lodge, supported his ambitions. 28 Finally, on April 6, 1897, 
EcKinley sent his name to the Senate for confirmation as Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy. The nomination was confirmed on ADril 8 and Roosevelt assumed 
his duties on April 19. 29 The Secretary of the Navy Long was a conservativ , 
elderly gen~man who was overshadowed by his forceful, bellicose, and out-
spoken assistant. 30 Roosevelt was a firm believer in a big navy and worked 
diligently toward that end. Moreover, he looked forward with a degree of 
enthusiasm to the war that was brewing with Spain. He did everything he 
could to put the navy on a war footing- and the excellent condition of that 
branch of the service in the Spanish-A'11erican War was due in no small part 
to his efforts. 31 
Once war had broken out, Roosevelt desired to get into active service. 
26 Ibid.' 134. 
27 Hurvntz, 149. 
28 Joseph B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, Shown in His Own 
Letters, Charles Scribner's Sons, N.Y~l920, vol. I, 70.-- --- ---
29 Ibid., I, 72. 
30 Pringle, 170. 
31 Bishop, vol. I, Chap. IX, 70-91. 
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He succeeded and the episode of the "Rough Riders" is so well-known as to 
need no retelling. Moreover, since it has no relation to the question of 
this paper--although very important to the furtherance of Roosevelt's 
career--we can content ourself with no more than a mention of this period. 
Roosevelt enjoyed himself greatly while in Cuba and then returned home to 
find his political future very bright indeed. 
,vbile Roosevelt was in Cuba, Thomas C. Platt, Senator from and boss 
of f!ew York State, did some serious thin~ing relative to a Republican 
candxate for governor of his state in 1898. The narty was concerned 
tecause of a threatened exnosure of undue extravagance in repairing the 
Erie Canal. 32 Platt needed a strong candidate to maintain his hold on the 
state anc the name ·of the leader of the "Rough Riders" was constantly being 
nut before him. Platt did not at first want Roosevelt but his lieutenants 
convinced him that the Colonel--the name Roosevelt acquired in the Spanish-
American War and which clung to him from that time on--would attract the 
needed independent voters because of his reforn record and woulc, moreover, 
be free from any connection with the canal scandal. 33 Roosevelt was 
approached and was not, at first, over-enthusiastic about the prospects of 
being governor of New York. He preferred national politics. 34 Nothing 
was forth-coming in that line, however, so the governorship became more, 
32 
33 
34 
Pringle, 201. 
Harold F. Gosnell, Boss Platt and His New York Machine, a Study of the 
Political Leadership of ThOffias-c: Plat~1heodore Roosevel~and others, 
The University of Chicago Press~ Chicago,-r92~8-99. 
Pringle, 202. 
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attractive. Roosevelt called on Platt to discuss the nomination. It 
was his in return for a promise that he would not make war on the Regular 
Republican organization and that he would consult Platt, especially in 
mald.ng appointments. 35 Roosevelt, after his election did live up to this 
promise and consulted Platt in reference to almost all appointments al-
though he sometimes disregarded his advice, especially where candidates 
for judicial positions were concerned. 36 
Once he received the nomination, Roosevelt made the campaign one 
of the "hoopla" and 11hurrah11 type with great emphasis placed on his war 
record. But it took a statement from Richard Croker, the Tammany leader, 
to the effect that Justice Daly had not been renominated to the Supreme 
court of the state because he refused to make certain appointments in his 
court that were recommended by the organization to elect Roosevelt. The 
Republicans cried for "an untrammeled judiciary" and the people were roused 
to action. 31 Even then, Roosevelt was elected by the small majority of 
17' 794. 38 
A great deal more will be said about the legislative advancements 
made during Roosevelt's administration later. He did support civil service 
reform, franchise taxation, economy in government, and increased honesty 
among public servants. 39 He, himself, felt that he had been an outstanding 
35 Gosnell, 96. 
36 Ibid., 207 ff. 
37 Ibid., 142-143. 
38 Pringle, 207. 
39 Public Papers of Theodore Roosevelt, Governor, 1899, Brandow Printing 
Company, AlbanY, N.Y., !899:, 25. Subsequently referred to as Roosevelt, 
Public Papers. 
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success as governor but he was a trifle over-enthusiastic. He did succeed 
in obtaining an improved civil service law, a corporation franchise tax, 
and a few other miscellaneous reforms of lesser consequence. One thing 
that restricted his efficiency as a reformer was his connection with 
platt. He could not, or would not, openly defy him, preferring to com-
promise. Roosevelt, himself, best summed up his ideas on the subject of 
compromise while he was governor in a speech before a State Bar Association 
banquet on January 8, 1899: 
It is not possible for any man ever to do or to get all that 
he would like to do, or all that he would like to get in the 
way of good government and in the way of striVing to see his 
ideals realized •••• perhaps we must always advance a little 
by zig-zag; only we must always adv~,ce; and the zig-zags 
should go toward the right goal. 40 
As Roosevelt's term as governor drew to a close in 1900, his name 
was mentioned for the vice-presidential spot on the national ticket led 
by McKinley. Roosevelt did not receive the suggestion with any great 
happiness. He felt that it was the road to oblivion. Neither Mark Hanna 
nor McKinley liked Roosevelt on the slate, either. 41 But when the con-
vention met, it nominated Roosevelt. T11is was largely due to Platt•s 
influence. Platt wanted him out of New York where his reforms were alienat-
ing the wealthy contributors to the Republican party. 42 And with the 
presidency at stake the wishes of the boss of the state wit~ the largest 
electoral vote could not be overlooked. Thus it was that Roosevelt became 
40 Ibid., 250-251. 
41 James Ford Rhodes, The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, 1897~ 
1909, The Macmillan-cQmpany, N.Y:;-1923, 134. 
42 GOSnell, 123. 
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vice-president at the time when the Republican Victory indicated na clear 
mandate to govern the country in the interest of business expansion." 43 
Roosevelt was wrong in his estimate of the vice-president's job. rt 
led not to oblivion but directly to the White House itself for President 
McKinley was assassinated in September of 1901 and Roosevelt succeeded 
to the presidency. To even summarize his career there would be a lengthy 
undertaking so we will leave those things which concern us to be treated 
under the proper chapters. We can say, though, that Roosevelt's accession 
did cause consternation among business men. 44 Roosevelt, however, 
indicated his willingness to work with his party leaders and even submitted 
his first annual message to Hanna for his suggestions. He snowed a 
willingness to consult with the regular Republicans although he did not 
always follow their advice. 45 His first term was not particularly 
productive of reform legislature--his chief achievements consisted of 
obtaining an amendment to the Elkins Act and setting up a bureau of 
corporations to investigate corporate practices. This may have been the 
result of an alleged agreement with Senator Aldrich, the arch-conservative, 
giving Roosevelt a free hand in foreign affairs in return for the president's 
non-interference in legislative affairs. 46 
Despite the apparent surface peace, there was a feeling of opposition 
43 Rhodes, 144, citing Croly, Life of Hanna, 341. 
44 Pringle, 238. 
45 Rhodes, 221. 
46 George E. Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement, 
University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, ~6, 17. 
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between Hanna and Roosevelt that became public in May of 1903. Already 
Republican eyes were turned toward the election of 1904 and Hanna was 
being considered as a candidate. In May of 1903, Foraker, the senior 
senator from Ohio and a foe of Hanna, came out for Theodore Roosevelt and 
demanded that the Ohio Republican Convention, meeting in June, do likewise. 
H&Lna opposed such a resolution and thus made evident his disapproval of 
Roosevelt. 47 Hanna, however, did not actively seek the nomination, 
probably because of his advanced age and precarious health. 48 Despite 
his disapproval, and that of business, he kept his opposition quiet and 
Roosevelt was nominated for a second term and elected. 
It was of this second election that Roosevelt wrote: "It is a 
peculiar gratification to me to have owed my election ••• above all to 
Abrru1am Lincoln's 1plain people'·" 49 And it was to these same people 
that Roosevelt directed many of his public utterances. He had the happy 
faculty--for a politician--of making himself loved by the masses. Yet 
Roosevelt was not one to sacrifice all for an ideal. Throughout his terms 
in the ~V'nite House, he was a good party man. He wanted to and did "work 
with my party and make it strong by making it worthy of popular support." 50 
In 1906, Roosevelt finally displaced Platt as boss of New York 
politics. Frank w. Higgins represented him in the state and, in that year, 
47 Rhodes, 281-282. 
48 Ibid., 287. 
49 Bishop, I, 345. 
50 ~., I, 150. 
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they succeeded in having Wadsworth elected United States Senator. 51 Thus 
when his term in the White House ended, Roosevelt had someplace to turn. 
He had established himself as a political leader of New York Republicans--
especially the more liberal minded among them. 
In 1910, after returning from his African hunting trip, Roosevelt 
was urged by the progressive Republicans of his state, under Lloyd c. 
Griscom and Herbert Parsons, to accept the position of temporar,y chairman 
of the Republican State Convention. The progressive group were opposed 
to the machine led by William Barnes, Jr. After some hesitation, Roosevelt 
accepted but he refused to run for governor or any other office. 52 At 
this convention, w'.aose chairman Roosevelt became, a direct primary plank 
was adopted, "this being the main fight as far as progressive planks went."53 
After the convention, Roosevelt became an observer of political develop-
ments until his entrance into the campaign of 1912. Of this we shall say 
more later. 
In summation, Roosevelt was a man of many advantages. His father, 
whom he greatly admired, was a philanthropist who worked for social welfare 
and his example quickened Roosevelt• s sense of obligation to the community.~ 
But he was preeminently a practical idealist. He felt that two gospels 
should be preached by every reformer: "The first is the gospel of morality; 
the second is the gospel of efficiency." 55 Furthermore he believed 11 in 
51 Gosnell, 352. 
52 Payne, 30-Jl. 
53 Ibid., 35. 
54 ROOSevelt, Autobiography, 12-13. 
55 Roosevelt, Pmerican Ideals, 27. 
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the duty of the man who preaches to preach realizable ideals." 56 His 
nhiloso:ohy is best sum.rned up by Howlanc , a loyal supporter of his. Howland 
said of him that he believed in getting things done anrl would compromise on 
the method but not on the principle. If he couldn't obtain all that he 
wanted, he would take what he could get. Roosevelt chose "the companionable 
roac' of oractical idealism rather than the isolated peak of idealistic 
ineffectiveness." 57 
It would be unfair to say that Robert La Follette was ineffective and 
he was sufficiently practical to gain the control of an entire state, yet he 
differed from Roosevelt in that he was one who never compromised. It was 
La Follette's way or not at all. 58 He believed passionately that, where a 
nrinciple was involved, 11 no bread is often better than half a loaf." Once a 
comnromise was written into the law, he felt, you had lost your chance to 
fight for a true reform bill. 59 This made him much harder to work with 
and much less poPular than rtoosevelt. But to understand La Follette, it is 
best to go back to the beginning of the story. 
Robert Earion La Follette had the right beginning for a politician 
of his time. He was born in a log cabin on June lL., 1855, in Primrose, 
Dane County, 60 Wisconsin. Eis ancestors had come to ~·:isconsin from 
S6 
S7 
S8 
S9 
60 
Theodore Roosevelt, ADplied .I!;thics, being ~ of the '!:illiam Belden 
i'Joble Lectures for 1910, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 1911, 7. 
Subsequently referred to as Roosevelt, Applied Ethics. 
Howland, 21. 
l1Jils P. Haugen, Pioneer and Political Reminescences {1.'\'isconsin r::agazine 
of History, volumes XI, XII, XIII), The P..ntes Press, lDvansville ;::isc., 
D."d., 151. 
La Follette, 268. 
Dictionary of American Biography, "Robert M:. La Follette!!, Frederic A. 
Paxson, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1938, X, .541. All factual 
information regarding rEr. La Follette 1 s life is from this source unless 
otherwise foo~noted. 
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Kentuc~ with a short stopover in Indiana. While in the former state, 
the La Follettes had been neighbors of the Lincolns. In fact, young Bob 
La Follette's background is remarkably like that of Abraham Lincoln. 
La Follette was left without a father while still an infant and, as soon 
as he was able, he took over the management of the family's affairs. When 
he was nineteen, he sold the farm in Primrose and moved his family into 
Madison. But, even before that time, the influences that made La Follette 
a progressive were already at work. He says himself: "As a boy on the 
farm in Primrose Township I heard and felt this movement of the Grangers 
swirling about me; and I felt the indignation m1ich it expressed in such 
a way that I suppose I have never fully lost the effect of that early 
impression." 61 
La Follette entered the University of Wisconsin, then a struggling 
prairie scho~ with the class of 1879. Things were not easy at the Univer-
sity. La Follette was still responsible for the welfare of his family and, 
as a consequence, it was necessary for him to have some means of income. 
To solve his problem, he purchased the University Press, then the only 
college paper and not very prosperous, and turned it into a paying 
proposition. He also helped to pay expenses by teaching school. ~Vhile 
at the University, President Bascom had a tremendous influence on the youth. 
He was constantly reminding his students of the debt they owed to the sta.te 
and instilling in them a "proper attitude toward public affairs." 62 
61 La Follette, 19. 
62 Ibid., 28. 
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La Follette, although he did not lead his class scholastically, evidently 
learned this lesson well. 
After his graduation in 1879, La Follette spent some five months 
studying law, dividing his time between the University's law school and 
a law office in Madison, and was admitted to the bar in February, 1880. 
He was then without funds and in rather desperate need of money because 
of his obligations. The district attorneyship of Dane County looked very 
attractive. As a result, La Follette began to canvass the territory with 
a view to getting himself elected to the job. Before long, the Republican 
llbosstt of that time, Colonel E. w. Keyes of Madison, informed him that he 
(La Follette) was not going to be the next district attorney of the county--
"Boss" Keyes had already chosen the man, and it was not La Follette. 63 
But La Follette was only spurred to greater effort by the incident. 
By his own hard work and with the help of his former classmates at the 
University, he succeeded in winning the election without the support of 
the machine. One thing that eonvinced the thrifty farmers that he should 
be elected was the fact that he promised to try all the cases brought 
before the court without employing additional help, a system which had 
long been in vogue. La Follette kept his promise and the farmers showed 
their satisfaction by reelecting him for a second term--the on~ Republican 
to win on the county ticket. 64 
In 1884, after completing his second term as district attorney, 
63 Ibid., ll. 
64 Frederic c. Howe, Wisconsin, An Experiment in Democracy, Charles 
Scribner's Sons, New York, 19!2, 6. 
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La Follette was encouraged to run for Congress by his friend and associate, 
sam Harper. The suggestion found favor with him almost at once. He had 
acquired a relish for public work and a love for the political arena that 
never left him. He and Harper immediately began to canvass the district. 
once again the political bosses told hin1 that he was wasting his time and 
money. But La Follette had gone to the people with his campaign in 1880 
and he was prepared to follow that plan again. 65 The farmers of his 
district knew about the work he had done and they liked the way he took 
them into his confidence and made them a part of his endeavors. They 
nominated him in the convention and they then elected him with a majority 
of 491. 66 Then just twenty-nine years of age, he was the youngest member 
in the House. 67 
After securing for himself the position of Representative, La Follette 
began to realize how little he knew of·national problems. As a result, 
he went to Washington in January, 1885, although the Congress to which he 
was elected did not meet until the following December. He hoped in that 
way to acquaint himself with some of the questions then under discussion. 
This is typical of the thoroughness that marked his course. As one writer 
has said of him: "La Follette is one of our deepest, most painstaking, 
and most cautious students, a man who speaks only after months, even years 
of investigation, and not then unless he has arrived at a constructive 
65 La Follette, 43-45. 
66 Howe, 6-7. 
67 La Follette, 48. 
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conclusion." 68 
When La Follette returned to Washington to begin his term of office, 
he immediately felt the influence of the senior Senator from Wisconsin, 
philetus Saw,yer, a multi-millionaire lumber man and one of the bosses of 
the state. Sawyer was very nice to him but when the young Congressman 
expressed a desire to serve on the Committee on Public Lands, Sawyer 
looked askance at the idea. 69 He was finally appointed to the Committee 
on Indian Affairs where his "radical views" would be less of a hinderance 
to the schemes of the politicians. 7° But La Follette still managed to 
make himself heard. He spoke against the "pork-barrel" bill for river 
and harbor appropriations in 1886. 71 He also worked to protect the 
Indian lands from the railroads. His action made the machine back in 
Wisconsin determined to defeat him for reelection in 1886. But La Follette 
had a way to beat them. 
His early experience had taught him that in order to beat boss rule 
it was necessary to have an informed electorate. As soon as he was elected 
he got a list of the voters in his district and then proceeded, while he 
was in the House, to send these people copies of all speeches made on 
pending legislation in their particular field of endeavor. He followed 
this system with only the necessary modifications throughout his public 
68 William Bayard Hale, "La Follette, Pioneer Progressive", The World's 
Work, XXII, no. 3, 14598 (July, 1911). 
69 La Follette, 53-57. 
70 Frank Harris, Contemporary Portraits, "Senator La Follette", Brentano' s, 
New York, 1923, 158. 
71 La Follette, 75. 
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life. He says himself that this is probably the reason that he never 
got rich in politics since most of the printing bills he had to pay him-
self. But he also says that this was the only way for him. 72 Despite 
the expense, it was worth while in furthering his career for "one great 
secret of La Follette's political strength was his constant touch with the 
masses of the people. He had respect for their understanding and, once 
he had determined upon a policy, he laid it before the voters at length 
with all the arguments in support of it.n 73 He followed this method 
now and was reelected, not only in 1886, but in 1888 as well. 
During the 1889-1891 sessions, La Follette came to the fore as a 
member of the Ways and Means Committee. This was a coveted position and 
he obtained it as a result of a speech which he had given the previous 
session on the Mills Bill. While on the Committee, he served with the 
future president McKinley and became a great admirer of his. He also did 
noteworthy service on the preparation of the McKinley Tariff Bill. This 
same bill helped to defeat La Follette, however, in 1890. The high 
tariff which it authorized brought difficult times to the farmers and, 
in addition, the Bennett law had passed the state legislature and this, 
with its regulation of the schools of the state, had turned the catholic 
and Lutheran vote against the Republicans. La Follette went down to defeat 
with the rest of his party. Despite the fights which he led against the 
party bosses in Wisconsin, his ntendency to insurgency" did not appear to 
72 Ibid., 63-67. 
73 Raney, 304. 
74 Ibid., 284. 
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any extreme extent. While he could not, by any stretch of the imagination, 
be called a "stand-patter", he had usually voted with the party. 74 He 
did not during his time in the House separate himself irreconcilably from 
his party and this is important, for it means that, had he so desired, 
he could still have allied il:imself to the regular Republicans and taken 
advantage of the opportunities that they had to offer. 
Wnen he returned to Madison following his defeat, La Follette turned 
his attention to his law business. 11 Any thought ••• of returning to the 
public service was vague and remote." 75 Yet the lure of political life 
was upon him and it was inevitable that he should return to the battle 
field. An event occurred in September of 1891 that served to both return 
him to the fray at once and to crystallize his antipathy toward machine 
politics. 
For years it had been tne habit of the state treasurers to deposit 
the revenues of the state in certain favorite banks and then appropriate 
the interest on the money for themselves. No one objected to the system 
until the Democrats got into power after the 1890 landslide. The attorney-
general then promptly brought suit against the defeated Republican treas-
urers to recover hundreds of thousands of dollars of back interest. 
Senator Sawyer was the principal bondsman for the treasurers and stood to 
lose $3,000,000 if the case were decided in favor of the state. The case 
was to be heard by Judge Robert J. Siebecker, La Follette's brother-in-law 
and his former law partner. Shortly before the trial was to begin, Sawyer 
75 La Follette, 136. 
asked La Follette to meet him at the Plankington House Hotel in Milwaukee, 
and the latter agreed. What happened when the two men met is a subject 
that is disputed. According to La Follette's story Sawyer attempted to 
bribe him. Sawyer claims that he was merely trying to employ La Follette 
as an attorney in the case. 
Whatever is the truth in the case, the results were far-reaching. 
La Follette, after consulting some of his closest friends, went to Siebecker 
and told him what had occurred. The judge promptly withdrew from the case 
and that gave rise to a great deal of speculation as to the reason. No 
announcement was forthcoming and La Follette made no statement. Sawyer, 
however, in an interView in the Milwaukee Sentinel said that he had tried 
to hire La Follette as an attorney in the case and that the latter had 
misconstrued his purpose. In the face of such a statement, La Follette 
presented his side of the affair. This cost him a great deal for he knew 
that his action would split the Republican party in the state and that the 
machine would now resolve to completely destroy him and would use every 
means at their command to discredit him with the people. Indeed, one author 
says of this time that 1~'his (La,Follette 1 s) greatest battle was with his 
~ 
conscience on the Sawyer-Siebecker deal." 76 But good came of the abuse 
and calumny which the machine-controlled newspapers and the machine 
politicians heaped upon La Follette. Out of the experience came the deter-
ruination to destroy the power that was corrupting and undermining the 
76 Richard Lloyd Jones, "Among La Follette• s People," Colliers, XLV, 
no., 24, 18 (Sept. 3, 1910.) 
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government of the State. 77 
In 1892, despite the objections of the regular organization, La Follett 
took the stump for the Republican candidate for the presidency, Harrison. 
He did not discuss state issues, but he did keep his place in the Republican 
party and in the eyes of the public. And his courage in facing the wrath 
of Sawyer's men set at rest any question as to the integrity of his 
motives. 7S 
In 1894, La Follette decided to put forward a candidate for governor 
in opposition to the machine's candidate despite the fact that there was 
no real chance for success. Nils Haugen, one of his associates in Congress, 
was chosen for the hopeless trial and gave up his seat in Congress for the 
endeavor. 79 La Follette and his helpers--most of them former associates 
of his at the university--worked feverishly. They did not succeed in 
nominating Haugen but they did put their men in the rest of the places on 
the ticket. This victory encouraged them tremendously. 80 
The La Follette group began to increase in size despite the fact that 
they did not, at that time, have a broadly constructive policy. La Follette 
attracted the younger and more progressive element to him and the group 
became knmm as nHalf-breeds" by the regular Republicans. 8l He was 
appealing for followers primarily of the program of overthrowing corrupt 
77 La Follette, 142-164. The story of the Sawyer-Siebecker affair is a 
summary of it as it appears in the Autobiography. 
78 Howe, 11. 
79 Haugen, 113. 
80 Ibid., 12. 
81 T:"S. Adams, "The Drama of Wisconsin Politicsu, T'ne Independent, 
LIX, no. 2800, 1824 (July 31, 1902). 
rr 
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machine control. 82 
When the calJlPai.gn of 1896 came around, La Follette announced that he 
was a candidate for the Republican nomination for governor. For a time it 
looked as though he might secure the honor but the political bosses 
rrreachedn many of the delegated pledges to him. As a result, he lost the 
nomination. Then La Follette decided to go to the people once again. 
In 1897, La Follette made a tour of the various county fairs, telling 
the people about the reforms which he advocated. To further help his 
cause, some of his friends purchased a small weekly newspaper in Madison 
and renamed it The State. 83 Even these steps did not secure the nomina-
tion for governor for La Follette when he sought it again in 1898, but the 
pressure on ~he machine was so strong that the bosses were forced to incor-
porate many of the reform measures in their platform of that year. Once 
elected, however, they completely forgot their promises. The people 
remembered this when the 1900 election arrived. 
In 1900, after six years of trJQng, La Follette was finally nominated 
and elected governor. From the people of Wisconsin, he received the 
unprecedented plurality of 103,745. 84 As governor, La Follette's troubles 
continued for, although the Assembly was progressive, the Senate of the 
state was still controlled by the bosses. More will be said of these 
problems later on. 
82 La Follette, 186. 
83 Ibid., 204-207. 
84 HoWe', 14. 
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In addition to these difficulties with the legislature, La Follette 
had to face a 11 smear 11 campaign on the part of the bosses. At this time 
one of them bought the Sentinel, one of the few large papers in the state 
that had previously supported him. The papers were filled with stories 
of the unconstitutional way in which he tried to force the legislature 
to pass the bills which he wanted. The~y- said that his program of regulating 
business would drive capital from the state. 85 Finally, to add fuel 
to their fires, La Follette became ill during the legislative session of 
1901 and the bosses tried to convince the people that he was physically 
incapable of handling his office. This last was strangely prophetic of 
1912. 
When the campaign of 1902 approached, the bosses organized the 
Wisconsin Republican League--usually referred to as the "Eleventh Story" 
League because it had its headquarters in the eleventh story of a MilwaUkee 
office building. 86 The League spent money lavishly and used every method 
known to discredit the 11Half-breedsn and their cause. But La Follette 
believed that platforms were pledges to the people and that they should 
be lived up to, and showed where the "Stalwarts" had not done this. The 
people believed him. He was reelected by a majority of 47,599, and this 
time he could count on a sympathetic legislature. 87 
85 Ibid., 15-16. 
86 Henry w. Wilbur, 11 A Coming Mann, Gunton' s Magazine, XXIII, New York, 
250 (September, 1902). 
87 Howe, 16. 
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The legislative session of 1903 passed most of the reform measures 
which La Follette advocated. There was one, however, which the governor 
could not get through the legislature. This was a bill that would fix 
the rates for railroad transportation, these rates to be based on a 
physical evaluation of the railroad's property. This was just the issue 
which La Follette needed to take to the people. He felt that another term 
of office was needed to "securely ground and bulwark self-government in 
Wisconsin." 88 As a consequence, he took the relentless logic of statistics 
to the county fairs and showed the people how they were being plundered 
by discriminating frei&~t rates and charges. 
The Republican convention was held in Madison in 1904. The "Stalwarts" 
bolted the convention after La Follette was renominated and nominated a 
ticket of their own. La Follette was named by the convention of his 
supporters to head the Wisconsin delegation to the National Republican 
Convention to be held in Chicago that same year. This is important because 
the "Stalwarts" also chose a delegation and when the two delegations 
arrived in Chicago those from the 11 Stalwart11 convention were seated despite 
the fact that the courts of Wisconsin had declared the La Follette men 
the true representatives of the people of the state. Paxson suggests the 
fact that Theodore Roosevelt, the Republican candidate for the presidency, 
did not object to the seating of the unlawful delegation aroused 11in 
88 La Follette, 320. 
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La Follette a conviction that his progressivism was neither genuine nor 
dependable. 11 89 
La Follette was reelected in Wisconsin, this time with a majority 
of 40,000. 9° He continued his reform program making common use of commis-
sions to study various problems. This gave great impetus to the University 
of Wisconsin and did much to bring that school to national prominence. By 
the end of 1905, the progressive movement in Wisconsin and the "Wisconsin 
Idea"--the name given to the reform ideas of La Follette--were fully 
launched. 91 In the five years that he had been in office through tireless 
effort "La Follette had transformed a state ruled for and by the corpora-
tions into an object lesson in social and economic democracy." 92 
La Follette was ready to move to higher levels and in 1905, the 
legislature of the state appointed La Follette to the United States Senate. 
The governor did not resign his office, however, until he had his program 
for the state completed. In 1906, he felt this was done and want to 
Washington to take his place in the Senate. 
There is no need to follow La Follette's career as a Senator in detail 
here. He took a uniformly progressive stand on measures before the Senate. 
One thing that served to mitigate his usefulness was the fact that he early 
began to think of the presidency. One source puts the time as early as 
89 Dictionary of American Biography, X, 544. 
90 Howe, 17. --
91 Dictionary of American Biography, X, 544. 
92 Mowry, 49. -
1907. This ambition made him anxious to steal the spotlight on all 
occasions and made teamwork difficult. 93 
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one measure against which La Follette took a very strong stand was 
the payne-Aldrich Tariff. La Follette mars11alled his forces to fight 
it as soon as its nature was evident and when the bill WE¥3 put to a vote, 
there were ten Republicans who voted with the Democrats against it. This 
is generally regarded as the beginning of the national insurgent movement.94 
The bill eventually passed but the opposition to it had solidified the 
progressive sentiment in the Senate. Moreover, opposition to it resulted 
in the election of the Democrats in 1910. The day of the nstalwarttt 
Republicans was drawing to a close. 
The battle over the payne-Aldrich Tariff gave some excellent indica-
tions of the ]jgJ.'lt in which La Follette was held by the "Stalwarts." When 
Taft was trying to swing the Progressives• votes to the bill, he invited 
mean like Beveridge, Clapp, Borah, and Dolliver to 1vine and dine with 
him in the hopes of "converting11 them. But he made no move toward 
La Follette or Curmnins of Iowa because he knew that they were unchangeable.95 
La Follette's stand on this tariff so enraged Taft and the eastern business 
men that they made plans to defeat him in the Wisconsin primaries in 1910 
when he was running for the Senate. 96 Their plans, however, failed. 
93 Haugen, 151. 
94 Raney, 297. 
9 ~ 63 .., Mowry, • 
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The story of La Follette after his return to the Senate and his 
part in the formation of the National Progressive Republica.~ League and 
the campaign of 1912 have already been discussed in Chapter I. In summary, 
we can say that La Follette did his greatest work as governor of Wisconsin 
where his efforts to educate the electorate were ablem be effective. On 
the national scene, too often his efforts were confined to opposing undes-
irable legislation because so many of his suggested bills never appeared 
after they once went to the committees. ~is influence on state governments 
and their management was unequalled. 97 His leadership was preeminently 
that of a crusader and a reformer. Yet "his cargo of reforms was too 
heavy for good political navigation". 98 Nioreover, his previously mentioned 
inability to work witn others and to allow tnem to sometimes put forth the 
ideas and get the credit, reduced his usefulness. Yet he did great good. 
I' 
His ideas of an educated electorate is sound democracy and the example 
he set served to awaken public thought and conscience and to stimulate to 
action. 
97 William Allen White, "The Progressive Hen and the Insurgent Ducklings," 
The American Magazine, LXXI, no. 3, New York, 397 (Janua~ 1911). 
98 'Raney, 304. 
CHAPTER III 
POLITICAL REFORM 
'\'roodrow Wilson characterized progressivism as "all those policies 
whose object is to wrest government from the control of special groups of 
men, and restore it to the country. All the policies that re-establish the 
connection between representatives &"ld the people." 1 The political 
reforms that the government advocated were directed to this specific end. 
They were designed to do away with the political "bosses" who controlled 
the party machinery and with the economic 11 bosses" who often controlled the 
political ones. We want to turn our attention now to a consideration of 
the stand of the subjects of this paper on the all-important question of 
political reform. 
EVery reformer has his strong point and it would not seem that 
political r~form was Theodore Roosevelt's. That is not to say that he 
was completely uninterested but there were other problems with which he 
was more concerned. This, in part at any rate, may be due to the fact that 
Roosevelt was, until 1912, always on good terms with his party and received 
its support when running for public office. He was a strong believer in 
party unity. 2 It might be said that he was always one of the party althoug 
not always one with it. 
1 Alberto. Barton, La Follette's Winning of Wisconsin, 1894-1904, 2nd 
edition, no publ., Madison, Wisconsin, 1924, 25. 
2 Pringle, 90. 
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Long before the Progressive platform defined that party's stand on 
questionf of political reform, Roosevelt had an opportunity to voice his 
objection to the system of boss rule as evidenced in Congress. As he was 
leaving office, the Insurgents in the House of Representatives asked his 
support in their attempt to oust Cannon as Speaker of the House. Roosevelt 
maintained that he could do nothing, although ne did approve of their 
course, because he did not know how Taft would stand on the matter. He 
did, however, promise to write a letter, that was not for publication, 
which the Progressives could show to their friends and which would 
express his stand. 3 On the day before he left office, Roosevelt said that 
he could not write the letter after all but offered to introduce two of 
the Insurgents, Nelson and Gardner, to Taft and to intercede. He took them 
to Taft, who was in another part of the room, but Taft has stated that he 
only introduced them and madeno plea for their cause. 4 
After Taft was elected, he suggested to Roosevelt that Cannon be 
removed as Speaker. Roosevelt was most unenthusiastic about this, pointing 
out that, though he believed the step was desirable, it would not be 
exPedient. 5 On this evidence it would not seem that Roosevelt was overly 
eager to destroy Ghe power of the political bosses as represented by 
Cannon in 1909. 
The Progressive platform devoted some of its most concrete planks to 
3 Hechler, 50, citing John )1. Nelson, interview, Feb., 1939. 
4 Ibid., 51. 
5 Mowry, 42. 
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the discussion of political reforms. These included the publication of 
campaign contributions and expenditures, the registration of lobbyists, 
public committee hearings in Congress, except on foreign affairs, and the 
recording of votes in coMrrittee, and a ruling that federal appointees could 
not take part in political conventions for nomination of elective state 
or national officials nor could they hold office in state or national 
political organizations. 6 The plank on the most important questions of 
political reform was equally definite and is worth quoting in full: 
The party declares for direct primaries for the nomination 
of State and National officers, for nation-wide preferential 
primaries for candidates for the presidency; for the direct 
election.of United States Senators by the people, and we urge 
on the States the policy of the short ballot, with respon-
sibility to the people secured by the initiative, referendum, 
and recall. 7 
The platform also urged the extension of the vote to women. 8 There 
remains now the examination of the records of Roosevelt and La Follette 
in the light of the Progressive party platform. 
As was common with the masculine leaders of the d~, neither Roosevelt 
nor La Follette was active in the fight for woman suffrage. Roosevelt, 
however, evidently did give some thought to the matter for, as governor 
of New York, he recommended to the legislature in his annual message of 
1899 the "desirability of gradually extending the sphere in which the 
suffrage can be exercised by women." 9 I could find no evidence, however, 
6 Payne, 306, from the Progressive Party Platform. 
7 Ibid., 305. 
8 Pringle, 567, citing Letter of Roosevelt to Taft, Oct. 12 and Nov. 
10, 1908, Roosevelt MSS. 
9 Roosevelt, Public Papers, 25. 
that he followed up this recommendation and in 1912 it seemed that the 
idea was new to him and he gave it only half-hearted support. 10 
The major questions of the hour revolved around the initiative, 
referendum, recall, and direct primaries. An examination of the stands 
of Roosevelt and La Follette on these will be a good indication of their 
interest in and positions regarding political reform. 
Roosevelt's position on these matters of major importance does not 
seem to have been consistent. When the Insurgents in Congress were just 
beginning to unite on a program, both La Follette and Bourne wrote to 
Roosevelt who was then on his safari in Africa. They asked his opinion 
of the policies of the group--those policies that were later included 
in the Declaration of Principles of the National Progressive Republican 
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League. Roosevelt replied that he was not at all decided about the recall, 
the initiative and the referendum, but agreed witn the rest of the program.ll 
rt would seem that, in early 1910, Roosevelt was not convinced of the 
wisdom of these reforms. 
When Roosevelt returned from Africa in June of the same year, he 
found that the direct primary was an issue in the New York campaign of that 
year and that the liberal Republicans, wnose leader he had been, were 
supporting the bill under Governor Hughes. Roosevelt joined the fight. 
On June 29, 1910, just eleven days after his return from Africa, he sent a 
10 Pringle, 567. 
11 Mowry, 176-177, citing Letter of Theodore Roosevelt to La Follette, 
Jan. 3, 1910 and to Jonothan Bourne, Jan. 2, 1910, Roosevelt MSS. 
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telegram to the chairman of the New York Republican State Committee giving 
his approval to the direct prim~ bill and expressing his earnest hope 
that it would be made a law. This placed him in the forefront of the 
fight for the bill in his state. 12 
As was mentioned in Chapter Two, Roosevelt became chairman of the 
New York State Republican Convention when it met in 1910. He dominated 
the convention and carried all his points. 13 out of this convention came 
a genuine direct nomination plank for the Republican platform. 14 This 
would seem as though Roosevelt was a supporter of the direct primary. But 
at this very time, Roosevelt was writing to Henry Cabot Lodge: 
'' Hughes made a fight on an issue upon which the people were 
not really aroused ••• He had created a situation, and had put 
me in a situation, where the least of two evils was to stand 
by him. The fight is v~ry disagreeable •••• There is no way out 
of it that I can see. 1~ 
This would hardly seem that Roosevelt was enthu3astic in his support of the 
primary bill. The peop~~ of New York were no more enthusiastic. The 
legislature had defeated t11e bill in July and the people defeated the 
Republican candidate for governor, Henry 1. Stimson in November. 16 
In the summer of 1910, before the New York Republican Convention met, 
Roosevelt went on a speaking tour of the West. At osawatomie, Kansas, 
on August 27, he gave the famous speech that formed the basis of his New 
12 Bishop, II, 299-300. 
13 Ibid., II, 304. 
14 Payne, 35. 
15 Letter of Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, September 21, 1910, 
Bishop, II, 303-304. 
16 Pringle, 537-538. 
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Nationalism. Yet, despite his progressive ideas on other subjects, he 
made no mention of the initiative and referendum, no did he mention the 
recall of judicial decisions that became a part of the Progressive party 
platform. 17 
When the National Progressive Rep~blic~~ League was fanned early in 
1911, its leaders naturally asked Roosevelt for an endorsement. He hedg~d. 
He told Bourne that tnough he was in sympathy with its purposes, in a 
general way, he felt that certain limitations and safeguards should be 
added. He said that he was uncertain about the recall on a national scale.lB 
Whatever his feelings were on the other specific measures which the organi-
zation advocated, Roosevelt•s name was not among tnose sponsoring the 
League. 
Roosevelt•s failure to support the League and his criticism of some 
of its measures are most amazing in view of his activities early in 1911, 
right after he nad refused tolend the prestige of his name to the League. 
He went on another of his speru{ing tours, this time through the South and 
the West. At Phoenix, Arizona and several places in california, he 
specifically advocated the recall of judicial decisions, saying that he 
favored it only when, by actual experience, the people were driven to it 
in order to do away with some serious evil. 19 The members of the League 
must have been not a little confused by this since the recall was Roosevelt•s 
17 Ibid., 543. 
18 Ibid., 548-549, citing Letter of Roosevelt to Bourne, Jan. 2, 1911, 
ra-Follette Papers. 
19 Bishop, II, )10. 
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greatest objection to the League's Declaration. It must also have been 
confusing to the readers of Outlook for in his article on the League in 
that magazine, Roosevelt had given it only luke-warm support and had made 
no mention of the initiative, referendum, and recall. 20 
Roosevelt finally completely allied himself with the principles which 
the Progressives had been fighting for wnen he made known his candidacy 
for the nomination for the Presidency in 1912. On February 21, speaking 
at Columbus, Ohio, he gave his "A Charter of Democracy" speech. In this, 
he termed himself a Progressive and declared his support for 11 all govern-
mental devices which will make the representatives of the people more 
easily and more certainly responsible to the people's will." 21 Among 
these devices, he included the recall of judicial decisions, the initiative 
and referendum on legislation, the short ballot, popular election of 
United States Senators, direct primaries, presidential preference primaries, 
and popular election of delegates to national nominating conventions. He 
closed his address 11with an earnest plea for social justice, for the 
moralization not only of political conditions, but of industrial con-
ditions.n 22 Thus did Roosevelt unequivocally place himself on the side 
of the Progressives and begin his fight for the presidential nomination in 
1912. 
There remain only a few more points to make regarding Roosevelt's stand 
on political refonn. Even after his campaign as an independent Progressive 
20 Pringle, 349, citing Outlook, January 14, 1911. 
21 Haynes, 427. 
22 ~., 427. 
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candidate in 1912, he evidently entertained some doubts as to the wisdom 
of all the measures which his platform had contained. After the direct 
primary for president was written into the Democratic platform in 1912--
their convention met before the Progressive convention--Roosevelt championed 
it but he then changed his mind although his own platform contained a 
presidential preference plank. 23 Shortly after the election was over, 
Roosevelt expressed his doubts as to the wisdom of another of his platform's 
planks. In a letter to a friend in Boston, he showed a definite weakening 
in his support of the recall as applied to judges. 24 
In conclusion we must mention the platfrom plank for a corrupt practices 
act. Roosevelt advocated this in his speech before ~~e Progressive conven-
tion in 1912, 25 but seems to have done little more about it. His own state 
of New York did not pass such a bill until 1909, 25 and I found no record 
that he had worked for such a measure earlier. 
In summarizing Roosevelt 1 s stand on tne questions of political reform, 
we cannot help but be struck by his inconsistency on the subject. That he 
was a firm believer in honesty in government cannot be denied, 26 but he 
was evidently in doubt as to the wisdom of the specific measures advocated 
23 Oscar King Davis, Released for Publication, some Inside Political 
History of Theodore Roosevelt and His Times, l:'898-1918, Houghton 
Mifflin Company, New York, 192;;--312, 433. 
24 Letter of Roosevelt to George D. Crocker, November 19, 1912, Bishop, 
II, 348. 
25 S. Gale Lowrie, Corrupt Practices at Elections (Comparative Legislative 
Reference Department), Madison, Feb., 1911, 51, citing New York Consoli-
dated Laws of 1909, Ch. XVII, sees. 175, 36~, 543-561; Ch. LXXXVIII, 
sees, 751-7B2.-
26 durwitz, 77. 
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by the progressive element in both parties. He probably did not give great 
thought to the matter until forced to do so when he began his fight for the 
Republican nomination in 1912. He had directed his reforming efforts 
previously toward different abuses. As has been said, this may well have 
been due to the fact that Roosevelt laid great stress upon party loyalty, 27 
and never, before 1912, had an actual falling out witn ti1e regular members 
of his party. Under sucn circumsta..>'lces, ne could hardly be overly critical 
of the methods employed by that party to keep itself in power. 
La Follette's record on political reform was very different from 
Roosevelt's. It was really a major part of the program which he sponsored 
for Wisconsin and which gave him his reputation as a reformer. La Follette 
was especially interested in the direct prim~J and did some of nis greatest 
work in its behalf. Indeed, even an apologist for the 11Stalwartsn in 
Wisconsin said of him: 
It must be acknowledged that to Robert M. La Follette should 
be given whatever credit is due for the ultimate adoption of 
the prima~ election system in Wisconsin. While others may have 
originated the plan and drea"D.ed over its success at some future 
time, he took the matter in both hands and went gut to cultivate 
the crop, even if he did not sow all tne seed. 2 
But La Follette's interest was tne result of an unhappy experience with the 
Republican party in Wisconsin and before this time his record was not 
unsullied. 
27 Rhodes, 218. 
28 Emanuel L. Philipp, assisted by Edgar T. Wheelock, Political Reforms 
in Wisconsin, a Historical Review of the Subjects of Pri~a~ Election, 
Taxation and Railway Regulation, E-.-L:-?hilipp, Mulwaukee, Wisconsin, 
n. d., 21-.--Subsequently referred to as Philipp. 
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La Follette made use of all the tricks of the political trade and took 
under his banner all recruits without scanning their motives in joining 
him nor their actions in the field while he was engaged in his fight with 
the political 11bosses 11 of Wisconsin. 29 In 1894, when he was promoting the 
nomination of Nils Haugen for governor, he did not oppose t11e use of the 
caucus and convention ~stem and he used some pretty shaFp, though legal, 
practices in attempting to control both of these bodies. 30 In 1896, he 
suggested to Haugen and Judge Emil Baensch tnat they, along w:i.th himself, 
become candidates for the Republican nomination for governor with the 
understanding that all would throw their votes to the leader in the conven-
tion. Haugen refused but La Follette and Baensch went into the convention 
witll this idea. They were botn defeated, however. 3l Also, La Follette 
did not object to collecting campaign funds from state employees in early 
1900. Haugen recalled that his last contribution to the La Follette cam-
paign fund was in the spring election of delegates to the National Convention 
in 1912. 32 
Yet it would not be fair to judge La Follette on the basis of these 
efforts of his to n fight fire with fire." In fact, he w as from his earliest 
days in politics the opponent of the political overlords of his state. His 
first position was obtained in the face of the opposition of the Republican 
29 Barton, 29. 
30 Allen Fraser Lovejoy, La Follette and the Establishment of the Direct 
Primary in Wisconsin, 189o-19oh, (voi.-r; Patterson Prize-Essays), 
Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1941, 30. 
31 Haugen, 118. 
32 Ibid., 141. 
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uboss 11 of his territory. He did not owe his election to Congress in 1884 
to the •toossesn, either. 33 La Follette definitely split with his party over 
the Sawyer-.Seibecker affair in 1891 34 although he did not immediately settle 
upon the principles of political reform that later became a part of his 
program. 
La Follette resolved upon the direct primary as an &'1swer to "boss" 
rule in 1896. In that year, he was a candidate for the governorship. Many 
districts of his state sent uninstructed delegates to the convention although 
the caucuses in those same districts had expressed a preference for La 
Follette. Ti1is prevented his obtaining the nomination. Knowing that the 
fault lay with a 11 system that permitted corrupt agents to betray their 
principles", La Follette resolved never to compromise with the system and 
never to give up the fight until he 11had made government truly representative 
of the people." 35 From tnat time one, one matter was supreme with him 
and that was the primary election law. On that he set his heart despite the 
fact that some of his followers had tneir doubts and expressed them to him.36 
La Follette began a study· of the direct primary question and, in 
February of 1897, he was ready to give public utterance to his ideas. In 
that month, he gave a speech at the University of Chicago in which he 
publicly advocated for the first time prima~ elections for the direct 
33 La Follette, 43-45. 
34 Ibid., 142-164. 
35 rna., 195. 
36 Haugen, 138. 
nomination of all political candidates. In concluding this speech, 
La Follette outlined a model law. It provided for nominations petitions to 
be signed by a certain per cent of the voters of a district at the last 
general election, and set down strict ~~les regarding pre-primary caucuses, 
electioneering, bribery, and the canvassing of the vote. It also stipulated 
that a committee to formulate platforms should be elected along with the 
party's candidates. 37 
After this speech, La Follette containued his c~npaign for the direct 
primary throughout the year 1897. On July 5, he spoke at Mineral Point, 
Wisconsin and promoted his direct primary plan. He also attacked tne state 
administration's attitude on the corporation and taxation questions. 38 
on August 20, he reiterated his belief in the direct primaF~ in a speech at 
Fern Dell and on March 12, he gave his f~ous Ann Arbor speech. 39 There, 
before the students of the University of Michiga"l, La Follette took an 
unequivocal stand in favor of the abolition of all caucases and conventions 
and the nomination of all candidates for state, congressional, legislative, 
judicial, and local offices by a direct vote of tile electors, using the 
Australian ballot. 40 This speech on 11 Primary :Slectionsn was important 
because it received nation-wide publicity and made La Follette a national 
figure. 41 
La Follette's work began to bear fruit. Although he was again defeated 
37 Lovejoy, 35. 
38 Barton, 80. 
39 Ibid., 80. 
40 Plirripp, 2L 
41 Lovejoy, 43. 
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for the Republican nomination for governor in 1898, the regular state 
Republicans adopted a plank in tneir platform, in response to public senti-
ment, that suggested that they would establish the primary law in 1898. 
The plank was most indefinite, however, merely admitting that there were 
defects in the caucus and convention system and promising legislation that 
nwould secure to every citizen the freest expression of his cnoice in the 
selection of candidates." 42 Yet it was a step forw·ard and La Follette's 
county fair campaign was largely responsible. 43 
In 1900, it was obvious that La Follette would again be a candidate 
for the Republican nomination for governor. Yet, in the ear~ part of tne 
year, he made no mention of the direct primary. This was evidently in 
the interest of party harmony and an effort to obtain adcli tional support 
from the less conservative members of the 11Stalwart11 faction. This silence 
led many to believe that La Follette had given up his pet tneory and when 
they found otherwise they felt that tney had been duped. 44 
Once La Follette was assured of the nomination in 1900 by the defection 
of the otl1er candidates, ne came out so strongly for a primary bill that it 
was obvious that he would not run on a platform which did not have it as a 
plank. 45 When the convention met, he insisted on, and got, a platform 
pledge providing that: 
caucuses and conventions for the nomination of candidates 
should be abolished by legislative enactment, and that all 
42 Philipp, 21. 
43 Lovejoy, 38-39. 
44 Philipp, 25-27. 
45 Lovejoy, 52. 
all candidates for state, legislative, congressional and county 
offices be nominated by a primary election upon the same day 
by direct vote under the Australian ballot. 46 
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Even this unequivocal statement did not alienate the regulars for in 
1900 all Republicans worked for La Follette's election, including such 
"Stalwarts" as Spooner and Quarles. 47 During the campaign, the candidate 
made few references to reform. La Follette was also working for party 
harmony. 48 once the campaign was over and he was elected, it was a differ-
ent matter, however. We can now trace the history of primary legislation 
in the Wisconsin legislature. 
The first attempt to regulate primaries by law in Wisconsin antedated 
La Follette's interest in the subject by many years. In 1891, tne Keogh 
law was passed but this applied to Yi.lwaukee county only. 49 The Keogh 
law was amended at each session of the legislature through 1897. Up to 
this time, the mean who subsequently became tne leaders in the fight for 
primary election reform had taken no nand in the framing of sucn laws as 
passed the legislature to better conditions. The movement had been an 
evolutionary one. The last of the evolutionary measures was the Lange bill, 
passed in 1899, wnich extended the operation of the primary law to the 
whole state in a modified form. It was essentially an experiment. 50 
But before 1899, the revolutionary movement to affect a real change 
46 Philipp, 27. 
47 Lovejoy, 47. 
48 Barton, 163. 
49 Philipp, 10. 
So Ibid., 17. 
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and improvement in the situation had begun. The sentiment growing among 
the people was evidenced by many things. Philipp, an avowed opponent of 
the 11Half-breeds 11 says of this time: 
Already the revolutionary movement had been foreshadowed by 
the introduction of a sweeping direct primary election bill 
in 1897 by Assemblyman William T. Lewis of Racine, in public 
addresses by Robert ~. La Follette, a tentative bill prepared 
for publication and publicly circulated by non. L. J. Nash of 
1;~anitowoc, and a bill introduced in the assembly by Gen. George 
E. Bryan in51899 as a suggestion of wnat Mr. La Follette then advocated. 1 
The Lewis primary bill was the first of the truly progressive measures 
introduced into tne ~Usconsin legisl&ture. When he was elected, Lewis had 
two projects which he hoped to have the legislature consider. One concerned 
convict labor, wnich he hoped to keep from competing with free labor; the 
other was the direct nomination of all candidates at primary elections. 52 
On arriving in Madison, he asked La Follette to draw up the primary bill to 
introduce to the legislature. La Follette was then working on his speech 
for the University of Cnicago so he turned the job over to his law partners, 
Sam ;:.rarper and A. G. Zimmermann. He clid, however, carefully supervise the 
provisions of the bill. 53 The bill was indefinitely postponed on recommen-
dation of the committee which reported it to the assembly. 54 
The second bill to require nominations by direct vote was introduced 
in the legislature by Bryant in 1899. This is the bill referred to above. 
This measure was almost identical in its provisions with the Lewis bill and 
51 Ibid., 18. 
52 I"'bfd:., 20. 
53 LOVejoy, 35, also Barton, 78-79. 
54 Philipp, 20. 
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it met the same fate at the hands of the legislature. 55 
Vlhen the legislature next met La Follette was governor of the state and 
the Republican platform had expressed its approval of the prima~ election 
bill. It seemed reasonable to expect some positive action on the measure. 
yet, before the measure came up for consideration, there were rumors that 
tne 11Stalwarts 11 would attempt to defeat it. On January 9, 1901, one of the 
Madison papers printed an article to that effect. 56 Whether this is true 
or not is a matter of dispute. Philipp mainta:ins that it is not and says 
that the Senate committee on privileges and election was not packed with 
anti-La Follette men thus proving that there was no conspiracy afoot. He 
holds that there were three administration men on the committee, one 
"progressi ven who was neutral, and one "Stalwart". 57 Lovejoy tells a 
different story. He divides the committee into two administration men, two 
"Stalwarts 11--he moves Senator Hatton from La Follette's camp--and one neutral. 
The latter, in both cases, was Senator vVhitehead, who, although not yet 
allied with the "Stalwarts", was felt to be opposed to La Follette's primary 
measure. 58 As events developed, he later did oppose the bill. 59 In view 
of Philipp's patently anti-La Follette attitude and on the face of the records 
of the men involved, Lovejoy's explanation seems the more reasonable. 
The primary bill of 1901 had an extremely stormy trip through the 
~5 Ibid., 20. 
~6 Lovejoy, 56, citing Madison state Journal, Jan. 9, 1901. 
~7 Philipp, 30. 
~~ Lovejoy, 59. 
~9 Ibid., 64. 
65 
Wisconsin legislature before finally being vetoed by the governor. The 
administration's measure was introduced simultaneously in the Assembly 
by E. Ray Stevens and in the Senate by George p. Miller on January 28. Both 
were promptly referred to committee. On lv1arcn 18, the bill came before the 
Assembly. It was placed on the agenda for tae following day. The March 
nineteenth session began at 7:30 p. M. with both the administration forces 
and the 11 Stalwarts 11 ready for battle. Before the measure could be brought 
to a vote, E. A. Williams, one of t~e members who opposed passage, moved 
na call of the house." The following morning, after a hectic all-night 
session, the governor's followers finally got the bill "ordered to engross-
ment and a third reading11 • It was then placed on the calendar for final 
consideration. 60 On March 22, tne Stevens bill passed the Assembly and 
was sent to the Senate. 61 
In the Senate, tne bill encountered great dii'ficul ty. When it was 
first realized that there would be trouble over it, the "Stalwarts" suggested 
compromise. They offered to refer the measure to the people at the elections 
in April, 1902. The administration supporters refused because the machine 
always was organized for election but many people wno were indep~ndent 
voters voted only in November. The "Half-breeds" thus reasoned that the 
"Stalwarts" could defeat the measure. 62 
The primary bill came up for consideration by the Senate on April 11. 
But before t~is, on April 9, two opposition Senators, Hagemeister and 
6o Philipp, 36, 41-44. 
61 Lovejoy, 59. 
62 ~., 63. 
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Kreutzer, introduced bills as substitutes for the administration measure. 
The Hagemeister bill was crudely drawn and provided for the nomination of 
county officers only at primary elections. Kreutzer's bill provided for the 
election of delegates to all conventions as well as the election of the 
county officers at primaries. 63 It was a much more carefully prepared bill 
but fell far short of the demands of the administration. 
The original primary bill sponsored by La Follette was defeated by 
the Senate, 20-13. Another attempt at compromise was made by the "Stalwarts" 
but was rebuffed by the administration. After s orne maneuvering by both 
sides, Kreutzer withdrew his bill and left the way clear for the Hagemeister 
measure. He then offered an amendment to the bill in the form of a referen-
dum clause submitting it to a vote of the people. This was carried. The 
Hagemeister bill was then passed by the identical vote which had defeated 
the measure supported by La Follette. 64 
vVhen the ~agemeister bill reached the governor, La Follette showed 
his determination to work for a real reform measure. He vetoed the bill 
and sent the Senate a scathing reprimand. Even his critic, Philipp, admitted 
that "Governor La Follette was justified in vetoing the Hagemeister bill." 65 
La Follette realized that if he signed it, he would have no further oppor-
tunity to strive for an acceptable bill. This was consistent with his 
theory of not taking half a loaf when there was a chance of getting the 
63 Philipp, 4 7. 
64 Ibid., 47. 
65 Ibid., 47-48. 
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w'nole loaf with a little added effort. 66 La Follette explaintedlis position 
to the people of the state ~1u he could feel fairly sure of their sympathy 
because of the nature of the bill presented to him. one of the current 
magazines cormnented on it in an editorial, saying that "a more farcical 
bit of legislation has rarely commanded the approval of even the anti-reform 
elements." 67 The people of Wisconsin, who had elected La Follette over-
whelrningly on a platform calling for a strong direct primar;:• bill, could 
not help but be aligned on the governor's side. 
In 1902, La Follette was again the Republican nordnee for goverLor. He 
made the question of direct primaries one of the major issues of his campaign 
In his opening speech, he stated that the primary election bill was "part 
of tne Progressive movement.'' 68 He went on to answer the objections of his 
critics to the effect that the primaries woula result in minority candidates 
being nominated with the irrefutable argument: 
Better an honest plurality representing tne honest judgment 
of a large constituency tnan a macnine-made convention majority 
which eXP.resses the will of only a small coterie of political 
bosses. '69 
He concluded his speech with a summary of the situation as he saw it. 
The problem of government today is protection from public service 
corporations and political machine domination. Direct nomination 
of all candidates by the people offers a simple, practicable 
solution. It is for us witn simple courage and patriotism to 
discharge our plain duty to the state. 70 
66 La Follette, 268. 
67 outlook, "Governor La Follette's Ringing Message, vol. 68, no. 4, !Jew 
York, 201 (editorial in tne issue of May 25, 1901). 
68 Lovejoy, 71, citing the !.[ilwaukee Free Press, Oct. 1, 1902. 
69 Ibid., 72, citation as above. ---
70 Ibid., 73, citation as in note 68. 
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Despite La Follette's stand on the direct primary and his criticism 
of the "Stalwarts", Spooner and the other 11Stalwart" leaders told their 
followers to vote for him in 1902 for the sake of party unity. 71 Thus, 
La Follette, as well as Roosevelt, was helped by the machinery of the 
Republican party. In La Follette•s case, however, after his one peace 
effort in 1900, no further efforts were made by him to promote party harmony 
within the state. 
La Follette was elected in 1902 and it was obvious that the primary 
bill would be brought to the attention of the legislature once again. The 
primary election law was accordingly introduced into the Assembly on 
February 2 and was rapidly passed on February 6, 1903 by a vote of 70 to 
19. It was just as rapidly referred to the Senate, reaching that body on 
February 9. 72 
Once it reached the Senate, the bill had a more difficult time. rt 
was referred to the Committee on privileges and elections. On March 26, 
the bill was reported out of the committee with minor amendments. In the 
discussion that followed, Senator Gavney added a referendum amendment. The 
bill was then passed on the same day by a vote of 18 to 15. The Assembly 
accepted the Senate measure on March 31 but struck out the section on the 
referendum. on April 1, the Senate voted to adhere to the amendment on 
referendum and the bill then went to conference between the houses. 
After much debate, an agreement was finally reached. It was finally 
71 Raney, 289. 
72 Philipp, 65-71. The history of the progress of the primary election 
bill of 1903 is taken from these pages. 
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agreed to submit the entire matter to a vote of the people at the November 
election in 1904, instead of submitting the question of applying the law 
to the nomination of state and legislative candidates only. The bill, with 
t.ilis provision for referendum, was passeci by both Assembly and Senate and 
was ready to go to La Follette on May 20. He signed it and the matter was 
then up to the people. 
In 1904, the people of Wisconsin elected La Follette governor for the 
tnird time and also expressed their approval of the direct primary election 
bill. Although only about half as many people voted for the bill as voted 
for governor, the measure was overwhelmingly approved. out of a total of 
210,891 votes cast, 61.9 per cent or 130,699 votes were in favor of the 
direct primary, while 31.1 or 80,192 votes were against it. This gave the 
bill a majority of 50,507. 73 
Wisconsin was the first state to adopt the state-1ride direct primary 74 
and the credit for this reform--one of those advocated by the Progressive 
party--must go to La Follette. And La Follette did not end his devotion 
to the cause after it was achieved in Wisconsin. Wnen he wrote the Declara-
tion of Principles for the National Progressive Republican League, he 
included it as one of the policies for m1ich the League would fight. 75 
And t:1is was before the Progressive party platform was written. 
An investigation of La Follette's stand on some of the other policies 
73 Lovejoy, 91, also Philipp, 82. 
74 Charles c. Platt, What La Follette's State Is Doing; Some Battles 
Waged for More FreedOm, Batavia Times Press~Batavia, New York, 1924, 
215. --
75 La Follette, 495-496. 
70 
supported by the Progressive party platform is now in order. Because of 
the difficalty which his own state had ·wit~ the lobbyists, he was c>..n early 
opponent of this group. When his followers founded their newspaper, The 
state, in 1897, they gave a s~~ary of La Follette's program. In addition 
-
to its advocacy of the direct primary, the platfonn included a recornmen-
dation to enact and enforce 11 laws to pnnish bribery in every form by the 
lobby in the legislature and wherever it assails the integrity of the 
public service. n 76 In announcing his candidacy for the governorship in 
1898, La Follette continued this idea by speaking strongly against tne 
lobbies. 77 Then wnen he was elected governor, in his first message to 
tile legislature, in 1901, La Follette urged that lobbies be curbed by 
legislation. 78 His recommendations were ignored until the progressive 
legislation of 1903. That year, Wisconsin got its law governing lobbies. 
It required all lobbyists to register with the secretary of state, giVing 
the names and business of their employers; and further provided that no 
lobbyist should hold secret communication with legislators or legislative 
committees. 79 La Follette continued his interest in the reform and it was 
likewise included among the Principles of the National Progressive Republican 
Leagae. 
The program of La Follette as given in The State also included a demand 
that laws be enacted and enforced to prohibit corrapt practices in election.8° 
. 76 Ibid., 209-210. 
'77 Barton, 110-111. 
78 Ibid., 167. 
79 ra-Follette, 320. 
80 Ibid., 209-210. 
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The following year, 1898, the first corrupt practices law was passed in 
Wisconsin forbidding corrupt practices at elections. 81 In 1905, while 
La Follette was governor, the law was strengthened. It then provided that 
"illegal registration or voting is punished by fine or imprisonment" and 
that all candidates had to file statements of expenditures within thirty 
days of the election or be fined. 82 In 1907, the law was extended to 
apply to primary elections as well as general ones. 83 And this reform 
was another one of tnose wnich La Follette included in the program of the 
League. 
Although La Follette was far from a suffragist, he evidently did feel 
tnat women should take a more active part in the government. In his message 
to. the legislature in 1901, he showed that he was at least abreast 1ri th the 
times on this question by recommending that women be appointed on various 
educational and charitable boards within the state. 84 
Finally, in concluding this section on La Follette &!d political reform, 
it might be well to review again the National Progressive Republican League's 
Declaration of Principles. These were written largely by La Follette and 
snow his feelings almost two full years before the Progressive party was 
formed. In addition to the previously mentioned provisions relative to 
the direct primary, to control of lobbyists, and the corrupt practices act, 
the Declaration asked for the direct election of United States Senators, 
81 Lowrie, 71, citing Wisconsin Revised Statutes, 1898, sees. 13, 4478-4546. 
82 Ibid., 71, citing Wisconsin Laws of 1905, ch. 313, 502. 
83 Ibid., 71, citing Wisconsin LaWS 01 I9IT1, ch. 666, sees, 11-24. 
84 Barton, 167. --- --
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direct election of delegates to national conventions with an opportunity 
for tne voter to express a choice as to presidential candidates, and 
@nendments to the constitutions of the various states providing for the 
initiative, referendum, and recall. 85 This would seem conclusive proof 
that La Follette gave thougnt to the problem of political reform and favored 
it. 
On the basis of the evidence presented, it seems obVious that La 
Follette's record on political reform had more to commend it than did 
Roosevelt's. He was interested in the problem from tne very oeginning of 
nis career while Roosevelt was still expressing doubt when the League 
was formed in 1911. 86 Another tning that counts heavily in La Follette's 
favor is the fact tnat he achieved his reforms without the aid of Roosevelt, 
then president and considered a leading progressive. It was generally 
understood that the national administration was hostile to the Wisconsin 
movement during Roosevelt's incumbency. He gave Federal appointments to 
the "Stalwarts" in the state upon the recommendation of the V![isconsin 
Senators who were themselves "Stalwarts". In visiting Madison in April of 
1903, in the midst of the fight for La Follette's reforms, Roosevelt did 
nothing to aid the governor in his endeavors. Vmen La Follette's delegation 
to the National Convention of 1904 asked for his help in getting their places 
in the convention, :1e put them off. He did not support them until after the 
85 La Follette, 209-210. 
86 Mowry, 176-177, citing Letter of Theodore Roosevelt to LaFollette, 
Jan. 3, 1910 and to Jonathan Bourne, Jan. 2, 1910, Roosevelt MSS. 
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Wisconsin Supreme Court declared tnem tne legal delegates and even tnen he 
allowed the "Stalwartsn delegation to be seated in the convention. 87 
Roosevelt's first endorsement of La Follette came in September, 1910, 
after the latter had achieved a sweeping landslide at the polls in the race 
for the Senatorship of the state. Roosevelt then said that it was the duty 
of the Wisconsin legislature to return La Follette to the Senate. 88 This 
wasunenthusiastic praise indeed. 
In conclusion, La Follette did some of his greatest work in the field 
of political reform. His Declaration of Principles was taken, almost intact, 
by the makers of the platform of the Progressive party as the basis of their 
policy. And as early as 1897, he had evolved a well-thought out program 
of reform. Roosevelt, on the other hand, was comparatively disinterested 
in political reform as a formal policy. Since this point was so basic to 
the progressive movement, his failure to wholeheartedly support it thoughout 
his career is a serious defect. His sudden allegiance to the principles 
of this reform and his coolness to them after that campaign do not speak 
well of his sincerity ru1d carFy the tinge of political expediency. Certainly 
on this point at least, La Follette was by far the more progressive of the 
two men. 
g7 Barton, 380-384. 
88 Ibid., 384. 
CnAP'rilt IV 
THE QUESTION OF EMPLOYEES 
In view of the current interest in the rights of the working man, it 
seems strange that neither Roosevelt nor La Follette took more interest in 
legislation to relieve the condition of the laborers of their day. It is 
probable, however, that their attitude was a result of the "laissez-faire 11 
principle which was prevalent in their youth. Both of them expressed their 
interest in the working man largely through forms of relief other than direct 
legialation to improve his condition. 
The Progressive party platform devoted one of its lengthiest sections 
to its numerous labor planks. Relative to the use of the court in labor 
disputes it said that the party was against tne issuance of injunctions in 
cases arising out of labor difficulties when such injunctions would not 
apply wnen no labor disputes existed. The platform further advocated 
legislation for the prevention O'f industrial accidents, occupational diseases 
overwork, and involuntary unemployment. 'E'1e list of reforms also included 
tae fixing of minimum safety and health standards, the proi1ibi tion of child 
labor and minimum wages for women with all night work forbidden. The plat-
form showed its concern for the more defenseless victims of industrialization 
further by sponsoring an eight-hour day for women and children. The party 
felt that one day's rest in seven was essential for all and wanted to see 
convict contract labor abolished. It approved of compensation for death 
by industrial accident and for injury and trade diseases and of social 
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insurance. Finally, it favored the organization of worker to protect their 
interests and the establishment of a separate Depar~~ent of Labor in the 
cabinet. 1 
For Roosevelt's attitude on the question of refonn of laboring con-
di tions, we can best begin with his record in his home state of New York. 
There he first attracted real attention wn~l he was appointed a member of 
a comrni ttee of Assemblymen to investigate the ma..J.ufacture of cigars in the 
tenement houses. The Cigar-Makers 1 Union wanted to prohibit this practice. 
Roosevelt went into the tenements and saw for hintself tne abominable con-
di tions that existed. As a result he reported the bill favorably anci. ius 
was tne determining vote of the three man committee. The bill was poorly 
drmvn but passed the legislature and was signed by Cleveland, then governor 
of l•;ew York, at Roosevelt 1 s suggestion. 2 
Later tne courts of Hew YorK declared the bill unconstitutional 
maintaining that it interferred with the sacredness of t11e home. Hoosevelt 
wa.s exasperated by the attitude of t-he court and said of it that 11 i t was 
this case which first waked me to a oim and partial understanding of the fact 
that the courts were not necessarily the best judges of what should be done 
to better sociaJ. and industrial conditions." 3 
Despite Roosevelt's cna'Ttpionship of the bill to forbid c.fgar-making 
in tenement houses, labor in New York was cool to him. The friendliness and 
1 Payne, 307-309, from the Progressive Party Platform. 
2 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 88. 
3 Ibid., 89. 
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praise given him when he first supported the bill, changed when he, in 
urging Cleveland to sign it, told the governor that he was opposed to most 
trade union measures. 4 
In addition to the activity mentioned above, Roosevelt's position on 
the various labor bills before tne Assembly during the time he served in 
that body give an indication of his feelings at that period in nis public 
life. The unions in 1883 were demanding the abolition of prison labor which 
could produce more cheaply and whose products were sold on contract to 
companies in competition with free labor. This obviously kept the wages of 
free working men down. A bill to abolish prison contract labor was intra-
duced into the !Jew York legislature. Roosevelt opposed it and delayed action 
on the measure in the Assembly even though the voters of the state had, at 
the polls, indicated their approval of the bill. 5 In a speech before the 
Assembly explaining his &and, he said that he did "not pretenci to have the 
interests of the working men 2_t heart." 6 He did not want to abolish the 
system of prison labor but he did indicate tnat he was open to suggestions 
relative to its reform. 7 The position that Roosevelt took on this matter 
did not meet with the approval of labor even as much as did his position 
on the Cigar-Makers 1 Bill. 
A brief summ~ 8 of the way Roosevelt voted on other labor bills is 
4 Hurwitz, 88, citing Cigar gakers Official Journal, March 6, 1883. 
5 Ibid., 93, citing New York State Bureau of Labor Statistics First Annual 
'RePOrt. 1883, I, 20,40'5'";""882, 966. - ---
6 Ibid., 93-94, citing speech before Assembly on Convict Labor Bill, 
ROOSevelt MSS. 
7 Ibid., 94,-clting New York Evening Journal, April 18, 1883. 
8 Ibid., 95-104. 
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equally enlightening. In the Agembly, he regularly opposed bills regulating 
the wages and hours of male workers. In 1882, he voted against an increase 
in salary for city laborers in New York Oity, Brooklyn, and Buffalo. That 
same year, Roosevelt voted 11 no11 to an increase for tne policemen and fire-
men in the same towns. T'.ais bill was passed but vetoed. 1Yhen it was revived 
the following year, it was passed again and signed by the governor and the 
following year an additional wage increase was provided. Roosevelt was 
against all of these bills. 
On the question of .aours which men could or had to work Roosevelt 
helped to defeat an attempt to put teeth in the eight-hour day law for 
state employees. He also opposed the reduction of the street railway 
workers 1 hours to twelve. The bill was then amended to make the working 
day ten hours ~~th overtime for t.ae other two hours but Roosevelt still 
voted with the opposition. This bill was passed by the Assembly and then 
vetoed by the governor. 
But all of Roosevelt's record was not so dark. Althoug.a he opposed 
respite for men workers as contr~ to the principles of free enterprise, he 
did support measures safeguarding women and children and the health of all 
workers. He voted for measures to limit the hours of women and to provide 
factory inspectors to enforce safety provisions. In 1882, we fino him 
voting for a bill that provided safety measures in workshops and factories. 
The next year, he approved a measure to increase the safety measures necessary 
and to limit the hours of mechanics to w.aat was considered a healthful 
number. In 1884, he applied the limited hours bill to building workers. He 
also agreed to the establishment of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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A~ter leaving the Assembly, Roosevelt felt called upon to defend 
his seemingly unsympathetic stand on the labor question. In a magazine 
article, he explained that he felt that people should depend on themselves, 
not the state. In his opinion the state had already done much to help 
tne working man and labor unjustly accused the "system" of being wrong. 9 
T~1is same idea was repeated in his message to the legislature of the state 
when he was its governor in 1899. 10 This stand is consistent with his 
great belief in the necessity for man to help himself and in the principle 
of rtlaissez fairen, still popular at that time. P..oosevelt, as a Uew York 
Assemblyman, was a far way removed from the Progressive platform of 1912. 
As governor of New York Roosevelt's labor record is more consistent 
with the principles of tne progressives. In his inaugural message, he 
reiterated his new solicitude for organized labor which had been spoken of 
in the campaign. 11 During the campaign, Roosevelt admitted t:n.at ne nad been 
rather uncharitable to labor in his past and announced tnat ae D.ad seen the 
light. 12 Although he was far from a radical reformer as governor, his 
position was advanced over that of his days in the Assembly. 
One of Roosevelt's earliest suggestions to the legislature regarded 
the law requiring an eight-hour day and a prevailing rate of wages for 
state employees. This law had been enacted in 1897 and had been poorly 
9 Ibid., 105, citing T. Roosevelt, "Phases of State Legislation," 
Centu~J, XXIX, 826 (April, 1885). 
0 Roosevelt, Public Papers, 10. 
1 Ibid., 2. 
2 Pringle, 206. 
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enforced. Roosevelt suggested to tne legislature tnat "if this law is to 
remain on the statute books, it should be enforced, and, therefore, the 
Legislature should make it the particular tiusiness of somebody to enforce 
it·" 13 The legislature followed ttle governor• s recormnendation and amended 
the law of 1897. Although Roosevelt•s suggestion to tne legislature coula 
hardly be said to constitute strong approval of the principle of the eight-
hour day for labor, he showed, in signing tne bill, t~at i1e was not unsym-
pathetic with this idea. Here he said: 11It is highly desirable that the 
principle whic11 this law seeks to establish should be really established and 
taat tne nominal purpose of the eight-hour aay snould be in fact fulfilled.nJ4 
Later on in his first year as governor, l~osevelt suggested that the 
legislature establisn a Board of Factory Inspectors t0 enforce labor 
regulations. 15 This was followed b;y the law that buildings to be used for 
manufacturing should be granted a permit after inspection by the -Board. 
This was designed to wipe out tne 11 sweat snop11 system of tenement manu-
facturing. 16 The passage of tnese laws was among the most notable accom-
plishments of Roosevelt•s first year as governor. 17 
In his annual Message of December, 1899, Roosevelt gave another indi-
cation of how far he had traveled from his labor stand as an Assemblyman. 
In the Assembly, he had voted against limiting the working hours of the 
13 Roosevelt, public Papers, 4. 
14 Ibid., 94-98. 
1s rora., 11-12. 
16 Ibid., 13. 
17 BIShop, I, 124. 
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employees of the street railways. 18 In 1899, he said: "The law regulating 
the hours of labor on surface railroads is also an excellent provision a-
gainst the tendency to work the men to an almost unlimited number of hours. 11 J9 
Thus was the Rooseveltian attitude on labor being revised. 
In this same message, Roosevelt had included a suggestion that the 
legislature provide for employer liability. However, Benjamin B. Odell, Jr., 
the Republican State Chairman, intimated tnat this was not desirable and 
Roosevelt removed it. 20 Tnis was an indication of the general tenor of 
events during the second year of Roosevelt's governorship. He was handi-
capped in whatever labor legialation that he might nave desired to have 
enacted by tae spector of the presidential election of 1900. As governor 
of Eew York, he was expected to carry his state for his party and the party 
leaders, who could also withnold the nomination for governor from him, 
urged him to a policy of caution so as not to alien:te essential sources of 
support. 21 
As President, Roosevelt's labor policy became more clearly defined. 
ae summed up this attitude himself in a speech in April of 1902 and his 
statement is worth quoting for it pertains not only to labor but to capital 
as well. 
This is the era of the great combinations both of labor and 
capital •••• But they must work under the same law, and the laws 
concerning them must be just and wise ••• conceived in the spirit 
18 Hurwitz, 95-104. 
19 Roosevelt, Public Pape~ 11. 
20 Pringle, 211-212. 
21 Ibid., 211. 
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of those who ••• recognize the need ••• of gJ.vJ.nc: the vl'idest scope 
nossible for the free exercise of incividual initiative, and yet 
who recognize also that after cOl'lbinations have reached a certain 
stage it is indis:oensable to the general welfare that the Nation 
should exercise over them, cautiously and firmly, the power of 
supervision and regulation. 22 
This exnlains much of his attitude for, at all times, he was a firm 
believer in orcerliness and confirmation to the law. 
In studying Roosevelt's recorc as nresident, his attitude on the variou 
problems as nresenteo in the ?regressive narty platform will be, in so 
far.as nossible, considered separately. In regard to some of these, such 
as restricted hours for women and safety measures, he hac already indicated 
his approval as 'Sovernor of New York. For some of the others, we can 
look to his Jears in the White Eouse. 
Roosevelt's ideas on at least one of the reforms advocated in the 
;Jlatform of 1912 underwent considerable change during his political life-
time. Long before the formation of the Progressive oarty, in 1896 to be 
. 
exact, the Der.1ocratic olatform contained a plank condemning the use of 
injunctions in la.bor cisnutes. Conunenting on this, Roosevelt said that it 
"contains a.'1 attack uryon the main deryendence of our liberties 11 and that it 
was fitting that "with the cemand for free silver should go the demand for 
free riot." 23 But this cannot be said to be Roosevelt's attitude even 
before he became the Progressive party candidate in 1912. 
22. Theodore ·Roosevelt, Presidential Messages and State Papers of Theodore 
Roosevelt, F. F. Colher anc Son, New York-;-n.c., I, 26. · 
23 Pringle, 163. 
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In 190.5, the U."lions started a move the deprive the courts of the right 
to is·sue injunctions in labor disnutes. In his annual ;-::essage of that year, 
Roosevelt opposed this bill, but he su~gested that the procedure in injunc-
tion cases mi:;ht be regulated by requirin'?: the judge to r_sive due notice to 
the arverse oarties before granting the wril. Such a bill was presented to 
congress in that year, but it was defeated. 24 
Throughout the year 190.5, Roosevelt had worked for the protection of 
labor against the excessive use of the injunction des:·Jite the fact that he 
did not a--yorove of the exact legislation desired by the unions. 2.5 In 1906, 
he continuer' his efforts. In !!Tay of that year, he said that he opposed 
having any "operation of the law turn into an engine of oppression against 
the wage-worker." In his I'lessage to Congress, the-presiden.t pointed to "gra~e 
abuses 11 which were possible ~)ecause of the use made of the injunction in the 
hands of caoi tal. 26 He had his bill of the year before introduced into 
Congress once again. The unions continued their opposition, but Roosevelt 
would make no further concessions. The law was not passed, however, even 
in the limited form thd Roosevelt asked. 27 
vVhen Congress convened in :Cecember of 1907, Roosevelt was still working 
for a limitation in the use of injunctions. On January 31, 1908, he sent a 
24 Bishon, II, 1.5. 
2.5 frin~le, 429. 
26 Theodore 3oosevelt, State Papers as Governor and President, 1899-1909 
(volume XV of :.-~-orks,ecr:-by HermanHagedorn) National ~clition, Charles 
Scribner's Sons, Kew York, 1926. Subsequently referred to as Roosevelt, 
Works, XV. 
27 Bishon, II, 16. 
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special message to Congress that was the most radical of all his messages. 
In it he scourged the courts for their promptness in using the injunction 
against labor unions. 28 He disclaimed any intention to abolish the injunc~ 
tion nrocess, which, in the hands of a wise judge, was an essential part 
of the judicial machinery. On the other hand, he said, 11 it has sometimes 
been used heedlessly and unjustly, and ••• some of the injunctions ••• inflict 
grave and occasiona2-ly irre'Jarable wrong upon. those enjoined." 29 He later 
sent another message to Conzress asking the limitation of t~e injunction 
but this was among the suggestions of the nresident which Congress chose to 
ignore. 30 Yet Hoosevelt certainly tried during his administration t:> obtain 
a law that would ,rotect the workers and the unio!l leaders in event of a 
strike. 
Yet it must not be sup:Josed from the above that Roosevelt was a person 
to condone disregard for the law and for order. Hepeatedly in his public 
utterances, we find the idea that violence was to be deplored. In a Labor 
Day sneech in Syracuse, !\lew York in 1903, he pointed out that "there is no 
worse enemy of the ~age-worker than the man who condones mob violence in any 
shane or who preaches class hatred." He coc1tinued by pointing out that when 
business was bad all people suffered and there was, therefore, great need 
for all to work together. 31 
28 Mowry, 28. 
29 Pringle, 47 8. 
30 Ibici. , 482-483. 
31 Bishop, I, 257. 
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Roosevelt exoressed much the same disa•)proval of violence in connection 
with labor organizations in the Annual ivies sage to Congress in December of 
1904. This section of the message is worth repeating. 
Wage-workers have an entire rightto organize and by all peace-
ful means to endeavor to persuade their fellows to join their 
organizations. They have under no circumstances the right to 
commit violence upon those, w-hether canitalists or wage-earners, 
who refuse to sup'Oort their organization, or who side vfith those 
with whom they are at odds, for mob rule is intolerable at any 
time. 32 
• Roosevelt was strongly in favor of the creation of a Cabinet post to 
look after the interest of the laborir.g class and to protect and foster his 
anti-trust prog;ram. For this purnose, in his first message to Congress after 
;:cKinley' s death, he suggested the creation of a Department of 8orrunerce and 
Labor with power to investigate corporate earnings and to guard the rights 
of the workingman. 33 Congress followed his sug~estion and created the 
Jepartment in February of 1903. The Department included a Bureau of Corpora-
tions which was to devote itself especially to the trust question. 34 
Roosevelt was pleased with the action of Congress and felt that this was 
one of the outstandir.g achievements of his first term in office. 35 
Another important part of the Progressive party platform concerned 
32 Ibid., II, 426. 
33 Pringle, 245-246. 
34 Ibid., 341, also Rhodes, 296-297. 
35 Letter of Theodore Roosevelt to Kermit Roosevelt, October 26, 1904, 
Letters to Kermit from Theodore Roosevelt, 1902-1908, Will Irwin, ed., 
Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1946, 78-79. Subsequently referred to 
as Roosevelt, Letters to Kermi!• 
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itself with the demand for workmen's compensation or employers' liability 
legislation. Roosevelt took up this problem early. We have seen that he 
was interested in it as governor of New York and he did not forge~ his 
interest as president. In his message of December, 1904, he suggested the 
possibility of workmen's compensation to Congress. 36 He continued to keep 
the idea in mind and in 1905, Roosevelt promoted the idea of employers' 
liability legislation for the District of Columbia. 37 Finally, the presi-
dent's efforts bore fruit and on June 11, 1906, Congress passed the Employer 
Liability act. 38 
The difficulties were not over, however. The Supreme Court declared 
the Employers 1 Liability act unconstitutional on January 6, 1908 because 
it was not made to apply only to injuries incurred in interstate commerce. 39 
When Roosevelt sent his message to Congress in Januar,y of 1908, he called 
the attention of Congress to the action of the court and suggested another 
law that would meet the Constitutional requirements. He asked that it be 
made to apply to carriers in interstate commerce only. He also called for 
workmen's compensation for all government employees, and expressed the hope 
that the "same broad principle" would be applied to all private employers. 40 
This was followed by a special message on the subject 41 and finally, on 
April 22, 1908, Congress enacted a law drawn up to Roosevelt's specifications 
36 Pringle, 360. 
37 Ibid., 430. 
38 Rhodes, 337. 
39 Ibid., 331. 
40 Pringle, 478. 
41 ~., 482. 
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This law was upheld by the Supreme Court on January 15, 1912. 42 As he was 
preparing to leave office, Roosevelt summed up his achievements by saying 
that, although Congress did not give him everything that he wanted, he 
bad obtained a good Employers• Liability act and he was justly proud of 
the fact. 43 
When discussing workmen's compensation in his message of 1904, Roosevelt 
also suggested the need for eliminating child labor abuses. Any such sug-
gestion was greatly opposed by the manufacturers. 44 Again in 1905, Roose-
velt suggested an investigation of conditions relative to child labor. 45 
It was not until 1908, however, that any law regulating child labor was 
enacted, and then it applied only to the District of Columbia. 46 
One of the best known labor incidents during the Roosevelt adminis-
tration was the coal strike which began on May 15, 1902. 47 The strike 
dragged on through the summer with the owners refusing to arbitrate. With 
winter approaching and the nation threatened with a serious coal shortage, 
the president decided to take action. On October 3, Roosevelt invited 
Mitchell, president of the union, and the operators, chief of whom was 
George F. Baer, to a conference in Washington. The operators again refused 
to have an arbitration board appointed. Mitchell then turned down Roosevelt' 
suggestion that the miners return to work while a commission reviewed the 
42 Rhodes, 337. 
43 Letter of May 30, 1908, Roosevelt, Letters to Kermit, 247~248. 
44 Pringle, 360. 
45 Ibid., 360. 
46 Letter of May 30, 1908, Roosevelt, Letters to Kermit, 247-248. 
47 Rhodes, 236. 
L 
87 
facts in the dispute. 48 The president then threatened to have the mines 
taken over and run by the ~· This brought the owners into line and th~ 
agreed to arbitrate. The miners went back to work and a commission was 
appointed. The event was significant because it was the first time in 
American history that the federal government had officially acknowledged 
that "at times justice might lay with labor in its disputes with capital." 49 
Roosevelt was just as ready to use the army against labor when it 
threatened violence as against capital when it refused to cooperate. The 
summer that the coal strike was in progress, there was also a general strike 
of labor unions in Chicago. On a tour of the Middle West, Roosevelt stopped 
at that city. A delegation of the strikers called on him and urged his 
support. His answer is an excellent summary o£ his feelings relative to 
organized labor. He said: "I am a believer in unions •••• But the union 
must obey the law just as the corporation must obey the law." And he 
threatened to use the ~ against the unions if necessary to maintain 
order. SO 
There is one other incident that should be cited. It illustrates 
Roosevelt's interest in seeing that labor received some degree of justice. 
In February, 1908, the Lowville and Nashville Railway company announced 
its intention of reducing wages because of "drastic laws inimical to the 
interests of the railroads." Other companies made similar announcements. 
48 Ibid., 239-246. 
49 Mowry, 18-19. 
50 Bishop, I, 440. 
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On Febru~ 18, the president sent an open letter to the Interstate Commerce 
commission ordering an investigation to determine the real cause of the 
reduction. This threat was sufficient to make the railroad change its 
mind. 5l 
Many of the reforms which Roosevelt suggested, in other fields as well 
as in the field of labor, were not enacted by Congress. This is especially 
true of the latter part of his administration when the forceful language 
he used in making suggestions to Congress alienated that body. Yet the 
very recklessness of his course "advanced the day when the reforms were 
adopted. They made these heresies (the reforms which he promoted) familiar. 
They were still heresies, however, when he left the White House." 52 This 
seems to sum up Roosevelt's position on labor. He made a great deal of fuss 
about those particular measures which he wan~ed and thus made the nation 
conscious of the problem. Even in his dem~ds he did not ask as much as 
did the Progressive party platform but he did help people to appreciate the 
problems of labor. 
La Follette came from a predominantly agricultural state and so he 
would not be expected to be as aware of labor problems nor as interested 
in labor reform as Roosevelt, coming as he did from industrial New York. 
It is true that he devoted the greater part of his efforts to reforming 
political conditions and to controlling the trusts, especially the railroads. 
Yet, in view of his background, La Follette showed a surprising interest 
in the problems facing the working man. 
51 Ibid., II, 81-82. 
52 Pringle, 485. 
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One of La Follette's earliest recommendations relative to the relief 
of workers came in his message to the legislature of his state on Januar,y 
15, 1903. At that time he suggested for their attention the "question of 
more effieient protection to employees of railroad companies" recommending 
"compensation for injuries which he (the employee) ~ receive through no 
fault of his own, ••• (and) provision for the support and maintenance of wife, 
children, or other dependents, if his life be destroyed in the performance 
of his duty." 53 Later that same year, at his Labor Day address at Beloit, 
La Follette discussed the trust question. In the course of his speech, he 
pointed out that during the previous six years the wages of factor,y workers 
in Wisconsin had increased, on .. the whole, only about ten per cent, while 
the cost of living had increased about twenty-seven per cent during the same 
period. This was practically the first public mention of the "high-cost-
of-living" note later to be so familiar. 54 It showed that even at this 
early date, La Follette was not entirely uninterested in bettering the 
conditions of the working man. 
The legislature of 1903 did not take La Follette's suggestions but in 
1905, with political reform and railroad regulation completed, the legis-
lature took up some of the other reforms which La Follette thought necessar.r 
Included in these reforms, introduced by La Follette while governor of 
Wisconsin, ware workingmen's compensation and the creation of an industrial 
53 Ellen Torrelle, compiler, The Political Philosophy of Robert M. La 
Follette as Revealed .!!: HiSSpeeches and Writings, The Robert-M.I:a 
Follette Company, Madison, Wisconsin,-r925, 129-130. 
54 Barton, 279. 
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commission which had the power to Hcontrol and regulate the most difficult 
questions of sanitation, safety, health and moral well-being whieh affeet 
the workers of the state." 55 These early measures in a state that was 
essentially agricultural show a surprising resemblance to the Progressive 
party platform of 1912. 
After the legislative session of 1905 in Wisconsin, La Follette moved 
his area of action to the United States Senate. There most of his time 
was spent opposing measures which he felt Were contrar,y to his principles. 
But he was not without his positive suggestions. It was La Follette who 
introduced the Employer Liability act in 1906, a bill which was considered 
as a glory to the Roosevelt administration. 56 When this bill was declared 
unconstitutional, La Follette introduced a similar bill eliminating the 
unconstitutional features in the Senate in 1907. 57 It was this bill which 
passed and withstood examination by the Supreme Court and which Roosevelt 
supporters made much of in discussing his labor record. This bill alone is 
excellent testim~ny to La Follette's concern for labor. 
In addition to his efforts on behalf of the Employers' Liability act, 
La Follette's record in the Senate had other things to commend it. He was 
instrumental in securing the passage of legislation establishing the doctrine 
of comparative negligence in rail~ employment; and he brought about a bill 
55 La Follette, 311. 
56 Torrelle, 138. 
57 ~., 139. 
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that forbade more than sixteen consecutive hours on duty for railwa,y employ-
ees. La Follette, himself, thought that sixteen hours were a long time but 
many of the workers felt that any further restriction would limit their 
earning power too much. 58 In 1910, he again came to the defense of labor 
and gave good indication of his feelings relative to labor unions. In a 
speech before the Senate, La Follette urged that the provisions of the 
Sherman Anti-Trust law not be made applicable to the labor unions. He felt 
that the courts were unnecessarily harsh in the application of the law in 
relation to the unions and, furthermore, that the law was never intended te 
refer to organizations of workingmen. 59 
Although La Follette's record as a labor reformer is not as extensive 
as Roosevelt's, it is equally as commendable. In fact, there is no evidence 
that he was ever inimical to labor and, although he did not talk as much 
about the topic, his ideas on the subject all resulted in substantial gain 
for the working man. We have seen that the very bill ~ich Roosevelt counted 
as an outstanding achievement of his administration was a product of 
La Follette's efforts. 
In concluding this chapter on employees, it is enlightening to consider 
a particular set of employees--those working for the government. The ex-
tension of civil service was a most important question during the period 
we are considering. The Progressive party platform took note of it. The 
platform expressed its approval of civil service and urged its strengthening. 
58 Ibid., 139. 
59 !5IO., 130-131. 
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The platform said that civil serVice law should be enf'orced in spirit as 
well as in letter. rt wanted postmasters, collectors, marshalls and all 
other nonpolitical officers added to the classified lists. It favored 
continuous service during good behavior &~d efficiency and an equitable 
retirement law. f:IJ 
Any discussion of civil service reform revolves around Theodore Roose-
velt. An authority on the subject who was a great admirer of his called 
him, 11 both as Commissioner and afterwards as President, the leading pro-
tagonist in t11e struggle for the overthrow of the spoils system." 61 
Another authority claims that, though Roosevelt worked.haro as civil service 
commissioner, as governor of New York and later as president he did not 
try as strenuously to "wreck the organization" by drying up tne sources 
of power as he mig~1t have done. He feels that then Roosevelt v;iewed the 
spoils system with an air of amused tolerance." 62 Whatever view one takes, 
Roosevelt's promotion of civil service did much to further tne cause of that 
reform. 
Roosevelt's interest in civil service showed itself early in his 
career. He made a few speeches on the topic to the Twenty-first District 
Republican Club wnen he first joined that organization and its members 
did not appreciate them. 63 When he was elected to the New York Assembly, 
60 Payne, 319-320, from the Progressive Party Platform. 
61 William Dudley Foulke, Roosevelt and the Spoilsman, National Civil 
Service Reform League, New York, 192~. 
62 Gosnell, 219. 
63 Pringle, 59. 
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he continued to work for civil service. In 1883, he got a bill before the 
Assembly that made civil service mandator,r for the state and permissable 
in all cities therein of more than 5o,ooo population. This bill was passed. 
Tne following year, he supported a bill making civil service imperative 
in cities of more than 20,000 population and to service in police, fire, 
and other departments. 11It was largely tt'1.rough his efforts that these 
reforms were enacted." 64 
As governor of New York, Roosevelt signea the Civil Service Rules on 
June 3, 1899. 65 These reestablished civil service in the state after it 
had been suspended by the "Black Act" which had repealed tne original law 
of 1883. 66 After this law was passed, Roosevelt supplanted the "starchless 
rules" by a set more rigid than had yet been established in any state. 67 
This was consistent witn his expressed idea on civil service. Of this 
reform, he said: 
Civil-service reform is not merely a movement to better public 
service. It ac~ieves this end too; but its main purpose is to 
raise the tone of public life, and it is in this direction thg~ 
its effects have been of incalculable good to the community. 
outside the state of New York, Roosevelt was no less active in working 
for civil service reform. He was appointed Civil Service Commissioner in 
1889 and served for six years. 69 As commissioner, he did some fine work 
and made some excellent improvements in the service. He insisted that the 
64 Foulke, 8. 
65 Roosevelt, Public Papers, 137-182. 
66 F'oulke, 49. 
67 Gosnell, 217. 
68 Roosevelt, American Ideals, 100. 
69 Ibid., 100. 
94 
list of persons eligible for examination be made public and ordered each 
such list posted openly in post offices and custom houses. Je also insisted 
that the questions asked in the various exams be of a practical nature. 70 
During his term as commissioner, the classified service was greatly extended. 
By the inclusion of the railway mail service, the smaller free-delivery 
offices, the Indian School service, the Internal Revenue service, and other 
less important branches, the extent of the public serrtce, which was tmder 
the protection of the law was more than doubled. More than 50,000 govern-
ment worl{ers were added to the civil service classification. 7l Of this 
Roosevelt said: "Our aim was always to procure tne extension of tile 
classified service as rapidly as possible, and to see that the law was 
administered thoroughly and fairly.~~ 72 
A few examples will serve to illustrate Roosevelt's continued concern 
over civil service while he was president. At tne beginning of his first 
tenn, he repealed a'1 order exempting from examination a great number of 
employees of various departments and added to the classified list all 
superintendents of Indian Schools acting as agents a~d tne rural delivery 
service. 73 During Roosevelt's second administration, tne local civil 
service boards were consolidated into districts with an experienced man in 
charge of each. Before he left office, thirteen such offices had been 
established. 74 
70 Foulke, 26. 
71 Roosevelt, American Ideals, 116. 
72 Ibid., 100. 
73 Foulke, 54. 
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Foulke criticizes Roosevelt's cha~ged stand on two questions relative 
to civil service reform. The reformers did not agree with his second 
position. In the matter of promotions, Roosevelt first felt that they 
should be by written examination but later changed his mind, probably due 
to his experiences as Police Commissioner in New York City. Regarding 
removals, the law as interpreted during McKinley's administration required 
reasons for dismissal, notice, and opportunity to answer. Roosevelt con-
curred. As president, however, he made summary removal the procedure if 
an offense was committed in his presence or that of the head of a Department. 
In other cases, there was to be no hearing altnough the cause of removal 
had to be stated in writing. Taft later reestablished McKinley's plan. 75 
Despite this cri t.icism, Foulke did feel ti1.at 11he (Roosevelt) was the only 
president Who from the beginning to the end of his career uniformly supporte 
Civil Service. 11 76 His record on tnis reform certainly met the requirements 
of the Progressive party platform. 
La Follette also indicated an early interest in civil service. one 
of the things advocated by nis newspaper, Tne state, in 1897, was a state 
civil service law. 77 This was later enacted by the state but there is no 
evidence to suppose that La Follette ever had Roosevelt's interest in the 
subject. He seems to have been a follower on this topic rather tha!l a leadE!" 
74 Ibid., 100. 
75 rora., 1o2-1o5. 
76 rbicl., 81. 
77 La Follette, 209. 
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A summary of tne positions of the two men on labor reform seems to 
snow, as previously suggested in this cnapter, that Roosevelt attracted 
much more attention but actually did no more ti1an La Follette. In fact, 
the latter had a more consistently favorable attitude toward the working 
man. ne did not have the natural SJ~pathy with labor, coming as he did 
from an agricultural state, but he did develop a generous attitude. Roose-
velt was inclined to speak and act in generalities while La Follette's 
work was more specific. He was certainly as much, if not more, in sympathy 
with the program laid down by the Progressive party platform in 1912. 
CHAPTER V 
THE FIGHT ON THE TRUSTS 
The terms ntrust-busting11 and Roosevelt are so closely allied as to 
be almost synonymous. Certainly, as in the case of labor reform, he did 
much to make the public conscious of the need of some type of regulation 
of the great companies that were dominating American life during the latter 
part of the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth centuries. 
But it is our purpose here to determine to what extent each merited the 
sobriquet of "trust-buster." 
The Progressive party platform expressed the sentiments of progressives 
everywhere when it said: 
We demand that the test of true prosperity shall be the benefits 
conferred thereby on all the citizens, not confined to individuals 
or classes, and that the test of corporate efficiency shall be 
the ability better to serve tne public; that those who profit 
by control of business affairs shall justify that profit and 
that control by sharing with the public the fruits thereof. 1 
It suggested enforcement of these ideas by the strong national regulation 
of inter-state corporations, the establishment of a Federal administration 
commission to supervise industrial corporations engaged in inter-state 
commerce, and the strengthening of the Sherman Anti-Trust law. rt wanted 
to give tne Inter-State Commerce Commission the power to value the physical 
property of the railroads as a basis for rate-fixing. 2 The program was 
1 Payne, 310-312, from the Progressive Party Platform. 
2 Ibid., 310-312. 
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not more inclusive because so much had already been done. It is our concern 
to discover the part played by Roosevelt and La Follette in this doing. 
One of the earliest fonns of trust regulation was the attempt to 
force the companies to pay tneir just portion of ttle taxes of the various 
states. We find that Roosevelt was working toward this end very early irt 
nis career. As an Assemblyman, he and a fellow-legislator, :Mike Costello, 
led the fight to prevent the return of over one-half of the taxes collected 
by the state from the elevated company of New York. The company was attempt 
ing to pusn such a bill through tne Assembly. Roosevelt did not succeed 
in stopping the passing of the bill but he did attract so much publicity to 
it that the governor vetoed the measure. 3 
In one of his earliest proclamations to the legislature of New York 
as its governor, Roosevelt returned to the problen1 of taxation of business. 
In his message relating to Tax Laws on March 27, 1899, he said: 
It remains true that a corporation which derives its powers 
from the state, should pay to the state a just percentage of its 
earnings as a return for the privileges it enjoys. This should 
be especially true for tne franchises bestowed upon gas companies, 
street railroads and the like •••• Qne thing is certain, that the 
franchises snould in some form yield a monied return to the 
government. 4 
Later on, in May of 1899, he further stated that the taxation of franchises 
was a right of the state and reconunended a law which would tax ti:1em as 
realty and which would provide for the assessment of the tax by the Board 
3 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 80-81. 
4 Roosevelt, Public Papers, 55-56. 
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of state Tax Commissioners. 5 
Roosevelt's insistence on franchise taxation forced the Assembly to 
consider the matter despite tne opposition of Platt and the regular Repub-
lican organization. 6 After the law was passed, Roosevelt indicated his 
intention of seeing that it was enforced. Platt asked the governor to 
sign a bill on behalf of tne New York Central Railroad exempting grade 
crossings of steam railroads from the provisions of the bill. Roosevelt 
thought that this was contrary to the spirit of the bill and replied to 
platt that his message had come too late as he (Roosevelt) nad already 
issued a statement saying that the tax corrmdssioners were opposed to the 
proposed measure. 7 Roosevelt made it very clear, however, that his actions 
as governor were not directed at the destruction of industry. H~ said that 
"we do not wish to discourage enterprise. vre do not desire to destroy 
corporations; we do desire to put them fully at the service of the State 
8 and the people. n 
When Roosevelt was catapulted into the presidency by McKinley's assas-
sination, the world of Wall street shuddered. It took repeated assurances 
by the leading conservative Republicans tnat there would be no cnange in 
policy under Roosevelt to prevent a serious panic in the stock market. 9 
5 Ibid., 107, also Theodore Roosevelt, The Roosevelt Policy, Speeches, 
Letters and State Papers, Relating to-corporate Wealth and Closely 
Allied Topics, The current Literature Publishing Co~pany, New York, 
1968, I, 8. Subsequently referred to as Roosevelt, Policy. 
6 Gosnell, 198-199. 
7 Ibid., 273. 
8 Roosevelt, Policy, I, 19. 
9 Pringle, 237-238. 
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Roosevelt did go slowly when he first came to the Wni te House out of 
deference to party narmony, but he was not one to long remain quiet. He 
watched the ever-increasing power and self-assurance of the industrialists 
and felt a corresponding reduction in the power of the government. He 
determined to challenge the ntyranny of plutocracyn that he believed was 
being established. 10 The point of attack chosen was tne Northern Securities 
company, a holding company recently organized by the Morgan interests acting 
for Hill, Harriman, and other of the railroad magnates. 
on February 19, 1902, Attorney-Generql Knox announced that the govern-
ment would shortly demand the dissolution of the Northern Securities Com-
pany. 11 The news came as a great shock to the industrialists despite the 
fact that, on January 7, the attorney-general of Minnesota had filed suit 
against the company under a 1ti.nnesota statute that forbade the consolidation 
of comp~ting railroads. 12 The Federal government's suit was filed in 
st. Paul on March 10. 13 The litigation had much greater significance 
than the breaking up of a llolding company. It was the first time since 
its passage that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was to be sincerely and ener-
getically enforced. It gave new heart to the reform elements. 14 
\Vhile tne Northern Securities case was still pending, Roosevelt went 
on a speaking tour of the northeastern states. Tnere in the stronghold of 
industry, ;1e again stressed the need for the regulation of the trusts. At 
10 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 423-425. 
11 Mowry, 18. 
12 Pringle, 257. 
13 Ibid. , 257. 
14 ~,1owry, 18. 
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providence, Rhode Island, he reiterated his belief that 11 the nation must 
assume this power of control by legislation; if necessar.y by constitutional 
amendment. The immediate necessity in dealing with trusts is to place them 
under the real, not nominal control of some sovereign to which, as its 
creatures, the trusts shall owe allegiance, and in w~ose courts the sover-
eign's orders may be enforced.n 15 In this same address, however, he gave 
evidence of the concilatory spirit that so often softened his blows directed 
at corporations. He brought out that a difference existed between the good 
and the bad companies, urged that legislation against business not be too 
stringent, and suggested that the power of the government should be exer-
cised with "wisdom and restraint." 16 
On March 14, 1904, the Supreme Court dissolved the ~orthern Securities 
Company by a vote of 5-4. l7 Logically, the government should then have 
started proceedings against its founders as law-breakers. But neither 
Roosevelt, nor anyone else, desired this. The suit had served its purpose; 
the government now haa, nominally, the power to deal wi tn the corporations 
dangerous to the public good. Moreover, Pringle suggested, the campaign 
of 1904 was approaching and Roosevelt had no desire to further antagonize 
the financial support of the Republican party. 18 
The establis.hrnen t of the Department of commerce and Labor has been 
mentioned in a previous cnapter of this paper, but it is necessary to review 
15 Roosevelt, Policy, I, 36. 
16 Ibid., 37. 
17 Rhodes, 224. 
18 Pringle, 263. 
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this again. Roosevelt insisted that the Department include a Bureau of 
Corporations witil tne power to "investigate the operations and conduct of 
interstate corporations." 19 Business opposed this and Congress was dubious. 
The president, however, enlisted public support on his side and., as mentione 
previously, the Bureau of Corporations was in the Department of Commerce 
and Labor when it was founded. Roosevelt felt that this was "one of the 
most important accomplishments of my administration.u 20 But after the 
passage of the bill, Roosevelt controlled the investigations of the Bureau, 
and any desire he might have nad to further prosecute the fight against the 
trusts, until after the election of 1904. 
The election had hardly been favorably concluded when the specter of 
corporation control stirred again in Washington. Just a, few days before the 
close of 1904, James A. Garfield, Commissioner of Corporations, issued 
a report recommending that congress pass legislation to bring all corporation 
engaged in inter-state trade under Federal supervision. Business was prop-
erly saocked by this sudden indication of the administration nto bite the 
hand that fed it.n 21 It was even more apprehensive when Roosevelt gave 
his speech to the Union League Club of Philadelphia a month later. Here 
he brought out the necessity of increased government supervision of business 
to meet the increased development of indus·t;,ry. He said that a constitutional 
amend.'T!ent would have to be passed if the courts refused to uphold Federal 
19 Ibid., 340, citing New York Times, January 7, 1903. 
20 Bishop, II, 330. 
21 Mowry, 23, citing Report of the Commissioner of Corporations (House 
Document 165, 58th Congress,~d Session), 4s:-
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regulation of corporations. He made special mention of tne need to control 
the railroads. 22 
Nothing of a spectacular nature was accomplished with the outgoing 
congress, however, and action had to wait for the new Congress to meet. 
Also Roosevelt beca~e so engrossed in problems of an international nature 
that reform was, for a time, crowded out of the limelight. When he came 
back to the fray it was to concentrate on railroad legislation. 
The £~kins Act had been passed on February 19, 1903. It forbade the 
granting of rebates to favored snippers and is counted one of the achieve-
ments of Roosevelt's first administration by his supporters. 23 Actually, 
it was framed with tne help of the operators thensel ves and they supported 
it. 24 No serious effort seems to have been made to enforce this bill, 
however; the rebates went on despite the ~~appiness of the railroads over 
the situation. They were tired of the demands made upon them by the large 
shippers and saw more profit for tnemselves if rebates were abolished. 25 
But enforcement of the Elkins Act was not the answer to the need for regula-
tion of the railroads. It did not begin to strike at the real problem. 
The magnitude of the problem in regard to the railroads becomes obvious 
w~en we examine some of the statements made by the contro]ers of the roads. 
So great was their power that in 1906 E. H. Harriman, railroau czar of the 
22 Roosevelt., works, XV, 215-226. 
23 Rhodes, 29o;---
24 Pringle, 340. 
25 Ibid., 417. 
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United States, could say: "Whenever I want legislation from a state legis-
lature, I can buy it. I can buy Congress.and ••• tne judiciary." 26 Certainly 
tnis is sufficient to make tne need for some curtailment of the power of the 
railroads obvious. 
In his message of December, 1904, Roosevelt urged that the Inter-State 
commerce Commission be given the authority to change the rates charged by 
railroads on tne complaint of the shipper. Tilis change was to be made if 
the rate charged was found unreasonable after a full hearing of the facts 
and it was to be subject to judicial review. Roosevelt did not go so far 
as to suggest that the C:ommission be given the power to fix rates and, 
in fact, termed this as "undesirable.,. 27 This was the opening move in the 
fight tnat was to eventually bring tne Hepburn bill onto the statute books. 
In accordance with the president 1 s suggestion, the Esch-Townsend bill 
was introduced into the House of Representatives early in 1905. This 
embodied the president 1 s de:nands for rate-making. 28 This was a ntame-Duck11 
Congress, however, a~d the Senate was not as responsive to the president•s 
demands. 'Ihere the bill never got out of the Committee on Interstate 
Commerce. 29 Roosevelt, never one to give up when there was a prospect of 
a fight, talked constantlya:fl regulation throughout the following year. 3° 
When Congress met in 1905, the opposing camps were ready for battle. 
26 Rhodes, 332, citing Review of Reviews, ed., 857. 
27 Ibid., 323. --
28 MSWry, 24, citing Congressional Record, 58tn Congress, 3rd Session, 
Vol. 39, 952. 
29 Bishop, I, 428. 
30 Pringle, 418. 
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The message wrlicn Roosevelt sent to Congress when it met in 1905 
reaffinned nis demands for a railroad regulation bill. This time, however, 
he went further than he had done in 1904. Although he did not· ask that the 
Interstate Commerce Commission be given the right to establish rates, ne 
did suggest that that body be given the pow·er to prevent the nimposition of 
unjust or unreasonable rates.n ]e also requested that all of the accounts 
of the railroads be open to the public. 31 When the bill was introduced 
into the House by Representative Peter Hepburn of Iowa, the man wi1o gave 
his name to the measure, it was more radical than the president had suggeste 
in tne power it gave to the commission. 32 The House passed this bill on 
February 8, 1906 by a vote of 346 to 7 with 3 answering merely npresent11 
and 29 not voting. 33 
It was not as simple to obtain Senate approval of the Hepburn bi~l. 
Roosevelt, himself, was not entirely confident of its pass~ge. He realized, 
too, tne source of the opposition. Concerning this, he wrote to Kermit: 
In trying to pass tile rate bill I have come straight against 
the most powerful corporate interests in tl1e country, wnich 
are represented in the Senate by men like Aldrich, Foraker, and 
tnerest. I think I shall get the rate Bill through, but it 
is a hard and doubtful fight, and they are making every effort 
to have some seemingly innocent amendment put in w'nich shall 
destroy something of what I am endeavoring to accomplish. 34 
Among the amendments suggested to the bill was one introduced by ex-Attorney 
General Knox, at that time Senator .from Pennsylvania, calling for general 
31 Roosevelt, Works, XV, 274-280. 
32 Rhodes, 323. 
33 Ibid., 324. 
34 ~er of March 4, 1906, Roosevelt, Letters to Kermit, 130. 
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court review of the decisions of the commission in rate cases. 35 So 
desperate did the fight become that Roosevelt turned away from the Republican 
leaders and enlisted 11 th.e aid of some fifteen or twenty Republicans added 
to most of the Democrats.n 36 1he combination finally won out and tne bill 
passed the Senate, but wi ti1 the amenduent giving the courts tae right to 
review the commissions rates, on May 18, 1906 by a vote of 71 to 3 with 15 
not voting. 37 
Roosevelt was jubilant over the victory and he was confident that final 
passage would be secured. He expressed these sentiments as well as saying 
that rrtnis has been my ci1ief fight of the session" in a letter to his son. 38 
Roosevelt was rigi1t in his prediction. A conference of the House and Senate 
met and their recommendations were accepted by both houses. 39 The bill as 
finally passed gave the Interstate Cominerce Commission jurisdiction over 
pipe lines, express ~~d Pullman operations, refrigeration, storage, and all 
otner aspects covered by the general term, transpo:rt..tion. The rate-making 
powers of the cormnission had been strengthened and the accounts of public 
carriers were open for examination. 40 The bill was approved by the presi-
dent on June 29, 1906 and became a law. 41 
The Hepburn bill, as finally passed, was really a compromise between 
tne progressive and the conservative members of the Republican party. 
35 Pringle, 422, citing New York Times, February 19, 1906. 
36 Letter of April 1, 1906, Roosevelt, Letters to Kermit, 135. 
37 Rhodes, 325. -
38 Letter of May 20, 1906, Roosevelt, Letters to Kermit, 143. 
39 Rhodes, 325. 
40 Pringle, L.25. 
41 Rhodes, 325'. 
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Roosevelt was mucn pleased by this for he felt that it would help heal 
tile widening breach in the party. 42 He had been anxious for the bill to 
pass in the first place because he felt that it would help to prevent the 
more radical step of government ownership of the roads. 43 At the tL~e 
the bill was passed, he had opposed La Follette's suggestion that fair rates 
could not be detennined upon unless the property of the carriers had first 
been evaluated. In this, as in most other measures, Roosevelt's progressiv-
ism was tempered by considerations of expediency. It wasnot until his 
message to Congress in December of 1908 that he supported the idea of 
physical evaluation of the railroads. 44 But then he was about to leave the 
• 
White House and he had passed the zenith of his influence. 
In addition to the work done on rate-making, the Roosevelt administrat· 
was active in other spneres. In December, 1905, the president recommended 
a Pure Food law 45 and followed that on June 4, 1906 with a special message 
to Congress urging the passage of a law giving the Federal government the 
right to inspect all stock yards and packing houses and taeir products that 
entered into interstate commerce. 46 These suggestions were largely the 
result of the exposures made by the muck-rakers. 
There i~ one incident concerning Roosevelt's relations with the trusts 
that occurred darii46 the panic of 1907 and that bears telling. At that time 
42 Mowry, 26. 
43 Bishop, I, 428. 
44 Mowry, 28. 
45 Pringle, 429. 
46 Rhodes, 334. 
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the United States Steel Corporation, a Morgan interest, bou~1t up the 
stock of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company, thus strengthening its hold 
on the steel industry. Tais stock i1.ad been used as collateral for loans 
wl1ich the company maaE:. from various New York banks. The Panic of 1907 
had driven the stock so low that it no longer covered the loans. and the 
banks were going to sell it. The representatives of United States Steel, 
Henry c. Frick and Elbert n. Gary, told Roosevelt that t11eir compailJI would 
buy the stock and thus prevent the furtner panic tnat would be caused by 
having it dumped on the market. But u. s. Steel hesitated to take the 
step because it feared prosecution as a moqppoly. Roosevelt told Frick 
and Gary that, while he coulun 1 t advise the purchase, he did not feel duty 
bound to object. With this assurance, u. S. Steel bought the stock at the 
very low panic prices. 47 
Roosevelt had obviously been duped by the steel company. In 1911, 
Taft 1 s administration started proceedings against the combine. Roosevelt 
took this as a personal affront and was furious. It did not increase his 
sympathy ~~th his successor. He answered the implied oriticism with an 
editorial in the Outlook in which he gave voice to a theory of industrial 
regulation and control of trusts whfch he had developed. He criticized 
Ta.ftts efforts to restore competition by 11 destruction of the trusts" and 
advocated instead a thorough regulation by a government body sL~lar to ttie 
Interstate Commerce Commission. He even wanted to go so far as to set 
prices on commodities manufactured by monopolies. 48 Yet, despite these 
47 Mowry, 189. 
48 Ibid., 191-192,~ citing Roosevelt, 11 The Trusts, the People, and the 
Square Deal," <!outlook, 649-656 (November 18, 1911). 
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seemingly restrictive suggestions, the article was favorably received by 
the business men of the time. Sucn confirmed believers in corporations as 
Andrew Carnegie, Gary, Grenville 11:. Dodge, and Frank A. Vanderlip publicly 
cormnended the article. 49 It is just possible that they felt that Roose-
velt's talk hurt less than Taft's action. 
Roosevelt's stand on the entire question of trust regulation was well 
summed up by nimself. He always, in his public statements, stressed the 
fact that trusts were necessary to modern civilization, and that there were 
good trusts and bad trusts. The good ones were of great benefit to the 
people and their owners were true heroes who should be corrunended for their 
efforts and who should reap their just rewards in monetary returns for 
their endeavors. He felt tnat the good trusts should be protected from the 
radicals who would destroy them. 50 This idea was constant~y repeated 
throughout Roosevelt's career and undoubtedly influenced him greatly. It 
might well account for the fact that the 11 trust-buster11 actually only 
started twenty-five proceedings leading to indictment under the Sherman 
Act while the "reactionary" Taft began forty-five. It was probably at the 
root~ the fact that it was not until the Taft administration that the 
Standard Oil Company and the American Tobacco Company were ordered to 
dissolve. 5l With Roosevelt, as was implied earlier, it was not ~nat he 
did that earned him his reputation, but what he said. 
49 Ibid., 192. 
50 Roosevelt, Policy, I, 52-53, 82, 151. 
51 Pringle, 427. 
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Another topic closely allied with the trusts was tne tariff. The 
Progressive party platform used the usual ambiguous language in establishing 
its stand on this. It did believe in a protective tariff but one 11which 
shall equalize conditions in competition between the United States and 
foreign countries both for the farmer and the manufacturer, and which shall 
maintain for labor an adequate standard of living." It went on to 11 demand 
downward tariff revision of those duties shown to be excessive", and the 
establishment of a tariff commission. It condemned the Payne-Aldrich 
Tariff and demanded immediate repeal of the Canadian Reciprocity Act. 52 
With such an innocuous platform, there is little opportunity to be 
out of step. Yet Roosevelt managed it as well as anyone could. As late 
as September, 1910, he was ver~ sparing in his criticism of the Payne-
Aldrich Tariff. He was then engaged in t~jing to return the Republicans 
to Congress and he wrote that, though the tariff was imperfect, it was 
"better than the last and considerable better than the one before the 
last. n 53 Moreover, it seems fair to presume that the Progressives were 
advocating some reduction in the tariff. But Roosevelt did notning about 
such downward revision while he was first in office. He did talk about 
improving the tariff and made a few moves in that direction but quit wnen 
Cannon told him that it was politically inexpedient. He later admitted that 
this was sound advice. 54 Later in his second administration, realizing 
52 Payne, 316-317, from the Progressive Party Platform. 
53 Pringle, 540, citing Outlook, September 17, 1910. 
54 Mowry, 45, citing Letter of Roosevelt to Jacob Riis, April 18, 1906, 
and to Joseph Cannon, February 28, 1907, Roosevelt MSS. 
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that he was soon to leave office, he decided that the party could not risk 
another campaign wi tnout promising downward reVision. He promised but did 
nothing more. 55 So, despite the reciprocal trade agreement which he spon-
sored between the United States and Cuba in 1903, 56 it would not seem 
that Roosevelt was in sympathy with tne Progressive party plank on the tarif 
La Follette nad no such glamorous title as Roosevelt, but he did much 
to limit the power of t11e corporations, especially in his own state of 
Wisconsin. He directed his efforts against the greatest offenders in the 
state--the railroads. 
La Follette adopted his attitude of fearlessly trying to control the 
actiVities of the railroads early in his career. While in the ilouse of 
Representatives, he withstood th'e efforts of the railroad lobbyists to 
obtain nis approval of the measures they sponsored even when they threatened 
to use their influence to defeat him in the next election. 57 When he 
returned to the piitical wars in Wisconsin, he made nis position clear from 
the first. In the program of action printed in ~ State, it was expressly 
stated that he desired equal taxation for all the property of each indivi-
dual and every corporation transacting business in the state, and that he 
wanted the state to prohibit the acceptance by public officials of railroad 
passes, sleeping car passes, express, telephone and telegraph franks--the 
ingenious means used by the corporations to gain a hold over the legis-
lators. 58 
55 Ibid., 45. 
56 Rhodes, 183. 
57 Haugen, 94. 
58 La Follette, 209-210. 
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La Follette continued his agitation especially against the two evils 
which he thought most needed correcting. In announcing his candidacy in 
1898, he spoke strongly against free passes and franks and against tax-free 
corporations. 59 The influence of La Follette forced the regular Republicans 
to incorporate some of the ideas which ne advocated in their platform. 
That instrument included planks against the pass evil and for a more equal 
taxation. 60 Later in that same 1898, the Republican Club of Milwaukee 
county contacted La Follette and obtained a summary of the principles which 
he was sponsoring. Included in these were two which are pertinant. One 
advocated the prohibition of the acceptance of railroad and sleeping car 
passes, and express, telegraph, and telephone franks by public officials. 
The other urged the enactment and enforcement of laws prohibiting trusts 
and combinations that destroyed competition and restrained trade. 61 
When La Follette was elected governor, he was pledged to a reformation 
of the method of taxing the railroads. T'nough this was not an original 
idea with him--Assemblyman A. R. Hall had been advocating it· for many years 
as a membe~ of the legislature 62 --he deserves much credit for the subse-
quent enactment of laws enforcing this reform. 
Before revie·wing La Follette 1 s work with tae Yfisconsin legislature 
relative to tax reform, it would be well to see wnat progress had been made 
in that direction previous to his administration. In 1897, a committee 
59 Barton, 110-111. 
W Ibid. , 135. 
61 Ibid. ' 120. 
62 Haugen, 126. 
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was appointed by the legislature to study the problem of taxation. In the 
next session of the legislature, in 1899, the committee returned its report, 
announcing that tae assessments of pro_t:Jerty were inadequate and tnat there 
was gross undervaluation. It also suggestea that a permanent commission 
be appointed to supervise all tax matters, study the question, ana make 
reconnnendations. 63 The legislature then passed the 11~"1hitehead Bills11 
providing for the taxation, under the ad valorem assessment system, of 
express, sleeping car, freigat line, and equipment companies. 64 Although 
these laws preceded tne administration of La Follette, tney were largely 
due to his influence on the Republican platfonn the previous year. It was 
his influence, too, that brought about t11e anti-pass legislation that was 
passed at tile end of the 1899 session. 65 
As was to be expected, La Follette 1 s message to the legislature in 
1901 contained reference to the problem of railroad taxation. In it, he 
accused the corporation lobbyists of preventing t:ne equitable taxation of 
the railroads and l1e proposed a permanent C·:>mmission to supervise and 
enforce the tax laws. tie also asked more stringent anti-trust laws, declar-
ing that the legislature nad the right to prevent monopoly by annulling 
charters or by otherwise severely punishing conspiracies to monopolize. 66 
In addition, he suggested that the legislature impress upon the temporary 
tax committee the duty that it. nad 11 to enforce the provisions of the 
63 Ibid., 128. 
64 Philipp, 129. 
65 Barton, 138. 
66 Lovejoy, 56, cit.ing Journal of Assembly (1901), 11 Governor 1 s Messagen, 
'rhursday, January 10, 1901, Ib-48. 
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(Vfhi tehead) law, that all property be placed on the assessment roll at the 
actual cash value. 11 67 
On January 31, 1901, two railroa<i bills were introduced into the 
'.lfisconsin legislature; one in the Assefllbly by Hall, the oti1er in the Senate 
by Whitehead. Hall's bill provided for an increase in the railroad license 
fee from four to five and one half per cent. Whitehead's measure required 
that the railroad taxes by based on the ad valorem value _of tne roads. 
On April 10, the license fee bill was reported out of committee with the 
recommendation that the bill be postponed until April 23. This bill was 
subsequently defeated in the Assembly. On May 2, the Assembly killed the 
ad valorem bill as well. The Senate also defeated both measures. 68 On 
May 2, La Follette gave vent to his feelings regarding the action of his 
legislature. In vetoing a dog license law that had been passed, he took 
occasion to upbraid the legislature for furt~'ler tmdng the people wnile being 
unwilling to tax the railroads. 69 But the session was not entirely without 
results. The legislatures did make the tax commission, set up in 1899 
as a tempora~ body, a permanent institution. 7° 
La Follette wasted no time in taking nis fight to the people. He 
believed that platforms were pledges to tne people anci that t11ey si:lould be 
lived up to and he showed wi:lere he had been prevented from doing this. 7l 
67 Haugen, 130. 
68 Barton, 175-178. 
69 Ibid., 178. 
70 Lovejoy, 67. 
71 Howe, 16. 
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In the opening speech of his 1902 campaign, he attacked the menace of the 
public service corporation and the trusts. 72 He continued his attack 
a..'1d it bore results. He was re-elected and had another opportunity to 
put his theories into practice. 
La Follette's message to the legislature in 1903 laid great stress 
once again on the problem of railroad taxation. In the section on taxation, 
he asked for an ad valorem tax on the railroads and the public service 
corporations. 73 He maintained that 11 equal and just taxation is a funda-
mental principle of republican goverru'Jlent.n 74 The most striking feature 
of the message, however, was the demand for a permanent commission to fix 
&'1d regulate railroad rates. He showed by tables waere Wisconsin citizens 
paid 28 to 40 per cent more in freight rates for the same service than the 
people in Iowa and Illinois wnere there were regulatory commissions. 75 
In addition to his regular message, La Follette sent three special messages 
to this 1903 legislature on the railroad issues. 76 This pressure finally 
brought results. 
Although unwillingly, the legislature of 1903 did pass an ad valorem 
railroad tax. On February 13, 1903, an ad valorem tax bill was introduced 
in both houses. The two were similar except that the Assembly measure pro-
vided that the tax go into effect in 1903 and did not exampt railroad bonds 
72 Lovejoy, 71. 
73 Ibid., 76, citing Journal of Senate (1903), 20-84. 
74 Barton, 242. -
75 Lovejoy, 76, citing Journal of Senate (1903), 20-84. 
76 Barton, 230. --
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from taxation: the Senate bill would not go into effect until 1904 and it 
did exempt bonds. On March 6, the Assembly passed their bill unanimously. 
It then went to the Senate where it was amended. A conference resulted. 
Meanwhile, also on March 6, the railway commission bill, providing for a 
commission to fix the rates charged by tne railroads, was introduced into 
the Assembly. Tnis posed a problem for the railroad lobbyists. They 
feared to defeat both of the railroad bills because of the public temper. 
The commission bill was more obnoxious thm1 the tax bill because the roads 
figured that they could cover the increased taxes by charging higher freight 
rates. £.1oreover, the commission bill was easier to defeat because it had 
been suggested by the governor and the tax bill was a product of the tax 
commission. Therefore, the railroads decided to defeat the commission bill 
and the tax measure was, consequently, passed. 77 
This measure remedied a long-standing inequity. La Follette had fought 
for it for many years and deserves most of the credit for its eventual 
passage. It forced the railroads to bear their full share of taxation and 
added more tha..."'l $600,000 a year to the state revenue. 78 rt made the market 
price of railroad stocks and bonds tae basis of new assessments and this 
was checked against engineers' estimates of the cost of replacement. 79 
The legislature of 1903 had defeated the railway commission and 
La Follette took this issue to the people. It was one of the major issues 
77 Ibid., 243-245. 
78 De Witt, 56. 
79 Lovejoy, 83. 
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in his campaign of 1904. He worked hard to impress upon the people the 
need for the regulation of the railroads and tlle trusts. 80 When the 
election was over and he was governor of Wisconsin for another term, La 
Follette went to the legislature and reco~~ended the commission. This was, 
of course, designed to prevent the railroads from raising ~1eir rates to 
cover their increased taxes. La Follette urged the creation of a commission 
having full supervision over the reasonableness of rates. 81 So strong had 
the progressive spirit become in the state that the bill was passed unani-
mously. 82 
This same legislature of 1905 enacted into law another of La Follette's 
measures. He had long campaigned against the policy of corporations giving 
free passes or franking privileges to officials. A law forbidding this 
procedure had been passed in 1899 83 but was difficult to enforce. In 
1905, the legislature moved to correct tnis. A law was enacted requiring 
all railroads to file their lists of passes w:i.. th t11e state. Trlis simplified 
supervision. Also, the state declared that passes given newspaper men in 
return for "free" advertising must be listed as earnings. This stopped the 
passes and left the newspapers free of railroad pressure. 84 
\Vhen La Follette arrived in Washington as United States Senator from 
Wisconsin, the debate over the Hepburn bill was in process in the Senate. 
80 Ibid., 89. 
81 3augen, 138-139. 
82 La Follette, 345. 
83 Barton, 138. 
84 ~-, 284. 
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Despite the usual prohibition against newcomers speaking, La Follette, 
feeling that because of his fight in Wisconsin he i1ad something to contribute 
took the floor. nis speech, according to the press of the day, was one of 
the most thoroughgoing discussions of tne railroad regulation problem that 
had so far been heard in the national Capitol. It toucned on the basic 
principles involved in the problem. Its chief proposition was the physical 
valuation of railroads as a basis in rate-making. He incorporated this in 
amendments to the bill-and to other measures that came up--but was voted 
down. This speech of La Follette, tne neophyte, gave the progressive move-
ment in the Republican party the stimulus that was to quicken it into 
organized, individual life. From this moment, Republican insurgency in 
Congress began taking tangible form. 85 
!Vhile in Congress, La Follette tried to strengthen tne power of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission. It was his fight, &~d that of other pro-
gressives, which made the Mann-Elkins act, passed on June 3, 1910, as strong 
as it was. He was in the Senate throu@1out Taft's administration and con-
sistently supported those meaaures designed to limit the power of the 
trusts. 86 
Although La Follette did not have the opportunities of Roosevelt to 
fight the corporate interests, he was consistent innis efforts to regulate 
them for the pub~ic good and he did not confuse the issue with platitudes 
about good and bad trusts. La Follette was one of the leaders in the fight 
85 Ibid. , 284. 
86 Mowry, 100. 
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agai11st trusts. He did not want to destroy them but he did believe that 
there should be the smne ethical standards for corporations as for indivi-
duals. He never doubted the validity of that theory &>d it fonned the 
"warp and woof of a social and economic creed to whicn he was passionately 
devoted. n 87 
La Follette's stand on the tariff, likewise, bears closer examination 
than does Roosevelt's. Coming as he dia. from an agricultural area, he was 
naturally opposed to t.'1e high tariff on manufactured goods tnat was designed 
to protect the industrialists. In his opening speech of tne 1902 campaign, 
he showed his comprehension of the problem by demanding that the national 
government revise tne tariff schedules so tnat they would be fairer to the 
country as a whole. 88 The plank in nis 1904 platform might well have forme 
the basis of the one in the Progressive party platform in 1912. It stated 
that: 
We firmly adhere to the fundamental Republican doctrine of 
protection to American labor, a.'1d believe that the aim of a 
truly protective policy should be to stimulate competition in 
the home market and not destroy it by favoring trust combina-
tions. We therefore believe in a readjustment of tariff schedules 
in all cases where protection is employed for the benefit of 
capital and only to tile injur.r of the consumer and working man. 89 
Yet it must be confessed that all of La Follette• s early record was not 
without blemish. During his service in the House of Representatives, 
he had served on the committee whicn prepared the McKinley bill and he had 
87 Frederic A. Ogg, "Robert M. La Follette in Retrospect, 11 Current 
History, vol. 33, New York, 687 (February, 1931). 
88 Lovejoy, 71. 
89 Haugen, 147. 
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supported this measure. 9° 
La Follette more than redeemed himself for his stand on the McKinley 
Tariff bill when ne next returneci to Washington as a Senator. Tnen he 
led tne fight on the Payne-.&irich Tariff. He had the Bureau of Statistics 
of t~1e Department of Commerce and Labor prepare a table comparing the 
Payne-J.~drich Tariff with the Dingley Tariff to disprove Aldrich's con ten-
tion that the former was a reduction. He read this report into the Con-
gressional Record. It showed that the Payne-Aldrich measure levied an ad 
valorem tax of 41.77 per cent on incoming goods, wnereas tne equivalent 
ad valorem tax of the Dingley bill was only 40.21 per cent. 91 Despite 
La Follette 1 s efforts to defeat it, the Payne-.Hdricr1 Tariff became a law 
but, when the bill was put to a vote, there were ten Republicens w11o voted 
with the Democrats against it. Tnese were tne nucleus of tne progressive 
movement wi tnin Congress. 92 La F'ollet te was certainly in step w:i.. th the 
Progressive party platfonn as far as the tariff was concerned. 
In concluding this chapter, there is still another part of the Progres-
sive party platform that bears examina.tion. Altilough not exclusively a 
matter of the trusts, it vitally concerned them and was largely directed 
against them. Tnis is the policy of conservation. 
There is one phase of Roosevelt• s record about wilicn there is unanimous 
agreement. He was a firm supporter of the policy of conservation of our 
90 Raney, 297. 
91 Mowr-J, 52, ci t:ing Congressional Record, 61 Congress, 1 Session, vol. 
44, 1447. 
92 Raney, 297. 
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natural resources and even tnose unfriendly to him list this as a great 
accomplishment of his a~~inistration. 93 His interest began early and he 
had promoted the cause while still governor of :New York. 94 His record 
as president needs no repetition. Even La Follette praised his stand. 95 
In this, Roosevelt w~s in perfect agreement wi til the Progressive party 
platform. 
The platfonn devoted much time to the discussion of the problem of 
conservation. Briefly, it urged that the lands containing natural re-
sources--coal, oil, forests, and water power--should be held by the govern-
ment but be open to the constructive use of tne public. 96 
Despite the fact that La Follette gained no fame for his part in the 
conservation movement, he was no less a regular supporter of it than 
Roosevelt. As governor of ·wisconsin, he urged t~1e development of natural 
resources of the state, but under such conditions as would protect these 
resources from exploitation. 97 His first speech in.the Senate put forward 
an amendment to tne Hepburn bill forbidding railroads to acquire title to 
Indian coal lands, thus saving many square miles of valuable lands from 
unnecessary exploitation. 98 As a fledging Congressman, he prevented the 
railroads from gaining much la...'1d through the Sioux Indian reservation which 
93 John Chamberlain, Farewell to Reform, Being a History of the Rise, Life 
and Decay of the ProgressJ.veMind in A;11erica-; Liverignt, Inc. New York, 
ID2, 217.- -- ---
94 Roosevelt, Works, XV, 21-22. 
95 Roosevelt, AUtObiography, 422. 
96 Payne, 313-314, from the Progressive Party Platform. 
97 Torrelle, 325-327, 11 Message to Legislature,n April 12, 1905. 
98 Ibid., 329-330. 
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they claimed they needed as a right of wqr. 99 He loyally supported tne 
conservation program under both Roosevelt and Taft. 100 It would seem that 
both La Follette and Roosevelt were in harmony with the policy of conser-
vation advocated by the Progessive party platform. 
In aummary, it is clear that, although not attracting as much attention, 
La Follette worked more consistently for the regulation of corporations 
and for a fair tariff tnan did. Roosevelt. Both men were actively interested 
in and supported conservation. It should be mentioneci, nowever, that 
Roosevelt was forced to deal with the problem on a national scale and to 
take into consideration the temper, not only of his own industrial state 
of New York, but of the people tl1.rougaout the country. La Follette, on the 
other hand, was limited in his activities largely to his own state and 
~:asconsin was essentially an agricultural state c.mere reg·~lation of the 
trusts was more universally desired. and easier to enforce. Uoreover, 
Roosevelt must be given credit for t;le attention wi1icn ae brought to the 
matter. Even though, as in most cases, he said more tnan he did, he did 
rouse the people to the need for some curb on the growing power of tne 
large corporations. 
99 La Follette, 75. 
100 Pringle, 431. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUlillJING UP 
The question of Roosevelt's motives in 1912 will always be a matter 
for discussion, and the discussion is unlikely to reach any permanent con-
elusion. Facts can be given and a deduction made but its accuracy will 
always be open to question. It is possible that even Roosevelt himself 
could not have honestly interpreted his actions for, once he became a 
candidate, he undoubtedly convinced himself of the righteousness of his 
cause. Here we can only look at some of the incidents of the period before 
the ca~paign and try to determine if they indicated a genuine interest in 
the progressive cause or whether they were indicative of personal ambition. 
lv.hile Roosevelt was still in Africa, nis name was mentioned as a 
possible Republican presidential nominee. 1 ~nen he did arrive in the 
States, he was greeted by a large and enthusiastic crowd. He evidently 
expected this t;ype of reception for he wrote before he arrivea that he hoped 
that arrangements woulu be made so that as few of the crowd as possible 
would be disappointed. 2 Yet, Roosevelt declared upon nis return that he 
had no intention of taking part in the fight then going on between the 
progressive and regular Republicans and that he hoped to reunite the party. 3 
1 Mowry, 118, citing Cnicago Tribune, February 14, 1910. 
2 Ibid., 121, citing Letter of Roosevelt to William Loeb, April 21, 1910, 
Roosevelt MSS. 
3 Ibid., 132-;-C'iting Letters of Roosevelt to General J. M. Ashton, July 
~1910 and to E. F. Waggoner, July 14, 1910, Roosevelt, 1JSS. 
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This, he later found, was impossible and so joined the progressive movement 
and, according to his friends, was drafted into tne presidential nomination. 
Before the draft took place, however, there does seem to have been 
some atteTipt to sound out public opinion. In mid-June of 1910, about the 
time that Roosevelt was arriving in New Yor~, the uoosevelt Club of St. Paul, 
lnnnesota held a meeting at which Gifford Pinchot and James Garfield were 
present. The president of tne Club, in his after-dinner speech, predicted 
the birth of a new party with Roosevelt, .Pinchot, and Garfield as its 
leaders. When Garfield and Pinchot rose to speak, they did not deny the 
ambitious statements of the president. 5 Thus, some people, even peo?le 
close to Roosevelt, were evidently considering the possibility of his 
candidacy and a new party long before botn of these things became actualities 
Roosevelt, himself, refused to commit himself definitely, but he did 
keep saying that he was not seeking tne nomination. He gave some indication 
in his correspondence for the reason for his attitude. He felt that the 
Republicans would be defeated in 1912 because of the irreconcilable split 
in ti1e party. Only defeat would bring the 11 Conservatives 11 and the 11 Progres-
sives" together. Because of this, Roosevelt felt that it would be best to 
nominate Taft and go down to defeat. The~! the party could reorganize for 
victory in 1916 under n some progressive leadership". 6 It was this idea 
4 De Witt, 79-80. 
5 Mowry, 118, citing Milwaukee Sentinel and Des 1Ioines Register and Leader, 
June 12, 1910; Ka."'lsas City Star, June lJ, 1910. 
6 Ibid., 175-176, citing Letter of Roosevelt to John C. Greenway, November 
21, 1910, and to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., January 2, 1911. 
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that may have caused him to refuse to sup:Jort the National Progressive 
Republican League. If he wanted to head the reorganization of his party, 
he could not alienate the conservatives by supporting the League, and he 
could not repudiate all of its principles for fear of angering the 
Progressives. 
But all of Roosevelt's friends were not as hesitant. They dropped 
many hints which led La Follette to believe later on that Roosevelt was 
planning to be a candidate long before he made his official a1nouncement. 
When the Progressives met in Cnicago in October of 1911, they endorsed 
La Follette's candidacy. 8 But outlook, a magazine extremely sympathetic 
to Roosevelt, said that fiThis endorsement is to be regarded as a recommen-
dation rather than a committal of t11e movement to any one man." 9 Later 
in ~~at same year, George Perkins, a Morgan partner, put his checkbook 
at the disposal of Roosevelt's campaign, althou~~ the latter had not yet 
11 tossed his hat into the ring. 11 10 Once the new year dawned, things devel-
oped more rapidly. On January 1, 1912, the Ohio Progressives met in con-
ference and declared that Roosevelt was to be considered a presidential 
possibility. On January 10, William Allen White started a nRoosevelt or 
Bust l 11 campaign in his Emporia Gazette. On January 20, cummins of Iow-a 
announced that he was a candidate for the nomination. This was the first 
break in the Progressive front. 11 The way was prepared for Roosevelt•s 
7 Ibid., 176. 
8 La Follette, 532; also Costigan Papers, 175. 
9 Ibid., 533. 
10 Mowry, 200. 
11 La Follette, Chapter XII. This account is a summary of the chapter. 
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candidacy. 
It is my own belief that Roosevelt himself gave ttle best explanation 
of these events. He did not want to run and lose in 1912, feeling that 
that would destroy his chances in 1916. But when he found that the Pro-
gressives had a chm1ce to win in 1912, he decided that he, m1d not La 
Follette, should be the winner. This is'consistent with the urge for power 
which seemed a dominant characteristic of Roosevelt's. It was an urge 
tempered by the strong conviction that he could use that power in the in-
terests of t..'le people as he saw these interests. 12 He undoubtedly con-
vinced himself that he would be of greater benefit to the people in the 
vVhite House than would La Follette. 
Now it is for us to decide whether Roosevelt's conclusion was correct. 
Progressivism was born of a fresh consciousness of the necessity of curbing 
the dangerous and growing tendencies toward industrial and commercial 
despotism on the part of organized wealth, a new reiization of the justice 
of the age-old demand for equal opportunities for all, and a determination 
to insist on its more general observance. 13 In order to put their ideas 
into practice, the Progressives put tneir faith in tne Americml people. 
They believed in teaching tne people the facts. Then the people would 
instinctively choose the morally right course, they felt. 14 This tendency 
to put facts before the people was most marked in La Follette. de aLways 
12 Mowry, 15. 
13 Barton, 23. 
14 Lovejoy, 97. 
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kept his constituents informed concerning the issues before him. 15 We 
find no similar tendency in Roosevelt. 
Roosevelt, as has been already mentioned, stayed within the framework 
of the Republican party throughout his career until 1912. And it was the 
conservative branch of the party that gave him support. He was nominated 
·by the conservatives in 1904 and ran on a conservative platform. l6 He had, 
it is true, showed some sympathy with progressive ideas early in his first 
administration, but had beat a strategic retreat as the 1904 election app-
roached. He withdrew his support of downward revision of the tariff be-
cause he doubted if such revision was wise just before an election. 17 
He became more kindly disposed toward Aldrich ru1d his fellow-conservatives 
in Congress. 18 He was, in other words, 11mending his political fences" 
with the demands of expediency. In 1908, Roosevelt again compromised with 
the conservatives in order to obtain the nomination of Ta£t. One of the 
few progressive planks that found its way into the platform was t>le sugges-
tion of a downward revision of' the tariff--a promise later reneged on. l9 
Despite the evidence, Roosevelt was capable of vocally expressing his 
progressive sentiments very well. Classifying himself as a Progressive 
at the. meeting of the New York State Committee on the eve of the State 
Convention, he said: "Our fight is squared against corruption and the un-
15 La Follette, 63-67. 
16 Mowry, 22. 
17 Pringle, 353, citing Letter of Roosevelt to J. B. Bishop, April 27, 1903. 
18 Ibid., 353, citing Letter of Roosevelt toW. H. Taft, March 3, 1903, 
in Stephenson, Aldrich, 218. 
19 Mowry, 31. 
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clean bossism that has bred corruption. n 20 That would imply that he 
favored political reform that was directed at eliminating tne bosses. Yet, 
much earlier, he had cautioned against revolution~ change in metaod. 
In every governmental process the aim that a people capable 
of self-government should steadfastly keep in mind is to pro-
ceed by evolution rather than revolution. 21 
And this statement was made in 1902, after La Fo~lette had ~ready been 
fighting for the revolutionary change that was the direct primary for almost 
five years. Rooseve~t evidently still be~ieved that graQu~ change was 
desirable in 1912, for he objected to the initiative and referendum in the 
National Progressive Republican League's Declaration of Principles. 22 
Even in his statements proclaiming hiznself a progressive, he was aznbiguous 
on the question of letting the people really rule. He said tnat popular 
rule was merely a means to an end, that end being tne development of "the 
right kind of private citizens and the right kind of pub~ic servants." 23 
Altho,Igh the idea was acceptable, it did relegate reform to a secondary 
place and voiced the moral generalities tnat Roosevelt was so fond of 
expressing. 
Roosevelt's policy on trusts sounded adequate, too. Speaking at 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on October 4, 1906, he said: "The Government 
ougnt not to conduct the businessof the country; but it ought to regulate 
it so that it shall be conducted in the interest of the public." 24 Yet, 
20 Payne, 34. 
21 Roosevelt, Policy, I, 59. 
22 Pringle, 349, citing outlook, January 14, 1911. 
23 Chicago Trlbune, JanuarJ 31, 1911. 
24 Bishop, II, 32. 
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an examinaticnof the facts would lead one to believe that there was little 
regulation while Roosevelt was in the presidency. There were 149 trusts 
when he took office in 1900, representing four billion dollars in approxi-
mate capitalization. When he went out of office, there were 10,020 trusts 
with a capitalization of virtually tnirty-(me billion d~llars, seventy per 
cent of which has been estimated as pure water. 25 That does not consti-
tute an impressive record for a "trust-buster11 • 
Roosevelt talked well of labor, also. In an address to the Brotherhood 
of Locomotive Firemen, in Chattanooga, Tennessee, September 8, 1902, he 
stated: "I believe emphatically in organized labor.n 26 Yet he was opposed 
to Governor Al tgeld of Illinois "wno alone stood out as an example of the 
Progressive type of governor. n 27 Roosevelt said that 11 Al tgeld is as 
emphatically the foe of decent government as Tweed, himself, and is capable 
of doing far more damage than Tweed. Tae Governor is tne foe of every true 
American and is the foe particularly of every honest workingman." 28 Labor 
could not have been comforted by his words relative to labor legislation, 
either. 
Most certainly we should never invoke the interference of the 
State or Nation unless it is absolutely necessary; but it is 
equally true that when confident of its necessity we should not 
on academic grounds refuse it. 29 
Such a statement left much leeway, for there could be much difference of 
opinion as to what constituted 11 absolutely necessary". Roosevelt also showed 
25 Chamberlain, 271. 
26 Roosevelt, Policy, I, 69. 
27 Chamberlain, 73. 
28 Roosevelt, American Ideals, 7. 
29 Roosevelt, Policy, I, 129. 
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a disposition to remain friends with capital and he expressed the desire to 
have it known that there were crooks and scoundrels in the ranks of labor 
as well as capital. 30 \~ile this was undoubtedly true, most of the men 
concerned with labor problems were more interested in the many thousands of 
honest workingmen than in the few dishonest organizers. 
Maybe all of tne points which we have been making are indicative of 
J Roosevelt's tendency to keep "to the middle of the road". He would progress 
to a certain point in ~lis program to ward off unrest, and then would make 
energetic efforts to appease the right wing. 3l That would explain the 
statement tr1at was meant for Hiram Johnson: "I am wi tr1 the insurgents in 
this fight but not for publication". 32 That was hardly t..'le kind of support 
that the Progressives needed. But Roosevelt was loath to take a stand that 
would make it embarrassing to change his mind. Only on the question of con-
\l servation, and possibly civil service, was Roosevelt unchanging. 
ll, \i Roosevelt once said, in an address to the Syracuse, New York, Chamber 
of Commerce on February 22, 1899: "I do not believe in hypocrisy." 33 
Yet he showed a remarkable facility for contradicting himself, in word and. 
deed, if by that contradiction he could further his career. 34 Some of his 
reversals, we have already mentioned. Roosevelt was definitely anti-labor 
in the New York Assembly, became at least vocally pro-labor after he came 
30 :Mowry, 193, citing Letter of Roosevelt to Hiram Johnson, October 27, 
1911, Roosevelt 1ffiS. 
31 Pringle, 427. -
32 Mowry, 132, citing Letter of Roosevelt to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., 
August 10, 1910, Roosevelt MSS. 
33 Roosevelt, Public Papers, 27~ 
34 Chamberlain, 266. 
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to the presidency, and later said that, if he were Wilson, he would not 
have signed the Adamson eight-hour day bill. He also felt that certain 
things were just m1en he did them, and unjust when they were done to him. 
His conduct in the 1908 and 1912 conventions is a good illustration of this. 
He could even compromise on morals when political expediency demanded it. 
i:le chose to ignore the Erie Canal frauds as Governor of New York, because 
his own Republican party had perpetrated them. 35 Roosevelt was a surface 
swimmer, always aware of the best thing for his career. He would roar 
invocations to morality and then suddenly descend to political bargaining. 36 
Possibly that fit into his idea of practical politics, but it hardly made 
for sincerity as a reformer. 
Yet no one can condemn Roosevelt entire~. He did serve a purpose, 
and served it better than anyone else could have done. The very moralities 
and platitudes that he was so fond of voicing served to glamorize the 
movement and obtain for it the needed publicity. ~e was an intriguing 
figure himself, and the interest in him was transferred to tile movmnent. 
The grim, never-compromising sincerity of a La Follette would never have 
received the publicity that the effervescent of Roosevelt did. As one 
author has said: 11 Roosevelt 1 s greatest contribution to Insurgency did not 
lie in his concrete legislative achievements. Rather it was his moral 
crusade against evil, his raising of the ideals of the Populists, Bryan, 
and the muckrackers to the level of respectability." 37 
35 Ibid., 266-268. 
36 Ibid., 265. 
37 Hechler, 24. 
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Roosevelt brought to the movement his whirlwind enthusiasm and drama-
tized the issues envolved. His legislative achievements were greatest in 
the field of conservation; his trust-busting was confined to some isolated 
attacks on specific combinations; his efforts at railroad regulation fell 
short of the progressive ideal of La Follette, who wanted to make physical 
evaluation the basis for establishing rates. Yet, with it all, it is ex-
tremely unlikely that the progressive movement would ever have attained its 
position of national prominence without tne support of Theodore Roosevelt. 
In La Follette, we find a different type of person than Roosevelt. 
La Follette was tne man responsible for the establishment of the 11Wisconsin 
Idea11 in his home state. Something of his motivation can be gained from 
an examination of this idea. It was brought from Germany, where the govern-
men t was experiencing its first pangs of social consciousness. It was based 
on the belief that it pays the state to concern itself with the betterment 
of human beings and the protection of human welfare. 38 Its doctrine was 
that "business and human welfare can increase side by side" and "laws can 
be so constructed as to lead to progress and at tile same time preserve to 
tne fullest all human bette~ent.n 39 The "Wisconsin Idean advocated rail-
road regulation, sanitation, and social legislation in the hands of experts 
who would deal justly and wisely with every interest in the state. It aimed 
at efficiency and social and industrial betterment. 40 La Follette was 
38 Haynes, 395. 
39 Charles McCarthy, The Wisconsin Idea, The Macmillan Company, New York, 
1912, 30-31. 
40 Haynes, 366. 
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basis of his program for his state. 
La Follette added to the German concept by sponsoring greater parti-
cipation by the people in their government. He felt that was an essential 
part of the progressive movement. He had great faith in the people and 
high hopes of the wisdom of their action. At ru1 address before the Republi-
can Platform Convention in 1910, he gave expression to his feelings relative 
to the people and the progressive movement •. At that time he said: nrt 
(the progressive movement) comprehends the aspirations of tne numan race 
in its struggle from the beginning to the present time.n :de continued by 
saying that laws are made to carry out the will of the people, and when they 
fail to do so, they must be changed; 11 for over all and above all and greater 
than all, and expressing the supreme sovereignty of all are tae people." 41 
And in order that the people themselves could care for their interests, he 
fought for political reform. Tne direct primary law in 7fisconsin was of 
his making. The other reformers "would have fallen to the ground but for 
the timely arrival upon the field of the Governor ••• To him belongs the credit 
for the victory. 11 42 La Follette did not just talk about modifying the 
system of government so as to restore the ttsovereignty of the people and 
carry out their will to rule." 43 de did something about the situation. 
La Follette also saw in the progressive movement the fight 11 for the 
rights of aJ.l the people against the encroachments of a powerful few. u 44 
41 Torrelle, 182. 
42 Lovejoy, 96, citing an unpublished letter by A. 11.. dall in the files 
of Fred L. Holmes. 
43 Haynes, 425, citing the American Yearbook, 1912, 2-3. 
44 Ibid., 425, citation as above. 
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From that idea came his fight against the special privilege that could 
bend a government to its own will. In order to distribute the cost of 
government more equitably, ne recommended an income tax in his message to 
the legislature in 1903. 45 He worked to reform the taxation system of 
Wisconsin, where ti1ere was definite need for reform because of the great 
undervaluation of property. 46 He protecteu ti1e people 1 s interests wr1en 
he insisted on a cownerce co~~ssion to regulate rates within his state. 
He worked on the very logical principle that it was tne state's duty to 
furnish transportation facilities and, since the function was delegated to 
the railroads, it was the duty of t:ne stateto regulate ti1em so that they 
were required to furnisl1 adequate service at reasonable rates. 47 Certainly 
that was protecting the interests of the people against the interests of 
the few. 
La Follette's efforts inevitably made enemies for him. But, unlike 
Roosevelt, ae made no attempt to appease these enemies. He voluntarily 
chose to fight his party after the Sa:wyer-Siebecker affair. 48 Only once 
did he go back consciously to the policy of friendship with the conservat-
ives. That was in 1900. In that year, he announced his candidacy for the 
governorship for the third time. There were five other candidates in the 
field. La Follette was so strong, however, that these withdrew. 49 Then 
he attempted to restrain opposition to the "machine" by his supporters. He 
45 Haugen, 137. 
46 Philipp, 105. 
47 McCarthy, 39. 
48 Barton, 52. 
49 Philipp, 24. 
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even tried to reach a ~armony agreement witn tne re~ular Republicans, agree-
ing to give no objection to the reelection of Spooner to the Senatorship 
if they would support him for t~1e governorship. So In order to insure 
himself general support, he avoided all mention of controversial state 
issues except the primary election law. He was especially quiet on the 
question of railroad regulation. Sl But he found that nis efforts to 
establish peace were in vain. The regulars, although they supported him 
in the election, did all in their power to destroy his planned legislative 
program. This was inconsistent with La Follette's ideas and he told the 
regulars tnat nto violate promises of that platform is to cneat and betray 
the voter." 52 
The 11 Stalwarts11 did not take kindly to La Follette• s reprimand, and 
they accused him of an attempt to become dictator of the state. They viewed 
"with alarm the persistent effort to strengthen the executive at the expense 
of the legislative department of ti1e state." 53 Despite these statements, 
the 11 Sta.lwarts11 again supported I,a Follette when he was nominated in 1902. 
This time, however, the governor made no effort to enlist the support of 
the conservatives, and he continued to fight for his reforms despite their 
objections. So persistent was his effort tnat the "Stalwarts" bolted the 
Republican convention in 1904, and refused to support La Follette. They 
even went so far as to form a new party, and tney called themselves the 
SO Barton, 142. 
Sl Ibid. ' 161. 
52 Torrelle, 41-47. 
53 Philipp, 52. 
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11National Republicans". 54 riowever, even this drastic step did not defeat 
La Follette. And he, in turn, never repeated his mistake of 1900 by allying 
himself with t11.e 11 Stalwarts". 
vVhile La Follette did not receive the support of the conservative 
element within his party, there were many in his state who supported him. 
The feeling in regard to him was well expressed by tne Milwaukee Journal 
and was a testimony to him. The Journal said: "He stancis for principles 
which are the very basis and founciation of representative government" and 
then listed these as: "The e:{ual rignt of every man to express his choice 
for candidates by direct vote", and 11 the equal distribution of all burdens 
of government by taxing the property of corporations the same as the proper-
ty of individuals is taxed. n 55 
When he became a United States Senator, La Follette consistently 
supported the very things for which he had fought in Wisconsin. In the 
Senate, his leadership was all-important in solidifying and vitalizing 
progressive sentiment. He was a rallying point for the other Insurgents. 
It was La Follette who founded tne National Progressive Republican League, 
and he was, at first, its unanimous choice for the presidency. 56 He 
showed his devotion to the cause of reform in a speech which he made in 
1911, after the formation of the League. He then completely stated his 
program, and it included 11 Congressional legislation to prevent unreasonable 
restraints of trade", taxation 11based on physical valuation of corporate 
54 Lovejoy, 87-88. 
55 Ibid., 70, citing Milwaukee Jounnal, July 12, 1902. 
56 La Follette, 519. 
f 138 
properties and the cost of productionn, "a permanent, non-partisan,. scien-
tific tariff commission" to establish duties. de favored 11 the direct 
primary for selection of delegates to conventions, the ?residential pre-
ference primary, the popular vote to be binding upon the action of the 
delegates." And he stood 11 for the initiative and referendum anci the 
recall, including the recall of judges.n 57 Certainly there could be no 
more sweeping and definite statement of support for progressive principles. 
There was no attempt to express generalities or platitudes here. 
Yet, for all of his sincerity, La Follette did not have the power to 
strike fear into the hearts of the conservatives tnat did Roosevelt. He 
was so far in advance of his time, that they were likely to disregard him 
as too radical to enlist popular support. 'fnis was shown at the time that 
Taft was trying to regain the leadership of the Republican party. Then, 
one of his supporters wrote that 11what La Follette says doesn't seem to 
hurt.n 58 Yet, it was because of this same La Follette, and tne nradicals" 
like him, that as much was accomplished toward reform as was done. 
As all was not bad with Roosevelt, all was not good with La Follette. 
He was always an obstinate man, and he became unnecessarily so as he got 
older. He insisted on his own plans and views, and whatever stood in the 
way had to be sacrificed. 59 He was ambitious, too. He had designs on 
57 Haynes, 425, citing the American Yearbook, 1912, 2-3. 
58 Mowry, 106, citing Letter of J. Adam Bede to carter, March 5, 1910, 
Carter MSS. 
59 Barton, 2(8. 
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the presidency, and pushed himself to the front in order to attract. atten-
tion to himself. 60 He was a nard man to get along with because of his 
inability to compromise, yet this very fact marked him as a sincere reformer. 
La Follette was a man of high morals in public life. He viewed the 
problems of.state as well as of the individual in the clear, white light 
of ethics, and there was no compromising with expedience permit ted in either 
case. 61 This was what made his work of such value. de was the consistent 
beacon to which all progressives could turn; there was no wavering of his 
light. Bristow summed up his greatest contribution in the words: "La 
Follette is the crusader, the pioneer. He has blazed tne way and opened 
the road for the rest of us to follow him ••• 11 62 He was a leader in tne 
:Middle West, too. He became governor of Wisconsin about the time that 
Altgeld died, and this carried on the progressive succession. 63 
Chamberlain says that La Follette and Lollis D. Brandeis were nthe most 
intelligent of the Progressives Who took over the ideas of the Populists 
in an attempt to make them nationally effective." 64 As might be expected, 
he based his program on eduction of the people. rte believed that, wnen the 
people saw the truth, tne "politicians collla. not keep the trutil off tne 
statute books. n 65 He believed in issues, and he always had one when he 
appealed to the people for election. 66 ae was a consistent supporter of 
60 Haugen, 151. 
61 Torrelle, "Forward", 12. 
62 Hechler, 84, citing Letter of Joseph L. Bristow to rtarold Chase, March 
7, 1909. 
63 Chamberlain, 73. 
64 Ibid., 233. 
65 William Allen White, "The Progressive Hen and the Insurgent Ducklings", 
The American Magazine, LXXI, no. 3, New York, 396 (January, 1911). 
66 La Follette, 63-67. ' 
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the progressive idea that the people snould be educated to be masters of 
their own destiny. 
There remains now only a general comparison of Roosevelt and La Follett 
in order to detennine which was the better representative of Liberal Repub-
lican principles. Going back to the beginnings of the two men, La Follette• 
background made him a born democrat; Roosevelt came closer to the English 
ideal of tae disinterested gentleman in politics--W.~ich ~nplied disinterest-
edness within a class orbit, of course. rt was no aberration that dictated 
Roosevelt's genuine detestation of Thomas Jefferson. This dislike was 
strangely inconsistent with tne opening paragraph of the Progressive 
party• s platfonn whicn held 11wi th Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln that 
the people are masters of t11e Constitution." 67 Roosevelt chose his friends 
and advisers from within his aristocratic circle, and he was not one to 
suffer men in denim shirts gladly outside of his ranch in the West. 
La Follette, on the other hand, had a mythical faith in 11 the people"; he 
believed that, provided ti1ere was plenty of light, t11e common man would 
-
find his own way. Tne superior population of Wisconsin was 11 excuse enough 
for his credo." 68 
Roosevelt yearned for the approval of history and simply wanted legis-
lati ve action. He demanded paper results to sr1ow for his term in office. 
He was not at all unwilling to take compromise if that would get a measure 
onto the statute books. La Follette, however, preferred to fight rather 
67 Payne, 304. 
68 Chamberlain, 243. 
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than to acquiesce in a bad measure. 69 There was one of tne fundamental 
differences between the two men. Roosevelt could see nothing wrong in 
taking II half a loaf11 • But La Follette felt tnat wnere a principle was 
involved 11 no bread is often better than half a loaf • 11 ae did not believe 
in jeopardizing his cnances to get a true reform measure by stunting the 
appetite of tne people with a half-way measure. 70 
La Follette was a man who sought to make strict economic analysis 
the basis of his laws; ne never talked without facts. 71 He made tremendous 
use of the University of Wisconsin; appointing its faculty to the commissions 
~nich he instituted and calling upon it to· compile tne lists of statistics 
with which he confronted the voters. 72 Roosvelt, on the ott1er hand, was 
11 rather an agnostic in matters of economics. 11 He never understood tne 
spirit of the laboratory, the spirit that was tne hope of the Progressive, 
or Liberal, movement. 73 
Roosevelt, for all of his compromising, ended up vvith a pitifully 
small amount of acaievement to s;1ow for nis administration. And wi1en he 
left the presidency, ne left me country too. It was La Follette, with his 
grim tenacity, who persisted in carrying the Progressive fig:at througn the 
Taft ad.'llinistration. 74 It was La Follette who organized the Progressive 
cause. ne made it possible to figi1t for a Republican Progressive as the 
· 69 Ibid., 245. 
70 La Follette, 268. 
71 Chamberlain, 237. 
72 Dictionary of American Biography, X, 544. 
73 Chamberlain--, 237. 
74 Ibid., 241. 
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presidential nominee in 1912, when he founded the National Progressive 
Republican League. La Follette said that the cause of the Progressives 
made more converts at<d fared better while Roosevelt was in Africa than while 
he was in the White House. 75 There is undoubtedly a great deal of trllth 
in this. Roosevelt served to confllse tne issues while he was president by 
his contradictory statements m1d action. He talked as a progressive and 
acted as a conservative; Taft acted in a progressive manner while he spoke 
as a conservative. More people listen than think, and a great anger arose 
against Taft ti:1at served to solidify progressive sentiment in the country. 
There is no one who can say that La Follette would nave been nominated 
by the Republicans, and elected to tne presidency in 1912, if Roosevelt 
had refrained from placing himself in the pictllre as a candidate. It is 
my own opinion that, even if he had obtained the Republican nomination, he 
could not have been elected. 3e did not have sufficient strength in the 
East to carry a national election. Yet I do feel that .1e would nave been 
more truly representative of the ideals for wnicn tne progressives had 
fought than was Roosevelt. La Follette had proven that nis devotion to the 
cause of reform was sincere, unchanging, a"'"l.d. dependable. He was words and 
deed in close alliance. Roosevelt, on the other hand, was not at all 
dependable. He talked much, ana evidently sincerely thougnt taat he nad 
done muc1<. In actuality, his deeds were few, and tnen not always completely 
progressive. He hypnotized himself into believing of himself what was 
most flattering and most beneficial to him. 
75 La Follette, 478-479. 
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Yet each man played a vi tal part in the progressive movement. 
La Follette was tne crusader, the trail-blazer, tne unbending disciple of 
I 
reform. Even Roosevelt acknowledged his preeminent position in the move-
ment. 76 He served to awaken the public's thought and conscience to the 
evils that were rampant. ~le was tile unbreakable steel neart of the movement. 
!-:Ie remained true even after tne war had returned the country to 11 1~ormalcy11 
and tt1e other leaders !1ad deserted the cause. 77 Hoosevelt, not nearly so 
much a true progressive, was tt1e 11 icing11 on tJ:le outside of t:1e progressive 
11 cake 11 • '!is personality made the movement one of interest to the public. 
de posed many pertinent questions and, while he did little to solve them 
himself, he d.ici. create a national demand that these questions be met and 
answered. lie did not make the people thinl<, as diu La Follette, but he 
carried them along by the enthusiasm of his very nature. There was danger, 
of course, in this method, for enthusiasm can die out and leave nothing in 
its wake. But ti1ere was need for some entllUsiasm, and Roosevelt gave it. 
de was the best publicity man that tne Progressive cause ever had. 78 
76 Torrelle, 11 Forward11 , 10. 
77 Ibid., 11-12. 
78 .Mowry, 16. 
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BIBLIOGRAPJICAL ESSAY 
In looking for material, I went first to the cara catalogue, where I 
looked t.mder tne headings "La Follette", "Roosevelt", "'Nisconsin11 , and 
11 Progressive Party11 • I found that tr1ere is an excellent bibliography of 
La Follette, An Annotated Bibliograpny of Robert ~· La Follette, the 1:an 
and His Work, by Ernest W. Stirn, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1937. This was ver-:1 helpful and is an excellent and very comprehensive 
work. It was especiaLly beneficial in view of tr1e fact tnat La Follette 
has not published nor had published about him as mucn as Roosevelt. I also 
used Poole's Index and the Reader's Juide covering t.ae years from 1880 to 
• 1· 
1912 in order to find tne articles published in periodicals, especially on 
La Follette. Insofar as possible, I avoided usin3 articles in contemporary 
publications because I fQund tnern so biased on the subject under discussion. 
We will list first those articles taken from periodicals. With the 
exception of t;1ree, I think that we may clc..ssify tne magazines as source 
material. Two of tnese are by Bruce Bliven, who is very sympathetic toward 
La Follette. !{e wrote 11 Robert M. La I'ollette11 in New Republica, XLIII, 
no. 552, New York, 144-145 (July 1, 1925); and 11Robert M. La Follette's 
Place in Our History11 in the August, 192_S issue of Current dis tory, XXn, 
no. 5, Hew York Times Company, New York, 716-722. Another article written 
after La Follette 1 s death was Frederic A. Ogg, ''Hobert 11. La Follette in 
Retrospect", current nistory, XXXIII, no number, New York Times Company, 
New York, 685-691 (February, 1931). Tnis is~a very fine and fair article. 
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I took three articles from The American Magazine, Phillips Publisning 
Company, no place; and all three were sympathetic to La Follette and the 
progressive movement. Ray Stannard Baker wrote two of t~e articles: 11 Is 
the Republican Party Breaking Up? The Story of tne Insurgent West 11 , 
February, 1910, LXIX, no. 4, 435-438; and "The Meaning of Insurgency", 
~ff.ay, 1911, LXXII, no. 1, 59-64. The other article is by 7filliam Allen 
7/hite, 11 The Progressive Hen aYid tr1e Insurgent Ducklings", January, 1911, 
LLU, no. 3, 394-399. The outlook was ver;r interest in~ in ti1e light of 
the fact that Tneodore Roosevelt was a contributing editor. Although 
progressive lll tone, it was never enthusiastically for La Follette. I 
consul ted the eaitorials in t.lle issues of February 4, 1911 (vol. 97, 245, 
256-258); Ja..'1uary 13, 1912 (vol. 100, 57-58); and in the volume 100, Febru-
-
ary 17, 1912, 337. In volume 100, I also used the issues of January 20, 
1912, "La Follette as a Candidate, a Poll of tae Press", 120-122; February 
3, 1911, 11 IA:r. La Follette as Seen from th<:: Gallery11 , 255-256. And from the 
' 
same magazine, I reaa "Governor La Follette's Ringing :;v1essage11 , ;Jay 25, 
1901, vol. 68, no. 4, 199-201. 
Current Literature, a Taft supporter, gave me two more references: 
11 TI1.e Grooming of La Follette", November, 1911, LI, no. 5, 496-500; and a 
series of editorials in ~arch, 1912, LII, no. 3, 245-248. ~~e World's 
Work likewise supplied two references. E. Jl.ay Stevens wrote, inOctober, 
1902, vol. IV, no. 6, about "The La Follette-Spooner Campaign" and, in 
July, 1911, William Bayard Hale wrote of 11 La Follette, Pioneer Progressive", 
tnL, no. 3, 14591-14600. Both of these are kind to La Follette al.tnougil 
not biased innis behalf. Hale is really a Wilson supporter. The magazine 
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is published in IJew York by Doubleday, Page, and Company. 
From Harper• s Weekly, Harper and Brothers, New York, I read an article 
by Earle Hooker Ec..ton, 11 A Personal Sketch of Governor La Follette11 , XIVII, 
no. 2506, December 31, 1904, 2025-2026, tnat. was pro-La Follette; anci 
another in the same vein but on June 24, 1911 by C£larles Jonnston, "A Talk 
with La Follette", LV, no. 2844, 9. Tne Independent, New York, was tne 
source of the article by T. S. Adams, 11 fne Dra.ua of IVisconsin Politics", LIV, 
no. 2500, 1824-1826, on July 31, 1902, tnat was very neutral in its atti-
tude. In its editorial on February 1), 1912, "Senator La Follette's Disa-
bilityn, LY..xii, no. 3298, 369-371, it snows a pro-Taft sentiment, altt10ugh 
not critical of La Follette. The Literary Digest was a neutral source 
" published irt New York. Qn February 17, 1912, it carried an article called 
11:dr. La Follette, as See~. by His Party Press", XLIV, no. 7, 318-319; and 
on July 13, 1912, another 11 La Follette's Thrust at Roosevelt11 , nv, no. 1, 
45-49. 
11 Ihe Vlooing of Wall Street" was an amusing bit of satire in The Nation, 
?Jew York, November 30, 1911, vol. 93, no. 2422, 512. It pokes fun at the 
progressives. Richard Lloyd Jones wrote a very favorable piece for La 
Follette in CoJ.lier 1 s, New York, called "Among La Follette's People", XLV, 
no. 24, 17-18 (September 3, 1910). 
Two earlier articles are a ,piece by Henry w. Wilbur, 11 A Coming Man", 
XXIII, 25'0-253, in the Sept.ember, 1902, Junton 1 s Magazine, the Gunston 
Company, New York. Wilbur proved himself a good prophet. The last article 
is one by Lincoln Stepnens in McClure's :r1agazine, s. S. :>Jc Clure Company, 
New York, October, 1904. The article is one of a series called "Enemies 
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of the Republica a.YJ.J its particular title is ~~"'/Tisconsin: a State Where the 
People Have Restored Representative Government--The Story of Governor 
La Follette", YJCVIII, no. 6, 563-579. It is, as tae name suggests, favorable 
to La Follette. 
In our ru1alysis of the books used as reference for this paper, we c&~ 
begin with those relating to the study of tile progressive movement. First 
to be discussed are those sources concerned with the formation of the 
Progressive party. William Jennings Bryan, !:. Tale of Two Conventions being 
an Account of tt1e Republican and Democratic National Conventions of June, 
1912, with ~ Outline of the Progressive National convention of August of 
the Same Year, F1mk and ',l!fagnalls Company, New York, 1912, is a re;>orter' s 
version of events and was very hel~;?.ful despite Bryan's lack of sympathy with 
both the Republican and Progressive conventions. In contrast, the Official 
Report of the Proceedings of tae Fifteenth Republican National Convention 
Held in Chicago, Illinois, June 18 through 22, 1912, IVIilton w. Blumberg, 
Official Reporter, Tne Tenny Press, .New York City, 1912, was of no direct 
benefit although it did give a comprehension of' t.1.e figat t11at ti1e Roosevelt 
forces put up in that convention. LYJ.other book used chiefly to obtain 
background, and a fine work it was, is Backstage in 1912, the Inside Story 
of the Split Republican Convention, Dorrar1ce and Company, Inc., Philadelphia 
1932. Rosewater was the 1912 chairman of the RepubJ.ic::m. ~Jational Committee 
and is, consequently, anti-Roosevelt, but it was enlightening to read the 
book in view of the number of things that have been written expressing 
~oosevelt 1 s side of this dispute. A collection of letters and documen~ 
Papers of Edward ?. Costigan relating to the Progressive Movement in Coloradc 
• 
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1902-1917, edited by Colin B. Goodykoontz, University of Colorado, Boulder, 
1941, was most informative and gave a picture of the progressive movement 
in the West. It also gave an excellent idea of tl1e sv•ting to Roosevelt in 
1912. Our final source pertaining to the Progressive party is fhe Birth 
of the New Party ~ Progressive Democracy by George denry Payne, J. L. 
Nichols and Company, 1~aperville, Ill., 1912. This book, written by an ardent 
supporter of the new party, was very pro-P.oosevelt and not very reliable. 
It gave only tnose facts wnich reflected glory on Roosevelt. 
Turning now to secondary works on progressivism, we nave first The 
Progressive Movement, Its Principles a~d Its ?rogr&mne by s. J. Duncan-
Clark, Small, :.:aJnard and. Company, Boston, 1913. This sounded as thougn. 
it would be very helpful, but it turned out to be a glorification of ti:le 
11 Bull-Koose11 party and its platform, its convention, and. its candidate. 
It was virtually useless. The Progressive MOVement, ~ Non-partisan, 
Comprehensive Discussion of Current Tendencies in American Politics by 
Benjamin Parke De Witt, T11e rK.acmillan Company, New York, 1915', proved much 
more helpful. It was really wi1at its n&ne implied. Another fine book, 
but one which covered only t11e last section of ti1e period of the development 
of progressivism, was Insurgency, Personalities and Politics oftiae Taft 
Era by Kenneth w. !-Iecnler, Columbia University Press, New York, 1940. 
Tnis was well-footnoted, scholarly, and seemed unprejudiced. 
There were also two books whicn treated the progressive movement in 
individual states and tnree which dealt with it in Wisconsin. Fred E. 
Haynes wrote Third Party Movements Since tne Civil War with Special Refer-
~ to Iowa, The State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City, 1916. This 
was excellently foot-noted and largely from periodicals or other current 
literature. It treated both Roosevelt and La Follette with equal enthusiasm 
which made it more valuable. The Progressive i\1lovernent of 1912 and the Third 
Party Movement of 1924 in Maine by Elizabeth Rin_g, The ~ Bulletin, Xx:t:V, 
no. 5, January, 1933, University of lJiaine studies, second series, no. 26, 
was taken largely from periodicals and was foot-noted but was not in suffic-
ient detail to be very helpful. The three books on Wisconsin included 
Charles Me earthy, Tne Wisconsin Idea, the ill:acmillan Company, New York, 1912. 
This is a rambling account of ti1e topic with profuse praise of 'Jermany, 
where the "Wisconsin Idea11 originated. It was not too helpful because it 
dealt largely with problems current in Wisconsin in 1912. On the other 
hand, Wisconsin, ~ Experiment in Democracy by Frederic c. Howe was very 
fine. It was published by Gharles Scribner's Sons in New York in 1912. 
It was very sympathetic in it.s attitude toward La Follette and had to be 
used'witn some discretion as a result, but the author nad a very compre-
hensive knowledge of his topic. This is natural in view of the fact that 
.dowe was then secretary of tne National Republican League and had been a 
lecturer at the University of Wisconsin. This book may almost be considered 
source since tl1e author nad sucn intimate connection wi tn the movement of 
which he was writing. The last of the books on Wisconsin was William 
Fre>ncis Raney, IVisconsin, ~ Story of Progress, Prentice-Iiall, Inc., New 
York, 1940. The volume included an excellent chapter on La Follette, and 
the entire work is very neutral in tone. 
Next we will analyze those books that dealt with La Follette. The 
most helpful source, aside from the magazines already mentioned, was 
• 
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La Follette's Autobiography, ~Personal Narrative of Political Experiences 
by Robert u. La Follette, the Robert M. La Follette co., Madison, Wisconsin, 
1913. This was botn interesting to read anci very informative. In view of 
the author's interest in the topic under discussion, tae book must be sub-
jected to internal criticism, but I feel that it is remarkably truthful. 
Because of the fact that there is so little source m.s.terial available, I 
was forced to make extensive use of this volume. fu~other book of source 
material that I consulted in part was Pioneer and Political Reminescences 
(Wisconsin L:agazine of History, volumes XI, XII, andXIII), The Antes Press, 
Evansville, Wisconsin, n. d., by Nils Haugen. Here again it was necessary 
to apply internal criticism. Alt;:wugh this book dealt witn tne progressive 
movement in Wisconsin in its entirety, I use<i caiefly that section that 
dealt with La Follette and so have listed it in tnis section. Ellen Torrelle 
assisted by Albert 0. Barton, and Fred L. Holmes, compiled Tne Political 
Philosophy of Robert M. La Follette ~ Revealed in His Speeches ~Writings, 
The Robert r.~. La Follette Co., Madison, 'illisconsin, 1920. Although this 
contained only direct selections, I felt that a conscious effort was made 
to select those waicr1 would reflect most to La Follette's credit. Of a 
very different nature was Political Reform in Wisconsin, ~Historical Review 
of the Subjects of Primary Election, Taxation, and Railway Regulation by 
E.rnanuel L. Philipp, assisted by Edgar T. ·wheelock, E. L. Philipp, Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin, n. d. Tnis was written by an apologist of tne nstalwarts11 and 
is naturally very anti-La Follette. From comparison with other books, I 
found that there were some errors in it. Yet more common than actual mis-
information, was editing offacts to make them appear in an untrue light • 
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Although there is no date given in the book, I think that it was written 
around 1908. The last book which I am listing as source material on La 
F'ollette is La Follette 1 s Winning of Wisconsin, 1894-1904, 2nd edition, 
Madison, Wisconsin, 1924 (The Homestead Company, Des Moines, Iowa). Tnis 
might not be considered strictly source material but I nave so listed it 
because l1r. Barton was intimately connected wi tn t:1e progressive movement 
during most of tne time of which he writes. The book was veFy favorable to 
La Follette and haJ to be used witll care for that reason. 
Of tne secondary references that I used, one of the best was Allen 
Fraser Lovejoy, La Follette and the Establismnent of the Direct Primary in 
Wisconsin, 1890-1904, Yale University Press, New ;-J.aven Conn., 1941 (Patter-
son Prize Essays, Yc:le University, Vol. 1). This is carefully foot-noted 
almost entirely from source material. .Utnougr1 it is sympathetic to La 
Follette, it 1naintains a scholarly detachment. To learn soMething of La 
Follette 1 s life from a neutral source, I consul ted the Dictionary of Ameri-
~ Biography. The article t,:1ere on r'Robert ,H. La Folletteu is w-ritten by 
Frederic A. Paxson. The Dictionary itself is edited by Allen Johnson and 
Dumas Malone and is published by cnarles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1938. 
Tae article I used is in volume X ana covers pages 541-546. I also used 
Frank ;-rarris, Conteinpora.."'Y Portraits, 11 Senator La Follette", Brentano' s, 
New York, 1923. The author is very definitely a liberal and, as a result, 
is very sympathetic to the Senator. The final reference used in my search 
for information regarding La Follette was Chester c. Platt, What La Follett~s 
State Is Doing, Some Battles Waged For I·/Iore Freedom, Batavia Times Press, 
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Batavia, New York, 1924. This was a rather worthless volume because it 
dealt with a later period tl1a...'1 that of t11e paper. Moreover, it was violent-
ly partisan. 
Before listing tne references used in studying Roosevelt, I want to 
mention two books that dealt wiu1 reform in general rather than the pro-
gressive movement. One that was of great help regarQtng the history of the 
corrupt practices law was s. Gale Lowrie, Corrupt Practices at Elections, 
Comparative Legislative Bulletin, no. 23 of the Wisconsin Library Commission, 
Legislative Reference Department, i'l:adison, Wisconsin, Februar.r, 1911. This 
was excellently foot-noted almost entirely from legislative sources. The 
second of the books on reform was Farewell to Reform, Being ~ History of 
the Rise, Life, and Decay of tne Progressive 1·~ind in America by John 
Chamberlain, Liveright, Inc., New York, 1933. Chapter Eight was entitled 
"The Progressive Hind in Action--La Follet·t.e and Rooseveltn. Chamberlain 
was a newspaper man a...'ld the book is most interesting reading. Jis analysis 
of Roosevelt and La Follette is scintilating. He is very pro-La Follette 
and unerringly picks out every weru~ spot in the Colonel's annqr. In spite 
of its interesting reading it must be subjected to criticism. Chamberlain 
is obviously liberal to the point of being almost radicP~ and, thus, he has 
no sympathy with a 11middle-of-the-roader11 like Roosevelt. 
In listing source material that was used regarding Roosevelt, it is 
best to begin with taat written by Roosevelt himself. This list does not 
begin to cover all the works covered by him for he was a voluminous writer, 
but I nave tried to use some of 11is key works. Since all these are by 
Theodore Roosevelt it will not be necessary to list ~~e autnor 1 s name with 
r 
153 
each work. I first read Theodore Roosevelt, an Autobiography, ?dacmillan 
and Company, Limited, London, 1913. I did not, however, make much use of 
this in the paper for Roosevelt was anything but a modest man ana was not 
always careful of the accuracy of the facts which ne presented. Applied 
Ethics, one of the Willian Belden :Joble Lectllres for 1910, aoward University, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1911, was of little value except as a statement of Roose-
velt's philosophy. Of more help, but very similar in content, was :~erican 
Ideals, New Knickerbocker Edition, G. p. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1897. 
The Roosevelt Policy, Speeches, Letters and State Papers, relating to 
Corporate Wealth and Closely Allied Topics, two volumes, The Current Litera-
ture Publishing Company, New York, 1908, promised mucn but, after reading 
one or two speecnes, I found that both volumes were repetitions of the same 
few ideas. Letters to Kermit from Theodore Roosevelt, 1902-1908, Will 
Irwin, editor, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1946, gave an interesting 
picture of Roosevelt as a father and also gave some idea of his own evalua-
tion of his administr2tion. One of the most helpful works on Roosevelt 
was Public .rapers of Theodore Roosevelt, Governor, '1899, Brandow Printing 
Company, Alba""ly, New York, 1899. Ranking with this was volume XV of T.ae 
Works of Theodore Roosevelt, Herman Hagedorn, editor, National Edition, 
Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1926. This was entitled State ?apers 
as Governor ru1d President, 1899-1909. 
There were three other source books which I used relating to Theodore 
Roosevelt. Joseph Bucklin Bishop wrote and compiled ~~eodore Roosevelt and 
His Time Shown in His Own Letters, two volumes, Charles Scribner's Sons, 
New York, 1920. The quotations contained in the book would be listed as 
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source material. They were, however, linked togetner with a narrative 
that was Mr. Bishop 1 s own. Bishop was a great admirer of Roosevelt's and 
t(lis is obvious in the work. Since the letter and speeches are excerpts, 
it is possible to include only t<lose parts which are desired to give the 
correctly favorable impression of Il.oosevelt, and this nas been done in some 
cases. I did not feel tnat this was an especial.Ly good source. William 
Dudley Foulke wrote Roosevelt ~ the Spoilsman, ~·Jational Civil Service 
Reform League, New York, 1925. Foulke was a civil service commission "t.mder 
Roosevelt and because of his contact with most of the fac·t.s presented, I 
have listed this as a source. Foulke is very loyal to Hoosevelt but the 
book seems fair. The last source was Oscar King Davis, Released for Publi-
cation, Some Inside Political History of Tneodore Roosevelt and His Time, 
1898-1918, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, 1925. This is another book 
by a newspaper man and, thoQgn it made interesting reading, it was not too 
helpful except for background material. It dealt largely with anecdotes 
that showed Roosevelt's character and personality. 
I read two biographies. Tne first was William Roscoe Thayer, Theodore 
Roosevelt, ~ Intimate Biography, Houghton 1iifflin Company, New York, 1912. 
This was of very little use because tne author was so definitely prejudiced 
in favor of Roosevelt. The other biography proved to be one of tt1e most 
helpful books which I used. It was definitely tne least biased and, there-
fore, one of the most unusual and most valuable. It was Theodore Roosevelt, 
~Biography by Henry F. Pringle, Harcourt, Brace artd Company, New York, 1931. 
It was foot-noted almost entirely from source material, including the 
available manuscript sources. I would reco~nend this book highly. 
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The secondary works which dealt witn- tne perioa rather tnan with just 
tne man were two in number. Chapters Eight to Seventeen of James Ford 
Rhodes, The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, 1897-1909, The Macmillan 
Comp~~y, New York, 1923, dealt wi~~ ~~e administration of Roosevelt. This 
work was sympatnetic to big business and still favorable to Roosevelt, an 
interesting situation. Altaough it. was 9rofusely foot-noted, Bishop was the 
usual reference. Since I read Bishop's books, I diu not find this especiall 
beneficial. Harold Howland wrote Tneodore Roosevelt and His Times, ~ 
Chronicle of the Progressive Movement (The CO.ronicles of America Series, 
Allen Johnson, ed.), Yale University Press, New :J:aven, Conn., 1921. This 
was exceedingly pro-Roosevelt; the autnor calls himself 11 anotner ardent 
supportera of Theodore Hoosevelt. There were very few foot-notes alt~·10ugh 
· there were many quotations. Here again, facts were distorted or misinter-
preted to place Roosevelt in tae most favorable light possible. 
Finally, I read three books that dealt 1ri. t11 particular phases of 
Theodore Roosevelt's history. Harold ~. Josnell did a competent piece on 
Boss Platt and ]is Jew York, ~ Study of the ?oli tical Leadership of Thomas 
£· Platt, Tneodore Roosevelt and Others, the University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1924. It was especially helpful in studying tae topic of political 
reform. For noosevelt 1 s labor record, particularly as an Assemblyman and as 
Governor of Ne'l'r York, IIoward Lawrence Hurwitz, Theodore Roosevelt and Labor 
in New York State, 1880-1900, Solumbia University Press, New York, 1943, was 
excellent. It was copiously foot-noted, almost entirely from source materi 
It also was compa:.~atively free from bias. The last book is Theodore 
Roosevelt and the Progressive ~~ovement by George 3. r,;owry, University of 
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'Hisconsin Press, Eadison, Wisconsin, 1946. It is well foot-noted from 
manuscript sources and current periodicals. Chapter One seemed vreak but 
the rest was commendable. It was objective and treated tne subject quite 
comprehensively althoug11 it concerned itself ci1iefly wi t~1 the period after 
1909. 
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